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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
On August 6th, 1945 the US dropped the first of two atomic bombs on 
Japan, a decision that effectively terminated the Second World War.  During the 
four months that followed former President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s death in 
April of 1945, President Harry S. Truman and his closest adviser, Secretary of 
State James F. Byrnes, engaged in an analysis of the available intelligence in the 
hopes of determining whether the atomic bomb could feasibly end the war in 
Japan. The analyses of Truman and Byrnes were based primarily on information 
obtained from the scientists who designed the bomb, members of the Interim 
Committee that studied the question of the bomb’s use, and the reflections of 
various diplomats and ambassadors with intimate knowledge of Japanese 
culture and intentions. By and large, Truman’s senior advisers and the atomic 
scientists, with the exception of Byrnes, assessed that the bomb’s use would not 
be necessary to end the fighting in Japan.  Instead, they calculated that altering 
the terms of surrender to include a stipulation allowing the Emperor to retain 
his throne would also stop the fighting.  In spite of this analysis, Truman and 
Byrnes made the assessment that ending the war in Japan was contingent upon 
the successful deployment of the atomic bomb over the Japanese homeland.   
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Almost a year and a half later, on March 12th 1947, President Truman 
delivered the “Truman Doctrine” to Congress, emphasizing the urgent need for 
economic aid to protect Greece and Turkey from the “totalitarian” advances of 
the Soviets.  The Truman Doctrine, though hastily produced subsequent to 
Britain’s withdrawal of financial support to Greece and Turkey on February 21st 
1947, was the product of almost a year and a half of debate and speculation 
amongst Truman and his advisers.  Ultimately, Truman’s speech was effective, 
and two months later on May 15th Congress approved a bill that appropriated 
aid to both Greece and Turkey.   
Three months later on June 5th, 1947, Secretary of State George 
Marshall stood in front of a crowd of thousands at Harvard’s annual 
commencement ceremony elucidating his vision for a “comprehensive” aid 
program to Europe, a program that would later become known as the Marshall 
Plan. This plan dictated that the Europeans would assume the “initiative” and 
responsibility for planning the aid program.  Over the next four months 
Marshall and his advisers would remain at arm’s length, merely observing and 
offering limited advice to the European planning Commission as the European 
nations worked together to devise a comprehensive program of aid. However, 
in September 1947, Marshall suddenly altered the policy of minimal US 
engagement in the planning stages.  Specifically, he advised the US delegates to 
wrest some of the “planning initiative” from the Europeans in order to facilitate 
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the formulation of a recovery plan that would be workable and acceptable to 
the US Congress and public.  
 Rationality and Foreign Policy Making  
 As a thorough analysis of the above case studies reveals, rational 
decision-making is frequently an elusive and intangible goal.  Most individuals 
do not have the cognitive ability to make rational decisions, especially when 
faced with obstacles such as time constraints, emergent political and military 
disasters, and conflicting belief systems.  In essence, everyday pressures and the 
hectic nature of the decision-making environment limit rationality.  
The purpose of studying the Truman administration’s approach to 
foreign policy decision-making in the aforementioned case studies is threefold.  
On the first and most general level, foreign policy decisions are worthy of 
analysis when another set of decision makers, faced with the same situation and 
given access to identical intelligence, would have chosen a different policy 
alternative.1  For example, after the attacks on Pearl Harbor President 
Roosevelt’s only feasible policy alternative was to enter World War II.  It is safe 
to say that any other set of decision makers would have made a similar 
assessment in that situation, calculating that any action short of a declaration of 
war would have signaled the US’s weakness to vital actors in the international 
arena.  However, in the cases I will be analyzing, including the decision to drop 
                                                 
1 Alex Roberto Hybel and Justin Matthew Kaufman. The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein: Deciding on 
Conflict, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 3.   
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the atomic bomb, design the Truman Doctrine, and formulate the Marshall 
Plan, alternative courses of action were available and could have very well been 
chosen by another set of decision makers.   
 The more specific purpose of the study is to identify if, and how, 
Truman and his advisers deviated from the “ideal rational choice model” when 
they made the decisions to drop the atomic bomb, deliver the Truman 
Doctrine, and formulate the Marshall Plan.  In pursuit of this goal I set forth a 
series of inter-related questions in order to elucidate if, how, why and when 
deviation from the rational process occurred.  For each case study I address and 
answer the following questions:   
 
1) What role, if any, did President Roosevelt’s foreign policy legacy play in 
shaping Truman and his administration’s decisions in each case?  
  
2) What was the role of Truman’s advisers in the decision-making process?  
How did they present information to Truman?   
 
3) Did Truman and his advisers engage in a thorough analysis of 
alternatives to their chosen course of action? Were they cognizant of 
the risks and problems associated with their preferred policy 
alternatives?  
 7 
 
 
 
4) How did aspects of Truman and his advisers’ personalities and belief 
systems affect the decision-making process?  
 
Initially, I hoped to be able to discern and apply a comprehensive 
theory of decision-making, which would explain the actions of the lead decision 
makers in all three case studies.  However, this final goal was not fully realized, 
given the fluctuating membership of the decision-making group.  Moreover, it 
was further impaired by the virtual disappearance of President Truman from 
the decision-making apparatus, especially in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall 
Plan Cases.   
As I continued to analyze Truman’s decision-making process, taking 
note of Truman’s withdrawal from the decision-making body, I began to ask 
myself, are decision-making processes really static? In laymen’s terms, do 
decision makers learn from their previous foreign policy blunders and 
successes? Thus, the second purpose of this study soon became to map out and 
then analyze the evolution of President Harry S. Truman’s decisions in the hope 
of ascertaining if and how Truman’s experiences as president altered his 
decision-making process.  Specifically this study asks, and tries to answer the 
question: Does experience change how presidents choose their advisers and 
interact with their core decision-making body?  Likewise, does gaining valuable 
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decision-making experience foster the development of rationality, or is the 
decision maker a perpetual victim of the same cognitive impediments to 
rationality?    
Theoretical Framework: Theories of Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
In order to effectively answer the aforementioned questions a working 
knowledge of the alternate theories of foreign policy decision-making is 
necessary.  The theories to be presented strive to explain how rationality in 
foreign policy-making is often impeded by the actions and conceptions of the 
individual decision maker and the entire decision-making body.  
The earliest studies of the dynamics of decision-making were based on 
microeconomic models. They assumed that decision makers were rational when 
identifying and defining problems and assessing the costs and benefits of 
various alternatives.  The authors of these studies assumed that decision makers 
did not allow their own personal biases, or previous experiences to dictate their 
decisions. 2  Moreover, these early scholars emphasized that the rational 
decision-making was a multi-step and multifaceted operation.  
For decision-makers to be rational they have to perform a series of 
inter-related and simultaneous tasks.  First, the decision-maker has to be able to 
define the problem, and determine how, if at all, the problem impacts the 
interested parties. To perform the first function, the rational decision-maker 
                                                 
2 Hybel and Kaufman, 9-10 
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must have access to reliable information, while concurrently remaining 
cognizant of her own personal interests.  Second, the decision-maker must have 
a series of isolated goals, which are ranked in order from most to least 
important.  The next step in this rational calculus is to formulate viable policy 
alternatives, weigh the costs and benefits of these alternatives against each 
other, and then select that policy alternative that is not only most likely to 
succeed, but also maximizes the identified goals.  This entire process is often 
complicated by the fact that decisions are made over an extended period.  Thus, 
the rational decision-maker must be able to constantly re-evaluate the problem, 
and adjust their conceptions to fluctuating circumstances. 3 
After attempting to explicate a variety of foreign policy decisions using 
the rational choice model, a number of scholars of decision-making argued that 
the model was an ideal to aspire to, not an attainable reality.  Following this 
contention, a new generation of scholars derived a series of explanatory theories 
that sought to identify and explain the “hurdles to rationality” faced by both 
individual decision-makers and groups.  
One group of scholars began by focusing on the impediments or 
“hurdles to rationality” faced by the president’s primary decision-making body.  
Typically, a president’s decision-making body consists of advisers whom the 
president has handpicked to keep him informed about all matters of foreign 
                                                 
3 Hybel and Kaufman, 10-11 
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and domestic policy, assess troublesome situations, and help him form coherent 
and well thought out policy alternatives.  Thus the president’s decision-making 
process is to a significant extent dictated by the quality, openness and 
competence of his most trusted advisers.  
Under specific circumstances the functioning of this decision-making 
group can be paralyzed by a phenomenon known as groupthink.  Scholars have 
defined groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are 
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members striving for 
unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses 
of action.”4  In short, a decision-making body pervaded by groupthink will 
often formulate, favor and reject alternatives based on the personal biases of 
the dominant decision-makers.  Likewise, the presence of groupthink tends to 
stifle dissent against the dominant decision makers’ “favored” plan. In the end, 
groupthink causes decision-makers to “ignore the risks behind their preferred 
choice, fail to reappraise alternatives and neglect to work out a contingency 
plan.”5 
 Individual decision-makers are also confronted by impediments to 
rationality.  One group of theorists argues that individual decision-makers are 
limited by the variables of time and energy.  Given these limitations, the 
decision-maker cannot possibly absorb all the information needed to make a 
                                                 
4 Hybel and Kaufman, 13; see also Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 9.   
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perfectly rational decision.  As a result of these limitations, schema theorists 
purport that decision-makers utilize familiar analogies to ascertain the 
significance and scope of a new and unfamiliar problem.  By using a familiar 
analogy the decision-maker drastically reduces the amount of time and energy 
spent on defining the problem and producing viable alternatives.  The decision-
maker, operating in the framework of a familiar problem set, will attempt to 
solve the new problem with the same “standard operating procedures” utilized 
in the earlier case.  This method of reasoning, though sometimes successful, can 
backfire if the new problem is not entirely analogous to the old one, thus 
necessitating the employment of a different set of standard operating 
procedures.  
Alternately, other theorists explain the actions of decision-makers by 
asserting that all human beings have a set of core beliefs and values that they 
utilize to order the seemingly random world around them.  Essentially, “human 
beings…are driven to shape an unwieldy, contradictory world into a coherent 
ideological construct that simplifies the nature of problems and gives concrete 
meaning and explanation to seemingly random stimuli…”6 As a result, decision-
makers unconsciously attempt to keep their core beliefs and values consistent 
when they define a problem and derive possible policy alternatives. 
                                                                                                                             
5 Hybel and Kaufman, 13 
6 Hybel and Kaufman, 14 
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Recent theorists have approached the study of cognitive impediments 
to rationality with a more comprehensive set of theories.  The starting point for 
these theorists was the classic “compensatory” theory of decision-making.  
Much like the rational choice theorists, compensatory theorists argue that when 
decision-makers derive policy alternatives, they give values to each of the 
alternatives dimensions, and then choose the alternative whose overall score is 
the highest.  Examples of dimensions that a decision maker may consider 
include the political or military benefits of an alternative.  Thus, “a particular 
alternative—for example the use of force—may score low on the political 
dimension…but such an alternative could be adopted if it scored high on the 
military dimension.” 
More recent research indicates that decision-makers do not engage in a 
compensatory process.  Instead, decision-makers are more likely to perform 
what has become known as a non-compensatory process.  Essentially, non-
compensatory theorists postulate that “foreign policymakers, instead of 
comparing both the positive and negative aspects of a number of viable 
options, stress the positive factor of its favored policy and the negative 
elements of other alternatives.” 7 In essence, decision-makers systematically 
negate viable alternatives while simultaneously supporting their preferred 
courses of action. 
                                                 
7 Hybel and Kaufman, 15; See also Alex Mintz, “The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory 
of Decision-making,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 37, no. 4, (December 1993), 598.  
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Structure of the Study 
In order to achieve the aforementioned goals, I have divided this study 
into eight separate chapters.  In the first chapter I briefly introduce the three 
cases, define the purposes of the study and then give a brief explanation of the 
most relevant foreign policy decision-making theories.  
In chapters two and three I examine the Truman administration’s 
decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan.  Specifically, in chapter two I give 
a detailed account of the information and intelligence available to Truman and 
his advisers regarding the destructive power of the bomb, its probable effect on 
the international balance of power, the intentions of the Japanese, and the 
bomb’s relevance to relations with the Soviet Union.  The analysis of this 
account, which appears in chapter three, reveals that Truman’s Secretary of 
State James F. Byrnes dominated the decision-making apparatus in both the 
individual and group settings. Ultimately, Byrnes’ dominance made Truman 
virtually impervious to the chorus of advisers and atomic scientists who were 
against utilizing the atomic bomb on Japan.  
I discuss the decision to formulate the Truman Doctrine in chapters 
four and five.  In chapter four I present a thorough analysis of the intelligence 
that Truman and his top advisers received with regards to Soviet or 
“totalitarian” subjugation in Greece and Turkey.  In particular, I focus on the 
reports and assessments of the American ambassadors to Greece and Turkey, 
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both of whom emphasize the deteriorating economic and political 
environments in their respective host countries.  Then, in chapter five I analyze 
the decision to provide aid to Greece and Turkey, and to do so in such a public 
statement in front of Congress.  I contend that the aid program, though 
warranted given the dire economic positions of these countries, was not devised 
through an entirely rational process.  Specifically, Truman and Byrnes, though 
cognizant of the impending economic collapse as early as 1946, were not 
proactive in mitigating it, given their rigid adherence to the policies of their 
predecessor, former president Franklin D. Roosevelt.  However, I argue that 
rationality was not totally absent from the process, given Undersecretary of 
State Dean Acheson’s ability to systematically assess the alternatives to, and 
risks associated with his preferred policy.  
Throughout chapters six and seven I analyze the Marshall Plan decision.  
Chapter six describes the decision-making process of the plan’s chief 
formulator, Secretary of State George Marshall.  It is divided into three sections, 
which is indicative of the three disparate planning stages.  In the first section, I 
describe how Marshall and the administration originally defined the problem, 
and drafted the speech presenting the plan and its rationale.  In the second part, 
I summarize the difficulties that the Europeans encountered at the planning 
conference for European Recovery in Paris, during the summer of 1947.  The 
final section highlights the importance of the American diplomat’s analyses of 
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the results of the Paris conference, analyses that ultimately spearheaded 
Marshall’s decision to give some of the planning initiative back to the US.   
In chapter seven I analyze and discuss how Marshall made the decisions 
to publicly proclaim at Harvard his support for a comprehensive European 
recovery program, give most of the initiative for its planning to the European’s 
and then later revoke that initiative and assign it to the US delegates in Paris.  
My analysis reveals that Marshall was able to do what few decision-makers do.  
That is, he carefully and methodically assessed both the risks and benefits of 
alternative policies while simultaneously weighing the advice of all of his 
advisers.  More importantly, however, Marshall was able to revisit and reassess 
the problem and reorient his plan when his advisers ascertained that a program 
based on “European Initiative” would not engender the results hoped.   
Finally, in chapter eight, I track the changes in Truman’s decision-
making process, using the three separate cases and analyses to come to specific 
conclusions about Truman’s individual evolution as a decision-maker.  
Specifically, I highlight how Truman’s involvement in the main decision-making 
environment diminished substantially from the first to the final case, to the 
point where Truman was barely, if at all, involved with the Marshall Plan 
decision.  Concurrently, I point out how the quality and “rationality” of 
Truman’s closest advisers improved markedly with each successive decision, 
thus facilitating the formulation of carefully designed foreign policies.    
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CHAPTER II 
Dropping the Bomb 
 
Introduction 
During April, 1945, things were going well for Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
administration and the US. The economy was booming, and most importantly, 
the Second World War, which had been raging for almost four years, was 
coming to a close in Europe. Roosevelt and his administration predicted that 
soon Germany would have to surrender unconditionally.8 Additionally, relations 
amongst the members of the Allied forces, though slightly strained between the 
US and Soviet Union because of disagreements over the post-war status of 
Poland, were relatively stable.  This relative stability allowed the Allied forces, 
with the US at the forefront of the operation, to begin to refocus their energies 
on quickly ending the long and drawn out conflict in Japan. In fact, Roosevelt 
was particularly confident in the abilities of the Allied powers to put an end to 
the fighting in Japan, given the ongoing development of a new weapon that 
would, according to Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, “be the 
most terrible weapon ever known in human history... [and] could destroy a 
whole city.”9    
                                                 
8 Martin J. Sherwin.  The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic-Energy Policy and 
Diplomacy, 1941-1945.  The American Historical Review, Vol. 78, No.4. (Oct., 1973), 945-968.  
9 Barton J. Bernstein.  “Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation.” Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol.90, No.1. (Spring, 1975), 36. 
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During his tenure as president Roosevelt had formed a relatively 
coherent set of policies in pursuit of victory in Germany and Japan.  In 1941, 
Roosevelt, in conjunction with Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
initiated a top-secret project, code named the Manhattan Project.  The 
Manhattan Project, known previously as S-1, was directed by General Leslie 
Groves and sought to harness the power of the atom to create a weapon that if 
utilized would end the war on the European and\or Japanese fronts.  From the 
beginning of the project Roosevelt, his policy makers and his advisers assumed 
that the weapon, if it could be developed, would be used to defeat Germany 
and Japan. Thus, by 1943, the bomb was viewed by Roosevelt and Churchill as 
an essential diplomatic tool, which could be used “to shape his post war 
policies.”10   
From the project’s earliest phases, Roosevelt understood the 
importance of creating policies to govern this new technology.  The first policy 
that Roosevelt considered, which was supported by the scientists working on 
the project, involved placing international controls on atomic energy. From the 
outset of the project scientists like Niels Bohr literally pleaded with Roosevelt 
to consider the international and long-term effects of using the new weapon.  
He pointed out that after the atomic weapon was used the world system would 
be drastically altered. Further, Bohr predicted that if Roosevelt informed the 
                                                 
10 Martin J. Sherwin, 946. 
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Soviets of the atomic weapon before it was utilized then the world system, post 
drop, would be regulated by some international atomic commission, and thus, a 
nuclear arms race could be avoided.  Alternately, Bohr believed that a nuclear 
arms race would ensue if the weapon was used without Soviet notification, and 
“that post war Soviet-American relations would be hopelessly embittered.”11   
On the other hand, Churchill was in favor of an Anglo-American 
monopoly of atomic power, which would be used to counter the post-war 
ambitions of other states.  Roosevelt, a clear proponent of “Big Power 
Domination” was inclined to agree with Churchill’s position.  Ultimately, by 
September, 1944 Roosevelt solidified his commitment to Churchill’s policy with 
the Hyde Park Agreement.  Essentially, Hyde Park indicated the US and 
Britain’s refusal to proactively establish international controls on atomic energy; 
it established a collaborative effort between the US and Britain to control 
atomic energy even after the defeat of the Japanese; and it pledged to use the 
bomb against Japan in order to achieve a decisive victory in the Pacific.12 Most 
importantly, the agreement excluded the Soviets from obtaining any intelligence 
about the bomb until a much later date.   
By April, 1945, the project to construct an atomic bomb was almost 
complete and had progressed to the point where the use of bomb was 
perceived as forthcoming.  During the last months of his life Roosevelt 
                                                 
11 Barton J. Bernstein, 27-28. 
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expressed his desire to use the weapon against Japan, stating that “It might 
perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should 
be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender.”13    
However, Roosevelt left very few written clues as to his exact intentions 
and often neglected to inform his closest advisers of his thought process.   At 
points, Roosevelt was so secretive about the project that even his closest 
advisers were unaware of the discussions and agreements he made with 
Churchill, including Hyde Park.14 Roosevelt’s  secrecy and lack of a mapped out 
path with regard to atomic energy would inevitably come back to haunt 
members of Roosevelt’s administration when on April 12th, 1945, the 
unthinkable happened; President Roosevelt suddenly collapsed, dead on the 
spot form a cerebral hemorrhage.   
Changing of the Guards: Harry S. Truman Assumes the 
Presidency 
The death of Roosevelt after 12 years in the White House came as a 
complete shock to both the American public and government. The unexpected 
nature of Roosevelt’s death meant that Vice President Harry S. Truman had not 
been prepared for his duties as president.15 In fact, Roosevelt had never shared 
                                                                                                                             
12 Martin J. Sherwin, 959. 
13 David McCullough.  Truman. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 379. 
14 Martin J. Sherwin, 960. 
15 David McCullough, 345.  
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information concerning foreign policy and top secret projects with some of his 
closest advisers, let alone his Vice President. Thus, Truman, an inexperienced 
politician when it came to matters of foreign policy, was thrust into a political 
environment that would have intimidated even the most experienced politician. 
Within hours of assuming his new role as president Truman was barraged with 
a myriad of classified information concerning his upcoming duties as 
Commander and Chief.  Included in these briefings was intelligence concerning 
the top-secret Manhattan Project, or the project to create the first atomic bomb. 
The sheer momentum of the events leading up to the use of the atomic 
bomb was exhausting for Truman and all the members of the administration. In 
reality, the decision to drop the bomb was made in less than four months from 
the day that Truman was actually informed of the project.  Records indicate that 
when Truman made his first address to Congress, on April 16th, just four days 
after Roosevelt’s death, Truman was not fully aware of the enormity of the 
project. Still, in his address to Congress Truman pledged to carry on the policies 
of his predecessor, including policies mandating unconditional surrender from 
the German’s and the Japanese. Truman emphasized that “Our demand has 
been and it remains—unconditional surrender.  We will not traffic with the 
breakers of the peace on the terms of peace.”16    
 
                                                 
16 Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf), 39. 
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Trouble with the Soviets 
One of Truman’s immediate tasks was to maintain peaceful relations 
with the Soviets.  Beginning April 25th, the US hosted a United Nations (UN) 
conference in San Francisco. An April 2nd memo to Roosevelt (later provided to 
Truman) from the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union William Harriman, took 
note of the rift that had already begun to form between the US and the Soviets.  
Harriman was particularly concerned about this rift, as he estimated that 
“Russia will emerge from the present conflict as by far the strongest nation in 
Europe and Asia…in the easily foreseeable future Russia may well outrank the 
United States.”17  
On April 23rd the Soviet Ambassador to the US, V. Molotov, stopped in 
Washington D.C. to have a private discussion with Truman. Prior to the 
meeting Stimson informed Truman that it would be beneficial to take a hard-
line with Soviets.18  Truman, unaccustomed to dealing with the Soviets, or any 
foreign diplomat for that matter, was “anxious to appear decisive,” and in 
control of the situation.19  Ultimately, Truman’s “decisiveness” came off as 
rudeness, and only widened the gap between the US and Soviet interests.  
Despite the tensions produced by Truman’s meeting with Molotov a 
breakthrough in Soviet-US relations occurred.  On April 24th, the Soviets 
                                                 
17 David McCullough, 372. 
18 Martin Sherwin, 962. 
19 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Volume One, Years of Decisions, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), 243. 
 22 
 
 
informed Japan they would not renew their Neutrality Pact.20 This move was 
significant as it signaled the Soviets recommitment to aid the US in a 
conventional invasion of the Japanese homeland.  As early as April 15th the 
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had stated his intention to aid the US in a military 
campaign in Japan approximately three months after victory in Europe was 
achieved. 
However, American officials, such as the Joint Staff Planners were not 
sure how they felt about allowing the Soviets to enter the war.  In fact, the Joint 
Staff Planners cautioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “If Russia enters the war, 
her forces will probably be the first into Manchuria…This will raise the 
question of introducing at least token U.S. forces in Asia.”21  Thus, Soviet aid in 
Japan, though beneficial as far as casualties were concerned, might result in the 
Soviets gaining territory in Asia, and thus the deployment of additional US 
forces to that region as well.  
Truman Tackles Foreign Policy  
Meanwhile, Truman was attempting to become knowledgeable about 
the intricacies of US domestic and foreign policy.  On April 23rd, James Byrnes, 
Truman’s future Secretary of State, gave Truman a brief introduction to the 
atomic bomb, noting that the possession and possible use of such a powerful 
weapon would put the US in a position to dictate its own terms at the end of 
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the war. 22 Just two days later, on April 25th, Stimson, accompanied by Groves, 
met with Truman and presented him with a memo about the atomic bomb. 
Stimson’s memo highlighted that “Within four months we shall, in all 
probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human 
history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.”23  Henceforth, the 
primary purpose of the meeting was to brief Truman on the problems 
associated with the creation of the bomb, including: a potential arms race, the 
need to establish international controls, and the possibility of an atomic war.24  
Stimson explained that the bomb would not only change the nature of 
civilization, but the way in which wars were conducted. However, Stimson 
insisted that the use of the atomic bomb would bring the campaign in the 
Pacific to a swift conclusion with fewer US casualties.  
During the briefing Truman inquired as to what Roosevelt had thought 
about using the bomb to end the war in Japan.  At the time Roosevelt’s only 
available commentary regarding the bombs use on Japan was recorded in the 
Hyde Park agreement. The agreement merely expressed Roosevelt’s desire to 
utilize the weapon to draw the war to its conclusion.  At the culmination of the 
meeting Stimson suggested that an Interim Committee be assembled to 
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consider the possible “implications of this new force.”25  The committee would 
be responsible for: 
Recommending action to the Executive and Legislative branches of    
      our government when secrecy is no longer in full effect. The          
      committee would also recommend the actions to be taken by the War   
      Department prior to that time in anticipation of the postwar          
      problems.26 
 
By May 1st, Truman had already approved the creation of the Interim 
Committee, and Stimson began to handpick its members.  
Events in early May confirmed that Japan was becoming concerned 
about the burgeoning US-Soviet alliance. As early as May 2nd the US intercepted 
sets of communiqués from the Japanese Army Vice Chief of Staff Kawabe to 
his military attaches in Sweden and Portugal.  The communiqués revealed 
Japan’s unease about the possible effects that Soviet entry into the war would 
have on Japan’s forces. In one particular communiqué, which was made 
available to Truman and his advisers,  Kawabe stated that “Russia’s anti-
Japanese attitude has clearly become more vigorous since her recent action with 
respect to the Neutrality Pact…we must view with alarm the possibility of 
future military activity against Japan.”27  
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A Shift in Concentration 
The May 8th, 1945 Allied victory on the European front allowed for a 
rapid shift in concentration to the war still raging in Japan.  Truman’s first act 
following the German’s surrender was to deliver a speech clarifying the terms 
of ‘unconditional surrender’ for the Japanese.  In his speech, Truman expressed:  
Just what does unconditional surrender of the armed forces mean for   
      the Japanese people? It means the end of the war. It means the        
      termination of the influence of the military leaders who have brought   
      Japan to the present brink of disaster…Unconditional surrender does   
      not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people.28   
 
Truman’s speech was of particular importance to members of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) and military leaders who believed that clarifying 
the meaning of “unconditional surrender” could elicit an earlier surrender from 
Japan.   The JIC was not the only party concerned about the use of the term 
“unconditional surrender.”  In fact, on May 12th Truman received a memo from 
OSS Chief William J. Donovan advising that the terms of surrender should be 
modified to assure the retention of Japan’s sacred Imperial Institution. 
Donovan wrote:  
One of the few provisions the Japanese would insist upon would be    
      the retention of the Emperor as the only safeguard against Japan’s     
      conversion to Communism… Undersecretary of State Grew…the best  
      US authority on Japan, shares this opinion.29   
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With the conflict on the European front resolved, Stimson and Truman 
could now refocus their energies on reviewing plans to bring the campaign in 
the Pacific to a close.  Stimson, in a May 16th meeting with Truman and the 
Joint Chiefs continuously emphasized “the need for speed in the Pacific.” At 
this point, the atomic bomb was not yet finished, thus necessitating the 
formulation of alternate plans.  By May the Joint Chiefs had already drawn up 
an invasion plan for Japan, which they viewed as “adequate for the defeat of 
Japan without such a sacrifice of American lives…”30  The military plans for 
invasion, known as “Operation Olympic” called for a two phase invasion.  The 
first phase would take place on November 1st, 1945 and would consist of an 
amphibious landing on the shores of Kyushu by the 6th Army under General 
Walter Krueger.  Four months later a second, larger invasion would be 
launched on the Kanto Plains near Tokyo.  The Generals estimated that they 
could “bring Japan to her knees” by late fall.31 
Records indicate that many of the Generals held onto the hope that the 
casualties resulting from this invasion might be low, and that the battle would 
be short.  An April 29th memo issued by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the catalyst for such hope.  The memo 
emphasized that increasing: 
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 Numbers of informed Japanese, both military and civilian, already     
       realize the inevitability of absolute defeat…the collapse of Germany   
      (with its implications regarding redeployment) should make this       
       realization widespread within the  year…The entry of the U.S.S.R     
       into the war would, together with the foregoing factors, convince     
       most Japanese at once of the inevitability of complete defeat.32   
 
After reading this memo, the Generals hoped that the Japanese, facing 
mounting pressures from all sides, would surrender in an expedient manner.    
The Interim Committee is Assembled 
Another matter of importance during this time period was the 
establishment of Stimson’s Interim Committee, which would meet and discuss 
issues related to the use and future of atomic power.  The Committee was 
chaired by Stimson and consisted of prominent members of the political, 
scientific and military communities.  Members included Stimson’s assistant 
George Harrison, the Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton and the 
Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph Bard. James Byrnes, though still a private 
citizen, was appointed by Truman to be Truman’s personal representative on 
the committee. Essentially, Byrnes was chosen “by the president to make a 
study of this project on which some 2 billion dollars had already been 
spent…Byrnes, seemed to be favorably impressed with the possibilities of this 
new explosive.”33  The Committee also included prominent scientists who had 
worked on the bomb’s development such as: Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman, 
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National Defense Research Committee; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of 
Scientific Research and Development; Dr. Karl Compton, Chief, Office of 
Field Service and Office of Scientific Research and Development; and Dr. 
Robert Oppenheimer, the head of the atomic lab in Los Alamos. General 
Groves and the US Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall were not 
permanent members, but attended many of the Committee’s meetings.34  
The purpose and scope of the Interim Committee’s work has been 
contested over the years. Originally, scholars and historians believed that the 
Interim Committee was established as a forum to discuss whether or not the 
bomb should be used on Japan.  However, access to secret documents revealed 
that there was not a significant exploration of that topic.  In reality, the 
Committee was established to consider the implications that would arise when 
the weapon was used.  Still, the Committee did engage in occasional discussions 
regarding alternatives to direct atomic use.  At the May 9th meeting, Stimson 
outlined the objectives of the Committee:  
 Appointed by the secretary with the approval of the president, the    
      Committee was established to study and report on the entire problem   
      of temporary war-time controls and later publicity, and to survey and   
      make recommendations on post- war research, development, and      
      control, and on legislation necessary for these purposes.”35   
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Many members of the Committee, including Groves confirm this 
analysis, asserting that the “story of the Interim Committee having any 
influence on the decision to use the atomic bomb…is just plain bunk.”  Bard 
and the other members of the Committee had a similar “impression that the 
Committee approved a decision that had already been made.”36   That is, the 
Interim Committee, though free to make suggestions about how to use the 
bombs, acted under the assumption that the bomb would be used.   
The Soviet Problem 
In early May Truman’s administration was still exploring alternatives to 
the atomic bomb, which might cause Japan to surrender.  On May 10th and 12th 
Truman’s administrators considered the prospect of a joint US-Soviet invasion 
of Japan.  At a meeting of the top Navy officials Harriman made it clear that he 
thought pursuing Soviet aid in the fight against Japan might mean the collapse 
of China into the Soviet’s Communist sphere of influence.  Harriman assessed 
that “Russian influence would move in quickly and toward ultimate 
domination…the two or three hundred millions in that country would march 
when the Kremlin ordered.”37   
Meanwhile, the Interim Committee was still discussing the atomic 
bomb. The Interim Committee’s second meeting on May 14th progressed 
similarly to the first, with the discussion focused on the prospects of developing 
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an international control system for atomic power. Despite the narrowness of 
the Committee’s stated objectives, it did briefly address the subject of Soviet 
entry into the war.  In a separate meeting with Marshall, Stimson would convey 
that that the atomic bomb might be a solution for the US’s diplomatic 
problems with the Soviets.  Stimson recorded:  
The time now and the method now to deal with Russia was to keep    
      our mouths  shut and let our actions speak for words.  The Russians    
      will understand them better than anything else.  It is a case where we   
      have got to regain the lead and perhaps do it in a pretty rough and      
      realistic way.38  
 
Stimson recognized that the bomb would be instrumental in obtaining 
two inter-related goals: controlling Soviet behavior in Poland and Manchuria, 
and maintaining US dominance in the post-war international system.     
Discussions surrounding the Soviets continued on May 15th in a 
Committee consisting of Stimson, Grew, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, 
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Harriman, and Major Mathias 
Correa Special Assistant to the Sec. of the Navy.  Throughout the meeting 
Stimson expressed his concern about the Soviets.  He was particularly troubled 
by the fact that Truman was scheduled to meet in Potsdam with the “Big 
Three,” (Truman, Stalin and Churchill) as early as July 1st to discuss important 
issues such the political future of Europe, and the occupation of Germany.   
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Essentially, Stimson ascertained that the successful test of the atomic bomb 
would be a valuable asset in the manipulation of the Soviets at Potsdam.  For 
Stimson it seemed to be “a terrible thing to gamble with such big stakes in 
diplomacy without having your master card in your hand.”39  The only solution 
that Stimson could muster was convincing Harriman to delay his trip back to 
the Soviet Union until some other plan was worked out.   
Second Thoughts: Politicians, Scientists and the Atomic Bomb 
While the Interim Committee was discussing the future implications of 
atomic power, the scientists who had worked on the project were having 
second thoughts.  Particularly, O.C. Brewster, a scientist who had worked on 
the isotope separation project was having reservations about using the bomb 
and chose to voice his concerns in a May 24th letter to Stimson. Brewster 
believed that “the idea of the destruction of civilization” by the atomic bomb 
was “not melodramatic hysteria or crackpot raving.  It is a very real, and I 
submit, almost inevitable result.”40   Essentially, Brewster advised that the 
atomic project be abandoned. If this was not possible, he recommended the 
demonstration of one bomb on Japan to elicit surrender, and then the cessation 
of all production of nuclear material.  Brewster related that “As horrible as it 
may seem.  I know it would be better to take greater casualties now in the 
conquering of Japan then to bring upon the tragedy of unrestrained, 
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competitive production of this material.” 41  After receiving the document, 
Stimson promptly forwarded it to Marshall, requesting that he review the 
document before the Interim Committee meeting on May 31st.    
Truman remained busy during the month of May, meeting with various 
government officials in an attempt to develop a coherent strategy to end the 
war in the Pacific.  On May 28th Truman met with former president Herbert 
Hoover to discuss the end of the war in Japan.  The meeting, though not 
officially recorded, produced a memo that was widely circulated among 
Truman’s administrators and advisers. In the memo Hoover insisted that Japan 
could be convinced to surrender without using the atomic bomb. According to 
Hoover, Japan’s surrender was imminent because of a few inter-related factors: 
The appointment of a former anti-militarist Prime Minister, Suzuki; Japan’s 
desire to preserve Mikado as the spiritual head of the nation; the fear of 
complete destruction; and the large middle class in Japan, who are liberal-
minded and exert pressure to form a stable government. 42     
Later that afternoon Truman would have a similar discussion with 
Grew.  Grew, a man known for his long and dedicated service to as an 
ambassador to Japan for 10 years was knowledgeable about their government 
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and culture. 43  During the meeting Grew advised Truman to abandon 
Roosevelt’s policy of unconditional surrender in Japan by allowing the emperor 
to retain his status as head of state. Grew pointed out that: 
…the Japanese are a fanatical people and are capable of fighting to     
      the last ditch and the last man. If they do this, the cost in American    
      lives will be unpredictable. The greatest obstacle to unconditional      
      surrender by the Japanese is their belief  that this would entail the      
      destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution   
      of the Throne.  If some indication can now be given the Japanese that  
      they themselves…will be permitted to determine their own future      
      political structure, they will be afforded a method of saving face       
      without which surrender will be highly unlikely.44  
 
Truman, after listening to Grew requested that he draft a formal memo 
on the subject and then arrange for a meeting with the Secretaries of War, 
Navy, and General Marshall. Grew, later reflecting on this meeting, would leave 
with the general impression that Truman agreed with his assessment and 
suggestions.45     
Politicians, former scientists and military advisers were not the only 
ones reformulating many of their conceptions. On May 28th three of the 
scientists from Chicago’s Metallurgical Lab traveled to Washington to meet 
with Truman.  Leo Szilard, one of the primary precipitators of this meeting, had 
been concerned about the implications of developing an atomic weapon for 
some time.  Initially, Szilard had scheduled a meeting to speak with Roosevelt 
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about his concerns, as he believed that the use of “the atomic bomb would 
precipitate a race in the production of these devices between the United States 
and Russia.”46  Szilard felt strongly that the future of US and Soviet relations 
would be marred by the use of such a weapon.  He predicted that the 
continuation of the war in Japan was far less threatening than the possibility of 
a breakdown in relations between the US and the Soviets.  
For Szilard and his colleagues, meeting directly with Truman to discuss 
their concerns was their number one priority.  Yet, when they arrived in D.C. 
they were redirected to South Carolina, where they met with James Byrnes, then 
a mere private citizen. At their meeting with Byrnes, Szilard voiced his 
objections to using the bomb against Japan without prior warning.  Szilard 
related that “the psychological advantages of avoiding the use of the bombs 
against Japan and, instead, of staging a demonstration of the atomic bombs,” 
would be a better alternative to the unquestioned and unregulated direct use of 
the bomb.47  A demonstration, insisted Szilard, might enable the US to avoid a 
catastrophic collision between US and Soviet interests and the precipitation of a 
nuclear arms race..48   
Byrnes, citing two rationales, refuted Szilard’s suggestions.  First, he 
stated that the sheer expense of the project warranted that the weapon be used 
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in a combat setting.  He reasoned that if the bomb was not utilized, then 
procuring money for future atomic research would be impossible.  Also, Byrnes 
strongly believed that the US’s possession of atomic energy would not damage 
relations with the Soviets.  On the contrary, Byrnes asserted that “American 
possession of enormously destructive weapons would make the Soviets more 
cooperative in the disputes about Poland and Eastern Europe 
The following day, on May 29th, a group of high level officials met to 
discuss Grew’s May 28th proposal to alter the surrender terms for Japan.  The 
group consisted of Grew, Stimson, Forrestal, McCloy, General Marshall, 
Director of OWI Elmer Davis, Counsel to the President, Judge Samuel 
Rosenmann, and Eugene Dooman from the Department of State. By the 
meetings culmination those in attendance agreed that such an alteration to the 
terms of surrender should occur, but not immediately.  Stimson captured this 
sentiment, noting: 
 I told him (Grew) that I was inclined to agree with giving the         
       Japanese a modification of the unconditional surrender formula…I    
       told him that I thought  the timing was wrong and that this was not   
       the time to do it.  After a discussion a round the table I was backed   
       up by Marshall and then by everybody else.49   
 
There is some speculation as to whether Stimson and Truman delayed 
modifying the surrender terms because of the atomic bomb.  In his Memoirs 
Truman indicates that he wanted to inform the Japanese of the altered 
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surrender terms at the upcoming Potsdam Convention in July because it would 
“demonstrate Allied unity.” Yet, there is evidence indicating that Truman and 
Stimson were concerned with another overriding factor: the successful test of 
the first atomic bomb. Truman estimated that if the bomb worked it could be 
used as diplomatic leverage with the Japanese. If the bomb did not work, 
Truman believed that he would need to sell the Japanese on the altered 
surrender terms in order to avoid a massive invasion and the subsequent loss of 
American lives. 50     
At the culmination of the May 29th meeting, Stimson, Marshall and 
McCloy remained in order to talk more openly about the atomic bomb project.  
A memo entitled “Objectives toward Japan and methods of concluding war 
with minimum casualties,” was composed for Truman after the meeting.  
According to them memo, the three agreed that the alteration of surrender 
terms should not take place until a later date.  Stimson then questioned Marshall 
as to when and if the atomic bomb could be used, in lieu of traditional 
incendiary bombs, against the Japanese.  Marshall stated that he was a clear 
proponent of initially utilizing the bomb against military objectives, or large 
naval installations in Japan.  If the first attacks did not render a sufficient 
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reaction, Marshall proposed that others be dropped on manufacturing centers, 
but only after the Japanese citizens had been sufficiently warned.51 
May 29th was also a day of regrouping for Szilard and his group of 
scientists, who had met with Byrnes on the afternoon of the 28th. The three 
scientists returned from South Carolina to the Chicago lab intent on 
persevering in their endeavor to stop the use of the atomic bomb.  By this time, 
research in Chicago was winding down, and many other Chicago scientists had 
time to ponder the implications of this new weapon.52  Now, the scientists were 
beginning to develop moral qualms about using a weapon of such great 
destructive force against Japan.  At this point, James Franck, another Chicago 
scientist, decided to draft a report in conjunction with Szilard objecting to the 
use of the atomic bomb on Japan.  
On June 11th the “Franck Report” prepared by Franck, Szilard and their 
Chicago Metallurgical Lab colleagues, was presented to officials in D.C.  In the 
report the scientists requested that there be an international demonstration of 
the bomb before its use on Japan, and preferably, that the bomb not be used on 
Japan at all.53  The scientists rationalized that such a demonstration would 
achieve a variety of ends including: fostering the development of an 
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international control system on atomic energy and weapons; coercing Japan to 
surrender sooner; and possibly giving atomic use justification if surrender was 
not achieved.   
Additionally, in the report the scientists consistently emphasized that an 
“arms race” would ensue between the US and the SU if the bomb was used. 
More specifically, the scientists insisted that chaos and insecurity would govern 
U.S.-Soviet relations in the years to come if the bomb was utilized without prior 
explanation or warning to the Soviets. 54  Originally, the Franck Report was 
meant for Stimson, Byrnes and other high ranking politicians. Instead, 
bureaucratic boundaries necessitated that it be left with a petty staff officer.   
The scientists, though unable to impress government officials, 
continued to voice their opinions.  During July, 69 of the Chicago scientists 
signed a petition insisting that President Truman to clarify the terms of 
surrender, and wait for a response from the Japanese before authorizing the use 
of the bomb.55  Specifically, the petition requested that Truman carefully 
consider the moral implications of the bombs use. Also, it requested that the 
bomb only be used if the surrender terms were altered and then subsequently 
rejected by Japan’s diplomats. Szilard, the initial proponent of the petition, 
attempted to procure the signatures of scientists from the Manhattan Project’s 
headquarters; however, the petition was not well received.  Similarly, the 
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circulation of the petition at another lab, Oak Ridge, though successful in 
procuring 88 signatures, was eventually stopped by Grove’s staff.    
Leslie Groves, reacting to the efforts of the scientists, created a survey 
to counteract the petition.  Groves’ survey, the Farrington-Daniels survey, 
questioned the Chicago scientists as to “which of the following five procedures 
comes closest to your choice as to the way in which any new weapons that we 
may develop should be used in the Japanese war.” 56  Of the 150 scientists 
polled, 46%, or 69 favored the option that entailed giving a military 
demonstration in Japan, which would be followed by an opportunity to 
surrender.  If the Japanese did not surrender at this juncture, the bomb should 
be used.  Compton, who was in charge of survey’s distribution was struck by 
the fact that 87% of the scientists polled favored options where the weapon 
would be used only after other non-military means were exhausted.  On July 
19th Compton, sent the results of the Farrington-Daniels survey, as well as 
Szilard’s survey to Groves for consideration.  The results took six days to reach 
Grove’s office, where Groves held them until August 1st until he sent them to 
D.C.  Thus, by the time Truman received the data he was already back from the 
Potsdam Convention and had issued the orders to drop the bombs.57 
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While many of the scientists in Chicago were vehemently opposed to 
atomic use, the scientists in Los Alamos were still unsure. On June 16th the 
scientists at Los Alamos met to discuss the suggestions contained in the Franck 
Report.  The scientists in attendance included Compton, Lawrence, 
Oppenheimer and Fermi. Ultimately, they concluded that a ‘demonstration 
blast’ would not be feasible because there were only three atomic weapons in 
existence, one of which needed to be used as a “tester” in July.  Moreover, the 
panel assessed that if the international demonstration failed it might provoke 
the Japanese to fight harder.  In the end, the scientists did release a fairly clear 
statement supporting atomic use, noting “We can propose no technical 
demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable 
alternative to direct military use.”58   
 The statement, though seemingly indicative of a consensus among the 
scientists, was later qualified by Compton in a memo to Grove’s Deputy 
Kenneth D. Nichols on July 24th.   Compton wrote that despite the earlier 
report of a consensus, “There was not sufficient agreement among the 
members of the panel to unite upon a statement as how or under what 
conditions such use was to be made.”59 Still, in the end this statement of 
support from the scientific community in Los Alamos over rode the earlier 
dissent, and sent the project hurtling toward its culmination.   
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The Interim Committee Makes a Decision 
While the scientists in Chicago were working to halt the use of the 
bomb, many of their colleagues were attending the final Interim sessions on 
May 31st and June 1st. The central focus of the discussion on both days was 
how, when and where to use the weapon in Japan, while concurrently 
influencing the Soviets.  Oppenheimer insisted that when choosing targets the 
Committee should consider that “the visual effect of a bombing would be 
tremendous.  It would be accompanied by a brilliant luminescence which would 
rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet.  The neutron effect would be 
dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile.”60  For 
Oppenheimer, the psychological implications of such a blast would be the 
primary catalyst for Japanese surrender, while concurrently impressing the 
Soviets.   
Oppenheimer, in conjunction with Marshall also suggested that the 
Soviets be informed of the bombs existence, and perhaps, be allowed to have 
two scientists witness the first explosion.  Byrnes, upon hearing this suggestion 
intervened, noting that such a demonstration would be inadvisable.  Specifically, 
Byrnes believed that “if information were given to the Russians, even in general 
terms, Stalin would ask to be brought into a partnership.  He felt this to be 
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particularly likely in view of our commitments and pledges of cooperation with 
the British.” 61  
By the culmination of the meeting it was decided that the Committee 
would recommend that the bomb be used as soon as possible.  The Committee 
reasoned that the bomb would achieve dual aims: it would be instrumental in 
procuring the Japan’s surrender and controlling the Soviets. The Soviets, 
because of Byrne insistence, would not be allowed to witness a test of the 
weapon. By the end of the meeting: 
Mr. Byrnes expressed the view… that the most desirable program     
      would be to push ahead as fast as possible in production and research   
      to make certain that we stay ahead and at the same time make every    
      effort to better our political relations with Russia.62 
 
At the conclusion of the meeting the minutes were assembled into a 
memo for President Truman.  The memo included recommendations that were 
generally agreed upon.  First, that the bomb should be dropped on Japan 
without warning and second, that it should be dropped on a vital war plant in 
order to make a “profound psychological impression.” 63 The memo to Truman 
neglected to mention Oppenheimer’s concern about the “neutron effect,” 
probably because “in May 1945, no one fully knew what the first nuclear 
weapon would be like.”64 Truman’s reaction when he read the document was 
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one of reluctant agreement. According to Byrnes, Truman “had to agree that he 
could think of no other alternative” to dropping the bomb on Japan.65 Thus by 
June 1st the plan to go ahead with the atomic bombing of the Japan was 
solidified by the recommendations of the Interim Committee and the scientific 
panel, and the sentiments of Truman himself.  
A Policy Shift 
The release of the Interim Committee’s final recommendations 
regarding the atomic bomb directly coincided with a major shift in Truman’s 
policy.  Recall, that on May 8th, Truman’s speech subtly declared America’s 
willingness to allow the Japanese to retain the Imperial Institution if they 
surrendered. Yet, on June 1st Truman reversed this policy in a speech, stating 
that the Japanese: 
 “Hope that our desire to see our soldiers and sailors home again and   
        the temptation to return to the comforts and profits of peace will    
        force us to settle for  some compromise short of unconditional      
        surrender.  They should know better…We are resolute in our       
        determination—we will see the fight through to a  complete and     
        victorious finish.”66   
 
A pivotal meeting took place on June 6th between Stimson, General 
Marshall and President Truman to further discuss the conclusions reached by 
the Interim committee.  Prior to the briefing, Truman indicated that he had 
been able to postpone the Conference of the “Big Three” to July in order to 
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“give us more time.”  Though there is no record of what Truman needed more 
time for, scholars speculate that Truman wanted to allot the scientists more 
time to test the atomic bomb, in order to use it as leverage in negotiations with 
the Soviets at the upcoming Potsdam meeting. Statements made by 
Oppenheimer, support this contention.  Upon reflecting about the months 
leading up to the bombing Oppenheimer noted, “we were under incredible 
pressure to get it done [the atomic bomb] before the Potsdam meeting…” 67  
Moreover, an entry from Stimson’s diary reconfirms this hypothesis, indicating 
that he wanted to postpone the conference because “it seems a terrible thing to 
gamble with such big stake in diplomacy without having the master card in our 
hands.”68 
Alternatives Revisited 
Truman, in spite of agreeing with the Interim Committee’s 
Assessments, still continued to hear other alternatives. On June 18th the 
president, the Joint Chiefs, and other high ranking officials met to discuss 
Operation Olympic, or the plan for conventional invasion of the Japanese 
homeland.  Prior to the meeting Truman had instructed Admiral William Leahy 
to inform all of the military leaders that:  
“It is the President’s intention to make his decisions on the campaign   
       with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in  
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       the loss of American lives. Economy in the use of time and in        
       money cost is comparatively  unimportant.”69    
 
This statement shocked Truman’s military advisers, who up until this 
point had not made plans based solely on minimizing American casualties. For 
many of the military officials Truman’s statement was counterintuitive, 
especially since the preliminary plans for invasion had already been drawn up 
and approved as of May 25th.   
The primary topic of discussion on the 18th included the military, 
diplomatic and political issues surrounding the campaign in the Pacific. Truman 
emphasized that he still approved of the military plan set forth in May by the 
Joint Chiefs, but he also “still hoped for some fruitful accomplishment through 
other means.”70  Stimson concurred, as he believed that an invasion of the 
Japanese homeland would be considered heinous by most Japanese citizens, 
thus provoking fierce fighting. Stimson stated: “there was a large submerged 
class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and 
influence had never yet been felt…He felt that this submerged class would fight 
and fight tenaciously if attacked on their own ground.”71  For this reason, 
Stimson was also pushing to consider alternatives to direct invasion.   
Throughout the course of the discussion the Joint Chiefs emphasized 
that an invasion of the Japanese homeland would involve a high human cost, 
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with as many as 31,000 American causalities.72  General Marshall pointed out 
that a reduction in American casualties could be achieved if the commitment of 
Soviet ground troops was secured.  Marshall believed that “the impact of 
Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action 
levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in 
Japan.”73   
Despite Marshall’s reassurances, the plans they had drawn up earlier for 
the two phase operation were worrisome to the Generals.  Military leaders were 
still hurting from the losses they had sustained about Okinawa and Iwo Jima.  
In Iwo Jima the military had lost more American soldiers than on D-Day.  
More recently, the campaign in Okinawa had killed at least 12,000 soldiers thus 
far, and left 36,000 wounded.  The Japanese too, had suffered incredible losses 
of about 110,000 men, or roughly equivalent to 1/3 of the islands population, 
yet they were not giving up.  
Japan’s determination and their ability to sustain massive casualties 
without remorse worried the US Generals.  The Japanese, with the use of their 
Kamikaze warriors, and their lack of reaction to the devastating firebombing 
raids that had killed at least 100,000 citizens in Tokyo, had illustrated that they 
would fight to the death.  An attack on the Japanese mainland, asserted the 
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Generals, would be far more devastating, and elicit a much more unforgiving 
reaction from its citizens.  General Marshall insisted that the Generals 
“regarded the matter of dropping the bomb as exceedingly important…we had 
to end the war, we had to save American lives.”74  
Even with the approval of the invasion plans, military officials were still 
open to alternative means of surrender.  At the June 18th meeting Admiral 
Leahy made it obvious that he thought a change in surrender terms could 
eliminate the necessity for invasion, and perhaps dropping the bomb.  Leahy, in 
accordance with Stimson’s perceptions stated: 
 He could not agree with those who said to him that unless we        
       obtained the unconditional surrender of the Japanese that we will     
       have lost the war.  He feared no menace from Japan in the           
       foreseeable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing           
       unconditional surrender.  What he did fear was that our insistence on  
       unconditional surrender would result in making the Japanese         
       desperate and  thereby increase our casualty lists.75   
 
Like many advisers before him, Leahy predicted that an actual attack on 
the Japanese mainland would be extremely costly.  Forrestal shared a similar 
opinion, noting “our determination to stick to the unconditional surrender 
position would possibly produce the result that every living person in Japan 
would prefer to die fighting rather than accept military defeat.”76   
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By the culmination of the meeting the plans for the invasion of Kyushu 
in November of 1945 were solidified.  Truman, however, was unwilling to 
definitively commit himself to one course of action.  In fact, Truman “said he 
considered the Kyushu plan all right from the military standpoint and, so far as 
he was concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we can 
do this operation and then decide as to the final action later.”77   
At the culmination of the meeting, McCloy engaged in a private 
discussion with Truman. Essentially, McCloy believed that the US needed to 
consider taking diplomatic action in Japan before initiating an all out invasion 
or dropping the bombs.  He suggested that the US open diplomatic channels 
with the Japanese and delineate exactly the terms of surrender.  These terms 
were that the US will allow Japan to continue to be a nation, choose their own 
form of government, retain the Imperial Institution, and control their own 
borders.  McCloy stated: 
 I do think you’ve got an alternative; and I think  its an alternative          
  that ought to be explored and that, really, we ought to have our            
  heads examined if we don’t explore some other method by which we       
  can terminate this war than just by another conventional attack and         
  landing.78   
 
Truman’s reaction to these statements was that he too, had considered 
taking a similar route, and that McCloy should bring his proposal to James 
Byrnes.  Later that day, when McCloy presented his argument to Byrnes, Byrnes 
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replied that “he would have to oppose my proposal because it appeared to him 
that it might be considered a weakness on our part.”79 
The following afternoon, on June 19th, Truman’s cabinet members 
reconvened to discuss the previous day’s meeting.  The high level officials such 
as Stimson, Grew and Forrestal were all in agreement that a clarification of 
surrender terms, which would guarantee the preservation of Japan’s imperial 
institution, might eliminate the need for the bombs and the invasion.  The 
consensus on this matter was widespread amongst officials such as Forrestal, 
Grew, Stimson, Leahy, and Admiral Nimitz. Stimson’s diary entry for that day 
revealed: 
There was a pretty strong feeling that it would be deplorable if we     
      have to go through the military program with all its stubborn fighting   
      to a finish.  We agreed that it is necessary to plan and prepare to go     
      through, but it became very evident today in the discussion that we all  
      feel that some way should be found of inducing Japan to yield without  
      a fight to the finish…80   
 
As part of the extended effort to change the attack procedures, Bard 
and Grew issued a resolution requesting that other viable alternatives to the 
bomb be seriously considered.  The resolution, which was composed on June 26th 
and 27th, reached Truman and Byrnes on July 2nd.    In the resolution, Bard 
insisted that there should be at least two or three days of warning before the 
atomic bomb was used on Japan, in order to maintain “the position of the 
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United States as a great humanitarian nation...”81  Additionally, Bard and Grew 
determined that the way to achieve peace without invasion or the use of the 
bomb was to “eliminate the serious single obstacle to Japanese unconditional 
surrender, namely, concern over the fate of the throne.” 82 
On July 2nd, Stimson presented a similar argument to Truman via a 
memo that had been drafted by McCloy. Essentially, Stimson and McCloy 
asserted that defeating the Japanese with “conventional” methods would be 
markedly more difficult than it was in Germany.  Victory for the Allied forces 
would come, but it would come at a higher monetary and human cost than 
initially calculated.  Specifically, Stimson highlighted that “the attempt to 
exterminate her armies and her population by gunfire or other means will tend 
to produce a fusion of race solidity and antipathy which had no analogy in the 
case of Germany.” 83 Stimson, in alignment with Grew and Bard’s statement, 
insisted that the US  give Japan a very detailed warning regarding the use of 
atomic weapons and their ability to destroy the “Japanese race and nation” in 
the hopes that it would elicit a premature surrender.  Stimson’s memo also 
reconfirmed Grews’ suggestion that allowing the emperor to retain his status 
would be instrumental in achieving an expedient Allied victory.  Essentially, 
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Stimson, standing on the cusp of the release of the most destructive power ever 
known to man, began to deviate from the hard-line approach set forth by the 
Roosevelt administration, which demanded that nothing less than unconditional 
surrender be accepted from the Japanese.   
Stimson had the distinct impression that the president was impressed 
with his memo, and “his attitude was apparently very well satisfied with the way 
in which the subjects were presented and he was apparently acquiescent with 
my attitude towards the treatment of Japan and pronounced my paper a 
powerful paper.” 84 Yet, Truman, in conjunction with Byrnes: 
Chose not to clarify the surrender terms during this period…he       
      continued to hold to this policy even though by the third week of      
      June all of the president’s official advisers—his chief of staff, the       
      secretary of war, the secretary of the navy…, the  acting secretary of    
      state, the Joint Chiefs of Staff—favored some form of clarification.85 
 
After receiving these various opinions Truman recorded in his diary his 
obvious dilemma; he was faced with the impossible, yet inevitable decision of 
whether he should invade, bomb, blockade, or use another alternative approach 
to coerce the Japanese to surrender.86 
The Road to Potsdam 
At 2:45 pm on July 3rd, Stimson held one of his last meetings with 
Truman prior to Truman’s departure for Potsdam.  Much of the meeting 
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centered around how Truman should handle Stalin in Potsdam.  Truman had 
never met Stalin, and had little experience with foreign diplomats.  His situation 
was further complicated by the existence of the atomic bomb.  Earlier in May, 
the Interim Committee had suggested and Truman had approved of not 
informing Stalin about the bomb until it was utilized on Japan.  However, as of 
June 21st, the Interim Committee members had decided to alter that stipulation.  
Regarding the bomb, Stimson advised Truman to tell Stalin: 
 We were busy with this thing working like the dickens…and we       
       intended to use it against the enemy, Japan; that if it was satisfactory   
       we proposed to then talk it over with Stalin afterwards, with the       
       purpose of having it make the world  peaceful  and safe rather than to  
       destroy civilization. If he pressed for details and facts,  Truman was    
       simply to tell him that we were not yet prepared to give them.87 
 
On July 7th Truman, accompanied by Byrnes, began his trip to Potsdam 
to meet with the Soviet and British leaders.  Stimson and McCloy traveled 
separately to the meeting because they were not invited to accompany the 
president and Byrnes on their ship, the Augusta.88  
The Potsdam Conference, which began on July 15th, was a forum in 
which the leaders of the Big Three could discuss the political future of Europe, 
the occupation and dismantling of Germany, and whether or not the Soviets 
would commit to helping defeat the Japanese in a conventional military 
invasion.  Initially, Truman’s primary goal had been to reconfirm that the 
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Soviets would provide aid in the invasion of Japan. Estimates from the Joint 
Chiefs had stipulated that Soviet aid was necessary in order to minimize US 
casualties.  A July 8th memo that Truman received from the JIC further 
articulated the importance of obtaining Soviet commitment, as “an entry of the 
Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the 
inevitability of complete defeat.”89     
However, key events began to unfold between the Soviets and the 
Japanese while Truman and Byrnes were en-route to Potsdam.  On July 12th, 
the Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Naotoke Sato, received a secret 
and urgent radio message from the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Togo.  
The message contained orders from Tokyo to begin discussions with the 
Soviets about ending the war.  According to Togo, the emperor was disturbed 
by the number of citizens perishing in incendiary raids and was ready to look 
for a peaceful solution.  The message read: 
 His majesty’s hearts desire is to see the swift termination of this       
      war...so long as England and the United States insists upon           
      unconditional surrender the Japanese Empire has no alternative but    
      to fight on with all its strength for the honor and the existence of the   
      Motherland.  
 
Grew immediately forwarded the message to Truman and Byrnes, 
accentuating that “if the President, either individually or jointly with other, now 
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conveys the impression that unconditional surrender may not be as bad as they 
had first believed, the door may well be opened to an early surrender.  This of 
course is guesswork but it seems to be sound guesswork.”90  
Grew, though decidedly optimistic about the cable, was countered by 
more cautious responders, like Forrestal.  Forrestal was more hesitant to accept 
the cable given Japan’s history of sending out “peace feelers” through 
Switzerland, Portugal and the Vatican, and then not acting on them. Yet, on 
July 13th Forrestal cited the message as the “first real evidence of a Japanese 
desire to get out of the war….”  91 Like Grew, Forrestal believed that procuring 
a surrender would only be possible if the terms were changed to allow the 
retention of the Imperial Institution. 
 Stimson and McCloy were also informed of the telegram’s contents and 
seemed relatively excited about its implications.   Earlier, McCloy and Stimson 
had been advocates of giving advanced warning to the Japanese while changing 
the terms of unconditional surrender.  Now, they were even more steadfast in 
that opinion and worked to make it known to Truman throughout his trip to 
Potsdam.92   
A series of important events began to unfold in the US, while the 
conference progressed in Europe.  The first event, which took place on July 16th 
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in Alamogordo, New Mexico, was the successful explosion of the first atomic 
bomb.  Prior to the test a group of scientists formed a betting pool, placing bets 
on what the destructive capacity of the bomb would be.  Every single scientist 
guessed too low.93  According to scientific measurements the explosion’s force 
was equivalent to the force of an explosion caused by 20,000 tons of TNT.  The 
largest bomb ever used during WWII was equivalent to a “mere” 10 tons of 
TNT.   
Government officials had hoped that the bomb would make a profound 
psychological impact, and they got what they hoped for. The flash at 
Alamogordo was visible for 250 miles and the sound from the explosion could 
be heard from at least 100 miles away. The destruction caused by the bomb was 
unprecedented.  The tower that the bomb was held in was vaporized, and 
another steel tower half a mile away had collapsed and been mangled. The so 
called “neutron effect” that Dr. Oppenheimer had warned about was realized in 
full when weeks later, radiation was detected at least 120 miles from the site of 
the explosion.94  The scientists, in awe of what they had created, immediately 
sent the message of the successful trial to Potsdam. The first notification of the 
bombs success was sent directly to Stimson, and was received on the evening of 
July 16th.  The message from was brief, and stated “operated on this morning. 
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Diagnosis not yet complete, but results seem satisfactory and already exceed 
expectations…Dr. Groves pleased.”95   
That same evening, Truman also received a memo that had been 
authored by Stimson and McCloy while en route to Potsdam.  The memo 
stated: 
 It seems to me that we are at the psychological moment to           
       commence our  warnings to Japan….the great marshalling of our     
       new air and land forces in the combat area in the midst of the ever    
       greater blows she is receiving…is bound  provoke thought even      
       among their military leaders.”  
 
In light of these developments, Stimson and McCloy proposed that the 
U.S. formulate a warning to the Japanese, which would be drafted during the 
conference.   According to Stimson and McCloy the warning should be a 
“double warning.”  That is, if at first the Japanese did not surrender, the U.S. 
would offer them another chance before utilizing the bomb. Ultimately, 
Stimson and McCloy’s suggestions were discarded by Truman, because of 
Byrnes’s objections to issuing any warning to Japan regarding the bomb.96  
On the afternoon of July 17th at 1:00 pm, just 21 hours and 30 minutes 
after the first atomic bomb was successfully tested, Truman was scheduled to 
meet with Josef Stalin for the first time.97 The July 17th meeting with Stalin went 
better than Truman and his advisers expected. In fact, Truman was fond of 
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Stalin, and believed that he was misunderstood, strong, fearless, and an 
expressive leader with a good judge of character.  To Truman, Stalin was 
“honest—but smart as hell.”98   
During this first meeting Truman was able to achieve his primary 
objective of securing Soviet commitment to aid in the potential land invasion of 
Japan. Looking back on the situation scholars assert that Truman was deceived 
about Stalin’s true nature.  In actuality “Truman and Byrnes did not know the 
true nature of Stalin.”99  The only two officials in the American government to 
truly understand Stalin’s actual personality were Ambassadors Harriman and 
Kennan, but they were not present at the conference to advise Truman, nor 
were they in close enough contact with Truman to warn him.  Regardless, 
Truman viewed the meeting as a success, recording in his diary that “I’ve gotten 
what I came for—Stalin goes to war August 15th with no strings on it.”100   
Truman believed Soviet participation, or the threat of its participation 
would be an integral factor in eliciting Japan’s surrender. Yet, the following day 
Truman expressed a somewhat contradictory sentiment.  Truman wrote: 
“Japanese would fold up before Russia comes in.  I am sure they will when 
Manhattan appears over their homeland.”101  Alternately, this statement 
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indicated that Truman was at least aware of, if not excited about the prospect 
that Japan’s surrender might be obtained through the use of the bomb, prior to 
a joint US-Soviet invasion.  
The following day Truman received a more detailed account of the 
atomic bomb’s first test. After receiving this report Truman met with Churchill 
in order to notify him of the bomb’s success.  Churchill had already been 
informed about certain aspects of the test by Stimson.  Churchill’s reaction the 
previous evening, as gauged by Stimson had been one of excitement and 
Churchill had been “intensely interested and greatly cheered up, but was 
strongly inclined against any disclosure [to Russia about the a-bomb]. I argued 
against this to some length.”102  Yet, on the 18th it appeared that Truman and 
Churchill were relieved that the bomb had worked, and that the coordinated 
and expensive efforts of British and American scientists had finally produced 
tangible results.   
Despite the bomb’s success, Churchill would continually emphasize that 
he thought it would be wise to alter the terms of surrender for Japan. 
Churchill‘s assessment was partially based on a July 17th cable, intercepted from 
Japan’s Foreign Minister Togo.  In the cable Togo stressed that: 
 If today, when we are still maintaining our strength, the Anglo-       
       Americans were to have regard for Japan’s honor and existence they   
       could save humanity by bringing this war to an end…If however,      
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       they insist unrelentingly upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese   
       are unanimous in their resolve to wage a thorough-going war.  
 
Churchill reasoned that altering the terms of surrender would be 
advantageous for both sides because there would be “a tremendous cost in 
American life, and, to a smaller extent, in British life…involved in forcing 
“unconditional surrender” upon the Japanese.” Truman’s reaction to Churchill’s 
position, though vague, was interpreted by Churchill as a sort of “soul 
searching.”  Essentially, Churchill believed that Truman, like other members of 
his administration was deeply engaged in assessment of numerous alternatives, 
and thus chose not to push Truman farther on the matter.103  
Also on July 18th, Stimson held a short meeting with McCloy in order to 
express his frustration with his exclusion at Potsdam.  In many ways, Stimson 
and McCloy felt that they were being left out of the major decision-making 
circle.  Stimson expressed candidly that “we [McCloy and Stimson] were all 
troubled by the wastage of time in getting information about what is going 
on.”104  They were most troubled by the fact that “Informal as well as formal 
conferences are being held, and we have to wait until they are finished and then 
McCloy gets hold of some one of the State Department subordinates who has 
been present, finds out from him what has happened and then brings it to 
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me.”105  In response to their concerns Stimson decided to “go to see Byrnes and 
see whether I could not get admittance for McCloy into the conferences where 
other Assistant Secretaries were present.”106   
Stimson was able to meet with Byrnes, the following morning on July 
20th, regarding his concerns.  Byrnes was somewhat accommodating and 
insisted that only one of them could attend the formal meetings. However, 
when Stimson asked Byrnes to acquire minutes of the formal meetings, Byrnes 
replied that there were none kept.  Thus, Stimson concluded that: 
 My meeting with him [Byrnes] was a rather barren one. He gives me   
       the impression that he is hugging matters in this Conference pretty    
       close to his  bosom, and that my assistance, while generally          
       welcome, was strictly limited in the matters in which it should be      
       given.107 
 
On July 21st, Stimson presented Truman and Byrnes with Grove’s 
formal assessment of the first atomic test.  Truman and Byrnes were 
“immensely pleased.  The president was tremendously pepped up by it and 
spoke to me[Stimson] of it again and again when I saw him...He said it gave him 
an entirely new feeling of confidence.”108 Upon viewing the report, Truman also 
asked for Marshall’s input. Marshall, given the information before him “no 
longer thought it urgent to have Soviet help.”109 
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The same night that Truman received Groves’ formal assessment, he 
had a meeting with Stalin.  Throughout the meeting Churchill and Truman’s 
advisers were impressed with Truman’s behavior and attitude toward the 
Soviets.  Churchill told Stimson that to him, Truman seemed like a new man.  
He was confident and able to assert himself in front of Stalin. In his diary entry 
for that day Stimson described Churchill’s reaction to Truman’s transformation: 
  Truman was evidently much fortified by something…and that he     
       stood up to the  Russians in a most emphatic and decisive            
       manner…when he got to the meeting  after having read the report     
       [Groves’ report] he was a changed man.  He told the Russians just    
       where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole           
       meeting.110  
 
Truman’s new found confidence was contagious.  Churchill, after 
witnessing the meeting was no longer nervous about informing the Soviets 
about the bomb.  Instead, Churchill was “rather inclined to use it as an 
argument in favor of negotiations.”111 
Truman continued to take the hard-line approach with the Soviets 
during the negotiations on July 22nd. For example, when Stalin questioned 
Truman about Poland and the type of government that would be established 
Truman essentially ignored him.  Eventually, Truman told Stalin that the 
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American’s were not budging, and that Poland would need to have a 
democratically elected government.112  
Truman’s outburst at the meeting with Stalin was not the only 
significant event of the day.  That afternoon, potential targets for the atomic 
bombing of Japan were chosen. Hiroshima, a primary production center for 
war equipment, was the favored target.  An entry in Stimson’s diary for that day, 
regarding a meeting with Truman indicates that the bomb was now a clear 
factor in the decision-making process. Stimson highlighted “the US was 
standing firm and he was apparently relying greatly upon the info as to S-1.”113 
July 23rd and 24th were formative days for Truman and his advisers in 
Potsdam.  As the hours progressed it became clear that both Truman and 
Byrnes desired to speed the conference to its culmination and return to the US.  
During Truman’s 10 am meeting with Stimson, Truman seemed anxious obtain 
a definitive assessment of whether Soviet participation was still a necessity in 
the war.  He asked Stimson to inquire further into this matter by asking for 
Marshall’s opinion during their afternoon meeting.  Marshall would later reveal 
to Stimson that he did not believe that the US would need the assistance of the 
Soviets in order to win in Japan.  Yet, Marshall did caution that “even if we 
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went ahead in the war without the Russians and compelled surrender to our 
terms that would not prevent the Russians from marching into Manchuria.”114  
While Stimson was meeting with Marshall, Byrnes was conducting 
business of his own.  On the morning of July 23rd Byrnes sent out a cable to the 
Chinese Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs T.V. Soong, suggesting 
that he break off negotiations for a short while with the Soviets. The cable 
instructed Soong “not to give way on any points to the Russians, but to return 
to Moscow and keep negotiating.”115  Churchill, upon hearing about this cable 
deduced that the US wanted to make sure that the Soviets could not negotiate 
on any matters until after the Japanese surrendered.  In a cable to his Foreign 
Service secretary, Churchill notes, “It is quite clear that the US do not at the 
present time desire Russia’s participation in the war.”116   
Other members of the administration saw the cable in a similar light.  
An employee in the secretary of state’s office Walter Brown also believed that 
the cable was Byrnes’ attempt to halt negotiations until the war was over.  In a 
July 24th diary entry Brown narrates “JFB still hoping for time, believing after 
that atomic bomb Japan will surrender and Russia will not get in so much on 
the kill, thereby being in a position to press claims against China.”117   Later, in 
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his 1958 manuscript, All In One Lifetime, Byrnes would admit that the 
assessments were correct.  Byrnes writes that he was trying to: 
 Encourage the Chinese to continue the negotiations after the         
       Potsdam conference. I had some fear that if they did not, Stalin       
       might  immediately enter the war…on the other hand, if Stalin and   
       Chiang were still negotiating it might delay Soviet entrance and the    
       Japanese might surrender.  The president was in accord with that     
       view.118  
 
 The morning of the 24th brought an onslaught of important 
information to Truman.  At 9:20 am Stimson provided Truman with two crucial 
pieces of information.  The first was Marshall’s assessment that the Soviets 
would not be needed in the invasion of Japan.  The second piece was a message 
from D.C. stating that the bomb could be used any time after August 1st.  When 
Truman received the message, he was clearly excited and exclaimed “that was 
just what he wanted, that he was delighted.” 119  Just as Truman was receiving 
his report from Stimson, Byrnes was at his morning meeting with the Foreign 
Ministers.  At the end of the meeting Byrnes expressed the US’s desire to depart 
the convention as soon as possible. The desire to depart Potsdam was not just 
apparent in Byrnes that day. In his afternoon meeting with Stalin, Truman also 
made it clear that he wished to leave Potsdam as soon as possible.120  
However, Truman could not depart without first informing Stalin of the 
atomic bomb. As the afternoon discussions were winding down, Truman took a 
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moment to privately approach Stalin and reveal to him that the US was in 
possession of a massively destructive weapon, which could be used against 
Japan to end the Pacific campaign.  Much to Truman’s dismay Stalin was not at 
all surprised by this news.  Stalin calmly expressed his desire that the Americans 
use the weapon against the Japanese in the most expedient manner.  Stalin’s 
nonchalant reaction left Truman perplexed.  How could a project and a 
development of this magnitude not impress the Soviet leader?  It was later 
discovered that a Soviet Spy, Klaus Fuchs, had infiltrated the project, giving the 
Soviets a heads up on the development of the new “super-weapon.”121  
Potsdam Declaration and Unconditional Surrender 
In reality, Truman and Byrne’s restlessness in late July was not 
unfounded; in their eyes little was left to accomplish in Potsdam. The Potsdam 
declaration, an ultimatum by the Big Three to Japan was almost complete, with 
the exception of a few points.  Fundamentally, the declaration consisted of 13 
points, which the Allies insisted gave the Japanese ample opportunity to end the 
war.  The declaration warned the Japanese that the combined land, sea and air 
forces of the US, and UK would be applied to the Pacific until surrender was 
issued.  The proclamation cited the devastation caused by Allied forces in 
Germany as a cautionary tale illustrating the futility of resistance.  Additionally, 
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the declaration related that the Allied powers would occupy Japan after the 
surrender until the country was deemed “stable.”   
What the declaration did not include was a stipulation ensuring Japan 
that they could retain their emperor. Initially, there had been extensive 
deliberation over whether to abandon Roosevelt’s unconditional surrender, and 
allow the emperor to retain his status.  At one point, the Potsdam Declaration 
contained a stipulation that allowed the Japanese to pick their government, and 
thus maintain the Imperial Institution. Stimson was one of the many officials in 
favor of this, while Byrnes asserted that to abandon unconditional surrender 
after all this time was equivalent to appeasement.  Yet, by July 24th it was clear 
that Byrnes’ insistence that unconditional surrender not be abandoned was 
more convincing to Truman, and the stipulation guaranteeing the retention of 
the Imperial Institution was removed from the final document.  
Similarly, the Proclamation did not contain an explicit warning about 
the US’s possession of the atomic bomb, and their plans to utilize it on the 
Japanese homeland if the declaration was rejected.  The only mention of a use 
of force was decidedly vague, stating that “the full application of our military 
powers…will mean the complete and inevitable destruction of the Japanese 
Armed forces and the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.” 122 This 
warning, though ominous, was not nearly as explicit as many scientists and 
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politicians, including Grew, Bard and Stimson, had advised.  It gave the 
Japanese absolutely no incentive, other than the precedent set by victory in 
Germany, to surrender.  With the document sent the Allied forces had only to 
wait for a reply before undertaking one of the most controversial and deadly 
operations of the century.   
Only July 28th the US received word that the Premier of Japan rejected 
the Potsdam declaration.  The previous day during a July 27th press conference, 
Premier Suzuki had read his response to the proclamation, stating: 
The government does not regard it as a thing of any great value; the    
      government will just ignore it.  We will press forward resolutely to     
      carry the  war to a successful conclusion.123  
 
Japan’s response warranted quick and decisive action.  Immediately, the 
suggestions of the Interim Committee were put into motion.  On July 30th, a 
single presidential directive was issued permitting the drop of the atomic bomb 
on two different cities. The infamous order read “suggestion approved. Release 
when ready, but no sooner than August 2nd.”124 
Truman and his advisers boarded the Augusta on August 2nd to head 
back to America.  During their voyage Truman and Byrnes each received 
MAGIC (Marine Air\Ground Intelligence Cell) documents pertaining to 
Tokyo’s ongoing pursuits for a diplomatic peace.  The intelligence came in two 
parts.  The first part, received on August 2nd, read “Unanimous decision of top 
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leaders in Tokyo that Japan should seek peace.” The second cable, an 
assessment from the War Department Analysts back in the US was received on 
August 3rd.  Their assessment emphasized the genuine nature of the Japanese 
communications.  It stated “the Japanese Army is interested in an effort to end 
the war with Soviet assistance.”125   
Dropping the Bombs 
The first bomb, which was dropped at 8:15 am August 6th, 1945, 
targeted an industrial center in Hiroshima, Japan.  As expected, the blow was 
devastating to the human population and the surrounding infrastructure.  
Oppenheimer had originally predicted that 20,000 would die, which was less 
than in a conventional incendiary raid.  It would be the “stunning” visual effect 
that would leave the impression on the citizens, thus eliciting the surrender.  
Oppenheimer was right on one count; the visual effect was literally out of this 
world. However, Oppenheimer greatly underestimated the loss of life that 
would ensue. In reality at least 200,000, not 20,000 were killed.  Truman 
received word of the successful operation and its “stunning visual effect” 
around noon on August 6th.               
Just days later, on August 9th, the US dropped another bomb on 
Nagasaki, inflicting similar devastation.  Many argue that a two day interval was 
not enough time for the Japanese to assess the situation and damage done to 
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the human population.  However, Truman was not directly involved in the 
decision to drop the second bomb, because authorization for the second release 
was guaranteed under the authority granted by the first directive.126   
The acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation was received by the 
United States on August 10th, a day after the second bomb was released over 
Nagasaki. Upon receiving the acceptance US officials agreed to allow the 
emperor to retain his symbolic status, though just as a subordinate to the 
occupying forces, so long as the Japanese would agree to fully surrender. On 
August 14th this concession coupled with the massive loss of Japanese lives 
because of the bombs finally produced surrender from the Japanese 
government, effectively ending World War II. 
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Chapter III 
Assessing Alternatives: An Analysis of the Decision to Drop the 
Bomb 
 
Introduction 
For Truman’s close-knit circle of advisers the decision to use the atomic 
bomb, though questioned substantially during the months prior to detonation, 
was inevitable given the thrust of his individual advisers to reap the strategic 
benefits of the atomic project. The Prime Minister of England, Winston 
Churchill, an informed observer during this period asserted: 
 The historic fact remains, and must be judged in the after time that    
       the decision whether or not to use the atomic bomb to compel the    
       surrender of Japan was never an issue.  There was a unanimous,      
       automatic, unquestioned agreement around the table…127  
 
Here, it is important to ascertain why Truman and the advisers in his 
core decision-making body held fast to the conception that the atomic bomb, 
regardless of the other alternatives, was still the best way to end the conflict in 
Japan.  In point of fact, during the four months leading up to the use of the 
atomic bombs, there were numerous alternatives available to Truman and his 
advisers.  These alternatives included: awaiting Soviet entry into the war to 
speed it to its culmination; relying on a conventional invasion of the Japanese 
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homeland; giving the Japanese a non-combat demonstration of the bomb while 
also redefining the terms of surrender to guarantee the preservation of the 
Imperial institution (the emperor); and finally, to pursue a diplomatic peace 
process with the Japanese.128   
Until now, most scholars have proposed a unilateral rationale for the 
bombs use, isolating a single variable to explain the administration’s decision.  A 
more thorough analysis reveals that there were numerous factors that caused 
the decision-makers to perceive the use of the atomic bomb as the most 
desirable course of action.   Ultimately, the rationale behind utilizing atomic 
power in lieu of other alternatives is multifaceted and deeply intertwined with 
the composition of Truman’s core decision-making body, the quality of 
intelligence that was available, and the individual decision-making process of 
President Truman.      
The Impact of the Roosevelt-Truman Transition 
It was 7:09 pm on April 12th, 1945 when Truman was sworn into office 
during a private ceremony in the White House.129  After the swearing in Truman 
was faced with his first task as president: to reorganize former President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s cabinet to fit his own needs.  The former president had 
selected his cabinet based on their competence and prior years of experience.  
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Moreover, Roosevelt’s cabinet operated under the “competitive” system, which 
“involved giving duplicate assignments and holding many decisions in abeyance 
until one seemed the best.”130  In fact, Roosevelt was known for taking his time 
to make decisions and seriously considering all pieces of advice that came from 
his cabinet members.  This process, though tedious, facilitated the formulation 
and execution of sound policy decisions.  
On the other hand, Truman selected a cabinet that personally catered to 
his cognitive shortcomings, including his lack of education and knowledge of 
foreign policy. In fact, when Truman was sworn into office he had not yet met 
the Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, England’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
or the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union William Harriman.   
Truman’s isolation and ignorance stemmed from a variety of sources.  In 
particular, Truman had gaps in his foreign policy knowledge because Roosevelt 
“never did talk to me [Truman] confidentially about the war or about foreign 
affairs or what he had in mind for peace after the war.”131 Similarly, Truman had 
not attended college.  Instead, he had been an artillery captain during World 
War II, fighting on the front lines with the common man.  
At his very first cabinet meeting Truman made it abundantly clear that 
his administration would be run differently from Roosevelt’s.  While he would 
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welcome advice, the “final decisions would be his.”132 Truman was determined 
to choose his cabinet members on the basis of impressions and loyalty.133  He 
wanted cabinet officers that would “carry out presidential decisions faithfully,” 
and keep decision-making focused at the presidential level.134  In other words, 
once Truman made a decision he did not want to be questioned.  He also 
wanted a cabinet that was strong and that he could delegate many 
responsibilities to. In many ways, this hierarchical organization was reminiscent 
of the military, an organization that Truman had belonged to during WWI.  
The composition of Truman’s cabinet during the key months in which 
the decision to drop the bombs was made was sufficient to bridge the gap 
between the two administrations.  The cabinet consisted of four Roosevelt 
holdovers and six new appointments.  The holdovers included Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Secretary of the Interior 
Harold Ickes, and Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace.  Of these holdovers 
Stimson was the most important.  At the age of 70, Stimson was an experienced 
politician who had held many important government posts. Stimson, because of 
his experience would become one of Truman’s closest advisers. However, 
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Stimson, given his old age, poor health and close proximity to retirement, was 
often sidelined by Truman. 135 
Truman chose to replace Roosevelt’s Secretary of State Edward 
Stettinius with James. F. Byrnes, a personal friend of Truman’s that Truman 
greatly admired. Byrnes, who had worked in all three branches of the 
government and spent seven terms in the House and the Senate, was an 
obvious candidate for the position.  He had been a member of the Supreme 
Court in 1941, as well as Roosevelt’s War and Mobilization Director.  Truman 
was particularly enamored with James Byrnes, given Roosevelt’s reliance on and 
fondness for him.  In fact, Roosevelt had viewed Byrnes, unlike Truman, as an 
“insider” in the administration. Roosevelt’s high opinion of Byrnes carried 
weight with Truman, because on numerous occasions Truman’s advisers, 
especially Stimson, were impressed with Byrnes’ ability to influence Truman, 
and at points, even reverse his thinking on an issue.136  In fact, Byrnes 
increasingly became Truman’s right hand man on all matters of policy, 
eventually surpassing Stimson’s influence.137   
Truman, in making the decision to retain many of Roosevelt’s former 
advisers, inadvertently inherited many aspects of Roosevelt’s foreign and 
domestic policies. The inheritance of Roosevelt’s policies was only natural, 
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because Truman “depended heavily on the advisers he inherited from Franklin 
Roosevelt...”138  This reliance was an inevitable necessity given the prestige of 
Truman’s predecessor, Roosevelt, as well as Truman’s ignorance regarding 
foreign affairs.  Truman, in his first address to Congress, vowed to carry out his 
predecessors policies. Roosevelt’s atomic policies were no exception.  To some 
extent Roosevelt’s atomic legacy was relatively clear.  It assumed that the bomb 
was a legitimate force, which would be used in a military setting without 
informing the Soviets, or issuing a warning and demonstration to the Japanese.  
These policies had been defined clearly in the Hyde Park agreement with 
Churchill.  
The force of Roosevelt’s legacy, Truman’s own ignorance, and his cast 
of advisers made it so Truman “was not free psychologically or politically to 
strike out on a clear new course.”139  Accordingly, Truman’s beliefs about 
atomic use and alternatives to it during the months prior to the drop of the 
atomic bomb were dependent on the beliefs of those around him. In essence, 
Truman was a veritable ideological chameleon.  Secretary of Commerce Henry 
Wallace took note of the phenomena on April 25th, 1945, writing, “Truman was 
exceedingly eager to agree with everything I said...”140  In the end it was 
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Truman’s inexperience, and his excessive reliance on the advice of his advisers 
that constrained his ability to forge a new path with regards to the use of the 
atomic bomb.141 
Individual Advisers and the President: Stimson and Byrnes 
Truman’s reliance on and interactions with his closest advisers was 
paramount in shaping his final decision to utilize the bombs. In particular, the 
beliefs and experiences of two of the decision-making bodies’ most influential 
members, Stimson and Byrnes, greatly affected the course and outcome of the 
final atomic decision. Specifically, Stimson and Byrnes, Truman’s chief advisers 
during the months leading up the bombing, never truly reconsidered the use of 
the bomb in a combat situation until it was too late.  
For Stimson, his inability to reconsider the bombs use in the face of a 
variety of alternatives stemmed partially from his commitment to the policies of 
Truman’s prestigious predecessor, Roosevelt.  Stimson’s views regarding the use 
of the atomic bomb were nearly identical to Roosevelt’s. So, when Stimson 
asserted that “at no time from 1941 to 1945 did I hear it suggested by the 
President (Roosevelt) or by any other responsible member of government that 
atomic energy should not be used in war,” it can be assumed that his thought 
process ran along similar lines.142  As a former member of the Roosevelt 
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administration, Stimson was literally caught up in the momentum of a project 
that he had been involved with since 1941.   He had been part of an 
administration that had viewed the bomb as a legitimate combat weapon. 
Imagine for a moment how hard it would have been to change a policy in just 
four months that had been hurtling forward for nearly three years.   
Additionally, Stimson, like Roosevelt was concerned about the bomb’s 
ability to shape the post-war environment, and to end an already costly 
campaign in the Pacific. For Stimson, Roosevelt, and the entire administration, 
ending the war in Japan as quickly as possible was of the utmost importance. 
They did not want another drop of American blood on their hands. Thus, 
Stimson’s adherence to the policies of Roosevelt essentially determined the type 
and nature of advice that he offered to Truman in the months prior to the drop 
of the atomic bombs.  However, of Truman’s two closest advisers, Stimson was 
markedly less influential than Byrnes.  In fact, Stimson would complain “bitterly 
that he was being denied access to the President—by the man who had almost 
total access: Byrnes.”143 
Historical records and testimonies indicate that the primary source of 
influence on Truman was his newly appointed Secretary of State, James Byrnes.  
Byrnes was able to exert such a powerful influence over Truman for numerous 
reasons.  First, Byrnes was greatly respected by Truman.  Unlike Truman, 
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Roosevelt had considered Byrnes an “insider,” someone to be consulted when 
it came to making important decisions.  Documented evidence indicates that 
this relationship was not reciprocal.  Matthew Connelly, Truman’s friend, 
adviser and secretary reported, “Mr. Truman to Mr. Byrnes, I’m afraid, was a 
non-entity, as Mr. Byrnes thought he had superior intelligence…Mr. Truman 
was completely loyal to Senator Byrnes.”144 Additionally, Byrnes was also able to 
influence Truman’s policies because of Truman’s ignorance regarding foreign 
affairs.  Essentially, Byrnes was Truman’s crutch when it came to foreign policy. 
Quite literally, Truman’s ignorance necessitated that he rely on Byrnes until he 
could acquire enough experience to form opinions of his own.   
The informal character of Truman and Byrnes’ political interactions also 
strengthened Byrnes’ influence on Truman.  In many cases Byrnes “commonly 
conducted business in private meetings or on the telephone…Byrnes even 
invented a private stenographic note taking code.”145 Decision-making scholars 
purport that informal, as opposed to formalistic advisory systems, produce far 
less coherent and well-thought out decisions.  Contrary to the informal advisory 
system, the formalistic requires that intelligence and policy alternatives be 
provided to the president by various members of his staff.  This ultimately 
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allows the president to consider multiple perspectives at once, and then, make a 
well-informed decision.146   
As is often the case in informal systems, Byrnes’ recommendations were 
valued highly by Truman, because in these types of settings “information and 
recommendations are given weight because of the properties of the 
recommender, not because of their intrinsic merit.”147 Truman’s conceptions 
were not challenged by a panel, but instead were confirmed or nullified by an 
individual, Byrnes, who had a single conception of the problem. General Omar 
Bradley noticed this trend, writing “Many of our most important moves were 
decided upon at informal conference where no memoranda were kept.” 148 
Stimson, too, complained that the informal nature of many of the meetings at 
Potsdam impeded his access to Truman. Ultimately, Byrnes’ policies, which 
reflected his desire to maintain diplomatic and military dominance over the 
Soviets, constituted Truman’s policy preferences as well.  Essentially, “Truman 
and the secretary of state designate, James F. Byrnes, began to think of the 
bomb as something of a diplomatic panacea for their postwar problems.”149   
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Groupthink and the Core Decision-Making Body 
Individual members of the core decision-making body, though integral 
to the formulation and manipulation of the administrations policies, were not 
the only factors that influenced the decision-making process. The president’s 
core decision-making body is composed of a group of advisers chosen by the 
president, to analyze intelligence, define the scope of problems and formulate 
feasible policy alternatives for the president. In an ideal decision-making body 
the analysis of a problem and the subsequent formulation of policy is purely 
rational and not tainted by personal beliefs, values or biases.150 As we will see, 
aspects of the core decision-making body, including the interactions between 
many of the individual members and the types and quality of information that 
they made available to Truman influenced, and some would say, impeded 
Truman’s ability to make an informed decision.   
During the months prior to the drop of the atomic bombs Truman’s 
advisers spoon fed him information and intelligence regarding feasible 
alternatives to direct atomic use. One of the most significant impediments to 
rationality for any decision-maker is the manner in which they decision-making 
body considers intelligence and then subsequently derives policy alternatives.  
Oftentimes advisers, because of their own personal biases or beliefs about what 
the decision-maker wants to hear can filter, and potentially alter intelligence, 
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thus making it incomplete and often, inaccurate.  This process, known officially 
as groupthink, is defined as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when 
they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for 
unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses 
of action.”151   
From the beginning, the Interim Committee’s membership almost 
guaranteed that it would be affected by groupthink. The Committee was headed 
by Stimson, a proponent of the atomic project since its inception.  Thus, 
Stimson’s established conviction that the bomb was a legitimate combat 
weapon helped dictate the Committee’s recommendations. Ultimately, the 
“responsibility for the recommendation to the president rested on me 
(Stimson), and I have no desire to veil it. The conclusions of the Committee 
were similar to my own…”152 Additionally, the Committee’s prestigious and 
influential scientific panel consisted of scientific holdovers from the Roosevelt 
era.  The scientists, including Robert Oppenheimer, were some of the most 
notorious proponents of the bombs use.   
By far, the most influential and detrimental member, with regards to a 
sound decision-making process was Byrnes. Early on, Byrnes was assigned to 
be Truman’s “personal representative” on the Committee.  It was Byrnes’ 
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presence on the Committee that ultimately locked the Committee into the 
conception that an alternative to direct military use of the bomb did not exist. 
Under the influence of Byrnes, the Committee “Far from formulating policy 
independently and upon due deliberation…responded for the most part to the 
interventions of the most important member when any significant difference of 
opinion arose: Byrnes spoke for the president.”153 Thus, it is not a surprise that 
the Committee, given its membership, recommended exactly the course of 
action that Roosevelt had formerly approved, and that Byrnes favored: the 
dropping of the bomb on military targets without warning to the Japanese. 
Essentially, the Interim Committee became “part of the bureaucratic strategy of 
a handful of American officials with a stake in the bomb…to head off 
opposition in the scientific community, lest the opposition succeeded in 
widening the range of options before the president on wartime use.”154  
Exacerbating Stimson and Byrnes’ influence was the fact that members 
of the Interim Committee were not properly informed about political and 
diplomatic events, which could have feasibly altered the nature of their 
recommendations.  Government officials, including Stimson, Marshall and 
Byrnes had access to information that was crucial to their decision-making 
process, such as the cables from Japan relating their willingness to surrender 
given an alteration to the surrender terms.  However, this essential information 
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was not made available to lower ranking, civilian and scientific members of the 
Committee. 
Specifically, it was the scientists on the Committee who were at the 
greatest disadvantage with regards to the intelligence they received. Specifically, 
the scientists did not have formal access to intelligence regarding the intentions 
of the Soviets or the diplomatic advances made by the Japanese.  In particular, 
the scientists were not aware that the Japanese were willing to surrender, as long 
as they could retain their emperor. Robert Oppenheimer, a scientist and 
temporary member of the Committee was well aware of his ignorance and 
noted that “we didn’t know beans about the military situation in Japan.  We 
didn’t know whether they could be caused to surrender by other means...”155   
Of particular importance is the fact that Marshall neglected to inform 
the Committee that, according to his educated assessment, the Japanese were 
close to surrendering, and could be pushed along if the terms of surrender were 
altered.   Essentially, Marshall remained silent, because it was the military mans 
obligation to “follow—not buck—directions which came from the ultimate 
civilian authority…he advised mainly on the strictly military aspects of the 
problem…the basic atomic decision was not to be made by the military.”156 In 
this case, the ultimate civilian authority was the president, who was represented 
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by Byrnes on the Committee.  Byrnes made it clear that the weapon would be 
useful in the post war era to control the Soviets, and thus, Marshall, despite any 
personal reservations, accepted that assessment and stifled his objections during 
the crucial sessions of the Committee. Ultimately, the gaps in intelligence, 
Byrne’s biased presentation of the situation, and Marshall’s reluctance to voice 
his opinion, converged to produce a decision-making body pervaded by 
groupthink.  
The Role of Intelligence 
The accuracy and overall quality of intelligence that decision-makers 
receive is integral to the way in which they define a problem and then formulate 
viable policy alternatives.  Under ideal circumstances, the decision-maker 
receives a complete and accurate set of intelligence to aid them in their 
decision-making process. However, time constraints and the quality of the 
intelligence collectors and providers dictates that the intelligence received by the 
primary decision-maker will be incomplete, inaccurate, or, in the worst case 
scenario, both.  As we will soon ascertain, these “intelligence” failures have a 
negative effect on the quality of alternatives available to and chosen by the 
decision-maker.157 
The first intelligence failure occurred when the heads of Truman’s 
decision-making body failed to relay to Truman the criticism and dissent of the 
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scientists who had worked on the atomic project. For instance, Leo Szilard and 
his Chicago Lab colleagues were not permitted to speak directly with Truman 
about the atomic bomb and how they thought its use would negatively affect 
the balance of power and integrity of the world system.  Instead they were re-
directed to James Byrnes, then a private citizen in South Carolina.   
 Byrnes was not sympathetic to the views of the scientists and refused 
to believe that the use of the atomic bomb would cause an arms race to ensue. 
Instead, Byrnes, like Stimson and Roosevelt, asserted that the bomb would 
allow the US to gain an upper hand in negotiations with the Soviets.  In the 
end, Byrnes was blinded by his conquest to manipulate the Soviets with the 
threat of atomic power.  Thus, he refused to accept the scientist’s educated 
evaluation and subsequently, did not present their dissent to Truman.158   
Byrne’s refusal to heed the warnings of Szilard and his colleagues was 
not the only instance where sound scientific advice was casually discarded. The 
top-policy maker’s ignorance of the Franck Report, a document prepared by the 
Chicago scientists objecting to the bombs use without warning, is indicative of 
the government’s refusal to recognize powerful scientific dissent. In fact, the 
Franck Report was only viewed by the scientific advisory Committee, which 
was staffed by the head of the Los Alamos Lab Robert Oppenheimer, Director 
the Chicago Lab and former Nobel laureate Edward Teller, James B. Conant, 
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Enrico Fermi and E.O Lawrence.  This prestigious Committee rejected the 
report, as they were “wary of pushing for a change in tactics if they might be 
held responsible for the future of those tactics.”159 Their analysis carried 
particular weight with Truman given the prestigious achievements of the 
scientists and of course, their extensive involvement in the project.   
Later, the same group of policy-makers ignored and blocked the 
circulation of a petition to the president that called for an alteration in the way 
the bomb would be used.  Again, the preconceptions generated by the 
Roosevelt administration regarding the bombs potential ability to “control” the 
Soviets clearly outweighed the presentation of sound advice and viable 
alternatives from the scientific community. Ironically, it was the scientists that 
created the weapon who had the most accurate conception of what the bombs 
capabilities were, and thus, should have been allowed to come into direct 
contact with Truman. Yet, it is evident that “of the main contestants for and 
against the use of the bomb for military purposes without warning, Truman did 
not hear the full case of those who were most opposed to its use.”160 Instead, 
important intelligence was withheld from Truman, as he was compelled to listen 
to his closest military adviser, Byrnes, who favored atomic use in order to speed 
the war to its culmination and hasten US domination of the Soviets.  
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The Role of the President 
The personality, beliefs, experiences and values of the individual 
decision maker also have a significant impact on any decision-making process.  
Decision-making scholars purport that “a president may have a personal impact 
on decision-making through his core personal attributes, the dispositions he 
brings to working with his advisers and other principal associates.”161  Not 
surprisingly, certain prominent aspects of Truman’s personality, specifically his 
lack of education and his interrelated propensity to make quick knee jerk, 
decisions, were detrimental to his decision-making process.  
Truman was extremely conscious of his lack of education and was 
continually forced to rely on the expertise of his advisers to acquire knowledge 
of current affairs. The atomic bomb decision was no different. For instance, 
Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Commerce during those four crucial months 
observed how easy it was to influence Truman. Thus, early on, many of his 
cabinet members had little respect for Truman’s opinions, as he tended to 
parrot the views of the last person he had spoken with.   
However, Truman strove to compensate for his obvious lack of 
education and knowledge by being a “decisive decision maker.”   Almost as a 
way of compensating for his lack of knowledge, Truman would emphasize that 
the final decision in all matters was his decision.  Essentially, Truman’s 
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insecurities caused him to be obsessed with being seen as the person who 
“makes the final decision in all matters of major policy after they give me their 
facts and recommendations.”162  
Truman’s knee jerk decision-making stood in sharp contrast to 
Roosevelt’s thoughtful and often tediously long decision-making process.  
Upon assuming the presidency, Truman was quoted saying that “I am here to 
make decisions, and whether they prove right or wrong I am going to make 
them.”163  On the other hand, Roosevelt was notorious for brooding over an 
important decision for days in order to make the “right one,” much to the 
irritation of his cabinet.  At first, Stimson welcomed the change with Truman, 
noting “it was a wonderful relief to preceding conferences with our former 
Chief to see the promptness and snappiness with which Truman took up each 
matter and decided it.”164  However, Truman’s tendency to make quick 
decisions, based on “knee jerk” reactions was inherently damaging to a coherent 
and rational decision-making process.  Rapid-fire decision-making processes 
can lead to many errors, such as making “inappropriate generalizations or 
analogies, premature cognitive closure and incomplete, causal analysis.”165  As a 
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result, many of the aforementioned cognitive errors are visible in Truman’s 
decision-making process leading up to the drop of the first bomb.   
In essence, Truman’s propensity to make quick decisions, coupled with 
his reliance on his advisers contributed extensively to his negation of feasible 
alternatives to direct military use of the bomb.  For instance, when Truman was 
given access to assessments that conflicted with those of his closest adviser, 
Byrnes, he failed to absorb and process the information.  Specifically, when 
Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of State Joseph 
Grew, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and even Stimson suggested 
that Roosevelt’s unconditional surrender terms be altered, Truman, instead of 
thinking critically about the option, stubbornly adhered to Roosevelt’s legacy 
and the opinions of his most trusted adviser, Byrnes.166  Thus, in every case, 
when presented with dissenting opinions Truman would strive to seem decisive, 
while concurrently adhering to the counsel of his closest adviser. In contrast, 
Roosevelt’s decision-making process, though arduous, was not as prone to 
these errors because he gave himself ample time to define the problem, collect 
information, and analyze feasible alternatives.  
Truman’s lack of education and knee jerk decision-making weren’t the 
only factors impeding rational decision-making. In fact, Truman’s extensive 
knowledge of and belief in the cyclical nature of history, coupled with his 
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experiences as a artillery captain during WWI negatively impacted his decision-
making process167  Truman may not have had a college education, but he was an 
avid reader of history. For Truman history was cyclical and could be used to 
inform future decisions.  Lacking a formal education and training, Truman 
“often used historical analogies to understand world events and chose among 
policy alternatives.”168   
It is not unusual for foreign policy makers, in the absence of complete 
intelligence, to rely on historical analogies to define a problem and formulate 
feasible alternatives.169 However, relying on analogies can be detrimental to the 
decision maker’s process for various reasons.  The danger of reasoning by 
analogy lies in the fact that the situations being compared may not actually be 
congruent, often causing the “introduction of biases and distortion into the 
analysis of a set of political events.”170 Thus, procedures followed and policies 
implemented for the first situation may not be applicable to the current 
situation.   
In Truman’s case, his analogies enabled him speed up an already hastily 
executed decision-making process, thus making him more prone to error.  
During the months leading up to the drop of the bomb Truman used various 
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historical analogies to guide his decision-making process. One of the first 
historical analogies Truman used to guide his policy decisions was his 
knowledge of Japan’s behavior prior to the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor.  
During the December peace talks in 1941, the US had responded to and 
believed Japan’s assurances of peace.  Obviously, the assurances had been false, 
and the result was the attacks on Pearl Harbor.  As a result of this earlier 
betrayal, Truman and his advisers blatantly disregarded a Japanese message on 
July 12th, which indicated a willingness to engage in peaceful negotiations if the 
terms of the surrender were altered.   
Records indicate that Truman and Byrnes had access at to intelligence 
reports indicating Japan’s desire to open up diplomatic channels with the US 
through the Soviets.  Yet, Truman and Byrnes were not interested in the 
reports, and barely even read them.171  Essentially, Truman and the analysts 
were convinced that the Japanese were merely attempting to use “peaceful 
overtures” to cause dissension between the “Big Three” during the meeting at 
Potsdam.  As a result of this reasoning, which equated the current situation with 
events prior to Pearl Harbor, the message was never taken seriously and 
discarded without further investigation.172   
The second analogy utilized by President Truman, an analogy that 
helped rule out a US land invasion, involved Truman’s perceptions of the 
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Japanese as ferocious in battle, and unrelenting, even in the face of massive 
casualties.  For Truman, history indicated that it was the “basic policy of the 
present Japanese government to fight as long and as desperately as possible.”173  
The US’s experiences in Iwo Jima and in Okinawa were indicative of the types 
and amounts of casualties that would be sustained by American forces in a 
conventional invasion of Japan.  Already, 12,000 American’s had been killed in 
Okinawa, and 36,000 had been injured.  The Japanese had faired much worse 
than the Americans, losing about 110,000 men, which was roughly equivalent to 
1/3 of the population of the entire island.174  Yet still, the Japanese persevered.   
In reality, Truman’s concerns were not unfounded. Statistically, things 
were grim.  American casualties in the Pacific in the three months since Truman 
had assumed office were roughly equivalent to half of the total casualties in the 
Pacific for the past three years. Moreover, the ferocity of attacks against the 
American soldiers was also intensifying.  Violent attacks, including the use of 
Kamikaze suicide warriors, the Palawan Massacre, which left 140 American 
soldiers dead, as well as the infamous Bataan death March were becoming more 
frequent.175    
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Likewise, casualty estimates for a land invasion of Japan were grim. It is 
difficult to say with confidence how many different casualty estimates for an 
invasion of the Japanese homeland were thrown around by Truman’s advisers.  
Declassified Department of Defense papers indicate that General Marshall 
predicted a mere 31,000 casualties during the first stage of the Japan invasion.  
However, later records, which include speeches, memos and manuscripts, 
indicate that casualty estimates ranged from a quarter of a million to a million 
American lives.176  A May 15th memo to Stimson from Herbert Hoover 
indicated that “a clarification of terms (surrender terms) might save 500,000 to 
1 million American lives.”177 Even Stimson was quoted as saying that “I was 
informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million 
casualties to American forces alone.”178  
Ultimately, however, Truman’s military service would be the 
fundamental analogy shaping his final decision to utilize the atomic bomb on 
the Japanese.  As a former artillery captain during World War I, Truman was 
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sympathetic to the thousands of soldiers and ground-troops fighting abroad.  
From the beginning, Truman emphasized the need to extract the troops from 
the war as soon as possible, in attempt to save the lives of the many “American 
boys” who were fighting.  Admiral William Leahy recognized Truman’s ranking 
of the lives of American boys above all other factors early on noting that “It is 
his [Truman’s] intention to make his decision on the campaign with the purpose 
of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives.  
Economy in the use of time and in money costs is comparable unimportant.”179  
Truman’s ranking of American lives above all other factors was the 
result of having witnessed firsthand the devastation caused by war.  His 
experience as an artillery captain caused him to view the atomic bomb as “just 
the same as artillery on our side.”180 This equation of the bomb to artillery, 
though obviously overly simplistic, created a tangible connection to the soldiers, 
while simultaneously equating the bomb to something he understood.  In 
essence, Truman understood war, “knew its nature, its importance, and its 
limitations.  He knew that its primary effectiveness was in overcoming opposing 
military powers or deterring another’s use of it, or in over awing an opponent 
and gaining acceptance of one’s own will.”181 Truman, unlike the other 
president’s during the modern era was a man who had experienced war first 
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hand, not just from behind a desk in Washington. Thus, Truman was extremely 
sympathetic to the nations own soldiers.  
Truman’s obsession with extracting his “American Boys” from an 
increasingly deadly war that was, in his eyes, only going to grow more deadly, 
becomes readily apparent in his conversations and letters with his advisers and 
family members. Truman’s letters to his wife Bess shed light on his thought 
process prior to dropping the bombs.  His first reaction to the news that Stalin 
planned to join the war in August was that “we’ll end the war sooner now and 
think of all the kids that won’t be killed…that’s the important thing” 182 For 
Truman, the soldiers deployed abroad were not just his responsibility; they 
became like veritable members of his family, almost equivalent to thousands of 
sons placed right in harms way.  His language, specifically his use of the word 
“kids” implied his inherent sense of responsibility for these young men.  
 Truman further emphasized his connection to the nation’s soldiers 
when he questioned how the American president would explain to the 
American people that their soldiers, brothers, dads, boyfriends and husbands 
were being slaughter when we could end the war with one single weapon.183  
Thus, at every point during the decision-making process, Truman was painfully 
cognizant of the amount of American blood that would be on his hands if he 
did not use the atomic bomb to end the war.  Truman, when faced with the 
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statistical recommendations of his advisers, most of who agreed that dropping 
the bomb would save American lives, also chose to believe that it would save 
lives. In the end, Truman, given his connection to the American soldier could 
not fathom sending more “boys” off to war, when he could end their misery by 
just dropping a single bomb.  
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Chapter IV 
The Path to the Truman Doctrine 
 
Introduction 
When analyzing the development of a foreign policy it is essential to 
pinpoint the key events that determined the final policy.  The case of the 
Truman Doctrine, which established an aid program for Greece and Turkey 
and some say the United State’s first policy of containment, is no different. In 
fact, the Truman Doctrine, though delivered on March 12th, 1947, began to 
germinate during the last months of 1946 and would continue to develop 
throughout the next year.  Though a seemingly clear statement of policy, it was, 
as we will see, the result of numerous actions and reactions to world events and 
conditions in the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the US.   
The Strategic importance of Turkey 
 By September of 1945 World War II, which had spanned three 
continents and caused countless casualties had finally come to an end.  Yet, the 
end of World War II did not mean that Truman and his administration could 
breathe a sigh of relief.  In fact, tensions were still high, as disagreements and 
differences amongst the Allied powers, particularly between the Soviets and the 
US began to emerge. During this delicate period of transition Truman 
recognized that “It was natural for people everywhere, when the fighting ended, 
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to hope that peace and harmony would come at once…”  However, this state 
of peace and harmony was not fully realized, as “many differences among the 
Allies had been subordinated during the war, but now that the common enemy 
was defeated, the problems of peace had brought these differences to the 
surface.”184  In particular, Truman was referring to the increasingly strained 
relations between the US and the Soviets Union regarding Greece and Turkey.  
According to Truman “we had already discovered how difficult the Soviets 
could be, but in the months that immediately followed the war this was revealed 
even further.”185 
Throughout 1945-1947 the Soviets and the US would disagree on a 
myriad of issues, including the control of atomic energy, the post-war status of 
the Balkan states, the control of vital resources and territory in Iran and even 
the composition of the newly organized United Nations.  The gravity of these 
aforementioned issues, while of the utmost importance to the Truman 
administration, would be surmounted by concerns surrounding Soviet 
infiltration and subjugation of Turkey and Greece.  US concern for these two 
nations was not unfounded.  As we will later discern, even in the absence of the 
Soviet threat, both Greece and Turkey were of significant strategic and 
psychological importance to the US.   
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The US’s concern about Turkey and subsequently, the rest of the 
Mediterranean falling into the Soviet sphere of influence was legitimate.  Since 
the end of World War II the Soviets had been applying pressure in a strategic 
‘war of nerves’ in hopes of sweeping Turkey behind its “iron curtain” and 
forming another satellite nation.  The situation began to intensify during the 
early fall of 1946 when the Soviet Union began to project “unmistakable signs 
that the Soviet Government plan(ed) to add Turkey to its group of satellites.”  
The signs included an anti-Turkish radio campaign by the Soviet press, Soviet 
claims to portions of eastern Turkey and the non-renewal of the Turko-Soviet 
treaty of friendship, which had existed since 1925. Yet, for the US government 
the most significant signs of forthcoming Soviet aggression were the Soviet 
notes to Turkey, on August 7th and September 24th, 1946.”186   
As long as anyone could remember, the Dardanelles had been of great 
strategic importance to whoever controlled them.  The Straits provided the 
Soviets with unlimited control of the Black Sea and an outlet to the 
Mediterranean. Thus, it was not a surprise when on August 7th, 1946 Turkey 
and Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson received a proposal from the 
Soviets to alter the Montreux Convention, the set of laws that governed the 
control and passage of vessels in the Straits.  The Soviet document proposed 
that, “Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable 
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of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security of the Straits, 
shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits…”187  Though not explicitly 
stated the US, Britain and Turkey took this to mean that the Soviets wanted to 
establish bases on the Dardanelles.  This was unacceptable, especially to the 
Turkish government, who viewed the establishment of Soviet bases as an 
outright infringement on their sovereignty and a threat to their national security.   
In response to the Soviet’s demand the Turkish government stated, on 
August 9th, that “from national viewpoint Soviet proposal is incompatible with 
inalienable sovereign rights of Turkey and with its security which cannot be 
made subject to restriction.” 188 Likewise, the US could not tolerate an 
arrangement of this sort by the Soviets because it obviously sought to bypass 
the United Nations by establishing a bilateral defense contract in the 
Dardanelles. Thus, the US, acting in concert with Britain and Turkey would 
inform the Soviets on August 19th, 1946 that “It is the firm opinion of this 
government that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible or the 
defense of the Straits.”  Furthermore, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson 
would emphasize the primacy of the UN, noting “should the Straits become the 
object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor the resulting situation would 
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constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for 
action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations.”189 
Though the reactions were varied, most members of the Truman 
administration viewed Soviet actions as a clear attempt to utilize Turkey as “a 
defense against possible outside attack from the Mediterranean,” and most 
importantly, as a “springboard” for political and military expansion by the 
Soviet Union into the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East.”190  This 
prospect was daunting because in 1946 Turkey was one of the only nations in 
the region still capable of resisting Soviet expansionism.  Already, the US had 
seen the Soviet Union expand its sphere of influence throughout Eastern 
Europe. The US Joint Chiefs predicted that the if the Soviets were able to 
further extend their influence into Turkey, something that they had been 
attempting to do since April 1945, then the Soviet Union would be in the 
position to control the rest of the Mediterranean, including the Middle East, 
Greece and Italy.191   
The Joint Chiefs emphasized that the consequences of Soviet control in 
these regions would be dire.  If the Soviets achieved their ends, then all western 
and US influence in the region would be eradicated and the Soviets would 
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possess vital resources, such as the rights to strategically important oil fields and 
communications networks. Concern was even expressed that control of Turkey 
might mean the spread of Soviet influence to China and India. 192 In essence, 
the administration viewed Turkey as a vital strategic asset because of its 
geographical position.  Fundamentally, “Turkey constitute(d) the stopper in the 
neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could 
most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.  A 
Russian-dominated Turkey would open the floodgates for Soviet advance…”  
That is, Turkey’s subjugation to Soviet influence would encumber other nations 
in the region and perhaps “fatally expose,” the surrounding areas to Soviet 
domination.193 
During an August 15th meeting Truman and his advisers decided that 
the deterring Soviet aggression was their utmost priority, even if it risked 
inciting conflict with the Soviets.   Acheson indicated that “in our opinion the 
time has come when we must decide that we shall resist with all means at our 
disposal any Soviet aggression....in particular…against Turkey.”  Yet, Acheson, 
Truman, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and the other secretaries were wary 
of relying on brute force to elicit concessions from the Soviets.  Instead they 
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hoped that the UN would function as the body through which this dispute 
could be resolved.”194  
In light of the Soviets increasingly aggressive stance, and under pressure 
from the Turkish Government to take a clear position, the Truman 
administration, on October 21st, 1946 decided to delineate a policy clarifying the 
US’s involvement with Turkey.  The US vowed to remain firm but reasonable 
with regards to the Straits and the Soviet’s desire to control sections of eastern 
Turkey.  Likewise, the US asserted its commitment to uphold UN principles 
with regards to Turkey’s claims of sovereignty.  The US, having already 
provided Turkey with financial aid, including a $25,000,000 loan through the 
Export Import Bank, indicated its willingness to offer future assistance. Finally, 
the US insisted that the British continue to aid Turkey militarily, given their 
historical treaty relationship.  If, however, the British could not continue to 
furnish aid of this sort, the US, “in a very exceptional case might consider 
furnishing certain supplies direct…”195 
Trouble Brewing in Greece 
Greece, not unlike Turkey, was put on the strategically important, but 
“endangered” list by the US during 1946.  By September 5th, 1946 the US had 
officially recognized that it was “in the interest of U.S. security that Greece be 
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supported,” through “economic assistance in the form of liberal and unfettered 
credits.”196 During the first half of 1946 economic and political aid was given to 
Greece by the US Export-Import Bank. In the initial phases the amount of aid 
Greece received was determined on “the basis of need, capacity to prepay, and 
general attitude of the recipient country...”197 Moreover, the US government, 
despite receiving additional requests for aid, would only consider furnishing 
more economic assistance if the Greeks demonstrated that they could manage 
their finances and “help themselves.” 198 
The US began to reconsider its policies as evidence materialized that the 
social and economic conditions in Greece were worsening.  By late September 
1946 Greece, unlike Turkey, who had been damaged during the war but not 
crippled, was in dire social and economic shape. On September 24th Byrnes 
would assert that Greece’s situation both politically and economically was more 
urgent than Turkey’s.199  During the war Greece had borne the brunt of 
repeated attacks by the German and Italian Armies. Factories had closed, 
production and agriculture had ceased and starvation and disease decimated the 
population.  Communist resistance groups like the EAM had been established 
to counter German domination. When the German forces finally withdrew 
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from Greece in 1944 the country was left in a state of disarray.  As a result, 
British forces moved in to provide support and facilitate the return of the exiled 
government.  Yet, even with the return of the Greek government the country 
was still wrought by considerable economic and political turmoil.   
The most significant challenge to recovery was the presence of the 
Communist rebel movement, the EAM, which refused to surrender and instead 
withdrew into the countryside to wreak havoc.  The EAM gathered a 
considerable following, capitalizing on the widespread feeling of discontent and 
the dire economic situation produced by the war. Soon, the Soviets, seeing their 
chance to acquire another sphere of influence, intervened and managed to 
provide the Communist groups with assistance, weapons, equipment and 
training.200  
The Soviets were not just aiding the EAM in promoting internal dissent 
in Greece. Throughout 1946 evidence would accumulate implicating the Soviets 
in using their satellite states, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, to pressure and 
weaken the Greek’s resistance to communism. The acting Undersecretary of 
State for Economic Affairs William Clayton would charge that the Soviets were 
not just providing ideological support, but also providing arms and 
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strengthening the anti-Greek groups in order to “set up in Greece a 
government which would be subservient to the Soviet Union.” 201 
The new challenges posed by Soviet actions in the Mediterranean 
justified a reconsideration of the US’s policy of economic aid toward Greece, 
and Turkey.  Since August 1st, 1946 reports had been coming from the 
Economic Mission in Greece that the country was in need of more aid.  
Throughout August the head of the Greek Economic Mission, Sophocles 
Venizelos, had stressed the “political importance of immediate further credits in 
order to bring hope to the Greek people,” while also noting that “Greek 
internal social order will collapse if early aid not forthcoming.”202  At this point, 
the US administration, including the president had been wary of furnishing 
more aid to the Greeks because of their “Inefficiency in connection to the 
utilization of the existing $25 million credit.” Thus, until the US saw what they 
perceived to be as sound fiscal policies they would not provide more aid. 203 
In the midst of the Greek “financial crisis” the US government was 
attempting to assess the status of Britain’s 28,500 troops in Greece. As early as 
September 11th, 1946, the US Ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, 
informed Byrnes that discussion regarding the British withdrawal of troops 
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from Greece had commenced.  MacVeagh reported that a conversation with 
the commanding officer of the British Land Forces in Greece, Lt. General 
Crawford, revealed that it would be politically and socially unwise to withdraw 
troops.  Thus, MacVeagh estimated that it would be at least another year before 
the British would discontinue their occupation.  Both the British and the 
Americans understood that until the Soviets withdrew their Communist armies 
in the “Balkan puppet states,” the Greek state would not be safe from 
subjugation, thus necessitating the presence of friendly Anglo or American 
troops. 204  
Troop distribution was not the only the only pressing issue during this 
period. In late September, the US government began to take its first “baby-
steps” toward bolstering their aid programs to Greece and possibly Turkey.  On 
September 24th Byrnes sent a strongly worded memo declaring that a change in 
the administration’s policy of economic aid based was in order.  In response to 
Soviet infiltration Byrnes proposed that the US “help our friends in every way 
and refrain from assisting those who either through helplessness or for other 
reasons are opposing the principles for which we stand.”205  Byrnes would stress 
that providing Greece with substantive economic aid would be a critical 
indicator to the Soviets and to the world that the US intended to promote and 
act in defense of its principles and ideals of freedom and liberty. Clayton, 
                                                 
204 11 September 1946, The Ambassador in Greece to the Secretary of State, FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, 209. 
 108 
 
 
replying in a telegram on the following day, agreed with Byrnes’s assessment 
emphasizing that he and the War Department believed that “the position of 
Greece closely parallels that of Turkey,” and that plans for a reorientation of 
policy were already underway. 206 
Persistent pressure from Byrnes, Clayton and MacVeagh coupled with 
the increasing threat posed by anti-Greek communist insurgents resulted in an 
October 21st memorandum assessing US policy toward Greece. The memo 
began by noting, “Many signs indicate that Greece is becoming a focal point in 
the strained international relations,” and that its survival might likely determine 
the status of the Near and Middle East in the future.  Internal challenges, such 
as the armed communist insurgents, a lack of public order and an enfeebled 
economy were greatly impeding recovery.  The analysis highlighted that the 
Greek insurgents were receiving physical and logistical support from the 
Soviets.  The US could not stand by and watch the infiltration of the Greek 
Government by communist forces because of “the strategic importance of 
Greece to U.S. Security,” and the fact that Greece was the only country in the 
Balkans that had not yet slipped behind the iron curtain and into the Soviet’s 
sphere of influence.   
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In light of these concerns, specific courses of actions were 
recommended.  First, it was urgent that the US government “increase and 
intensify its political and economic assistance promptly lest it come too late.”  
Economic aid was of the utmost importance, and the Export-Import Bank 
needed to be consulted for grants. The memo recommended providing extra 
relief assistance upon the cessation of the UNRRA (United Nations Relief and 
Recovery Agency) programs. Likewise, an American Economic Mission in 
Greece needed to be established for the purpose of determining where aid 
would be most effectively utilized.  Finally, the authors of the memo even 
considered providing military equipment to Greece, “in case of British inability to 
sell Greece sufficient arms for the maintenance of internal order until such time as military 
forces of the UN are prepared to undertake guarantees against such aggression.”207 
The Meeting of the Turkish and Greek Crises 
By November of 1946 Byrnes, Acheson, Truman and MacVeagh were 
cognizant of the threat that the Soviet’s posed in Greece and Turkey.  The most 
influential memos on the countries, both produced in late October indicated 
that the administration was pondering a reorientation of their policy of non-
intervention via military aid, while concurrently beefing up their economic 
support.  
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The first test of the administration’s policy of professed economic 
support would be gauged by the US responses to two telegrams from the 
Ambassador in Turkey, Edwin C. Wilson, on October 28th and November 8th.  
In his telegrams Wilson emphasized that the Turkish economy was having a 
difficult time sustaining its massive armed forces, which were serving to protect 
the borders from Soviet infiltration.  To make matters worse, the Turkish gold 
and exchange reserves were depleting rapidly.  In light of these events Turkish 
government would need substantial loans to maintain her defense capabilities 
and continue reconstruction. US aid, if it could be spared, would be 
instrumental in maintaining Turkish security.208  
The US, though not teeming with financial resources, began to 
investigate ways to provide Turkey with additional aid. Yet, ‘consideration’ was 
the only attention that the US could give Turkey during the final months of 
1946 given the stringent caps put on loans from the Export-Import Bank.209  
On a similar note, the US was even more reluctant to positively answer 
Turkey’s request for additional military appropriations.  At this point, the US 
would assert that it could not furnish military supplies to Turkey for fear that 
“the impression be obtained in the United States and elsewhere that we are 
carrying on a provocative policy with regard to the Soviet Union and are 
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fanning the embers of a possible Soviet-Turkish war.”  Instead, the US would 
pursue a policy whereby Great Britain would be the sole provider of weapons 
and military equipment to Turkey, given the legacy of their “treaty” 
relationship.  210 
Likewise, a reorientation of American thinking with regards to the 
economic and political situation in Greece (Expressed in the October 21 
memo) did not constitute a tangible change in US economic and military aid to 
Greece.  In fact, a November 4th memo to Byrnes from MacVeagh, detailing the 
“extremely critical foreign exchange position of Greece,” did not elicit an 
immediate change in attitudes.211  On November 8th, Acheson informed 
MacVeagh that the US government would not furnish the requested arms and 
military supplies to Greek.  Acheson rationalized that although supplying arms 
would be beneficial for American ends, the government did not want to risk 
“provoking” the Soviet Union and its Balkan puppets.  Again, Acheson 
confirmed that the British would continue to shoulder the burden of supplying 
military equipment in Greece.”212 
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The US, though not able to supply direct aid, created an Economic 
Mission to assess the situation in Greece.  The mission, which would embark in 
January 1947 for Greece, would be headed by Paul A. Porter, the former head 
of the Office of Price Administration.  Traveling with the mission would be a 
group of economic, financial and engineering experts charged with examining 
economic conditions and their effect on the reconstruction and development of 
Greece. Because of the “urgency of the situation” the evaluation was scheduled 
for submission by the end of April, 1947.  
A Reorientation of Policy 
When 1947 arrived, the Truman administration, the US and the rest of 
the world system were in a state of flux.  Domestically, Truman’s administration 
was faced with a myriad of changes, which had both positive and negative 
effects on the functioning of the government.  The first, positive change, 
according to many of Truman’s cabinet members was the resignation of 
Secretary of State James Byrnes, and the appointment of General George 
Marshall in his place.  Byrnes, who had been planning to retire upon Marshall’s 
return from a diplomatic mission in China, had not been liked in the State 
Department because of his frequent absences from the country, his lax 
administrative methods, and his penchant for “secret” policy making. 
General Marshall, on the other hand, was orderly, and consulted his 
subordinates in order to give them more policy-making responsibility. Acheson 
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and the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority David E. Lilienthal were 
among the members of the administration who expressed satisfaction with 
Byrnes’s resignation. For them, Byrnes’ administration had been erratic, 
thoughtless and inept. Even Joseph Jones, the Special Assistant to the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Public Affairs, noticed the how the change affected the 
department “from top to bottom and called forth a great surge of ideas and 
constructive efforts.”213.  
A second, less positive change from the point of view of the 
Democratic Administration came in Congress.  The November elections had 
tipped the Republican-Democrat balance in the Senate and the House, leaving 
both in the control of the Republicans for the first since 1930.  The changes in 
Congress became effective in January 1947 with the initiation of an extremely 
fiscally conservative set of senators and representatives.214 It was in this context 
that Truman began 1947, well aware that his new programs of providing 
economic assistance to marginalized and threatened regions would be difficult 
to pass through a penny-pinching Congress.215 
In early January, 1947 it became evident that Soviet threat in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East had not been neutralized.  On January 9th, 
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Truman received word from the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union 
Walter Bedell Smith that the Soviets were resuming their efforts to “encroach 
upon” Turkish sovereignty. Smith relayed that Turkey had little hope of 
maintaining independence without significant aid from the US and Britain.216 
Turkey, according to Smith, had two alternatives for dealing with the Soviets.  
The first was to seek support through a regional agreement involving the US, 
UK, Turkey and USSR.  The second involved working within the UN.  Smith 
was inclined to support the UN alternative, estimating that it would not be 
probable that the “USSR would participate in (a) Turkish agreement with what 
it regards as its inevitable and greatest enemies—US and UK—.”   
Byrnes, before officially resigning as secretary of state would agree with 
Smith’s assessment noting that any suggestion of a regional agreement for the 
Straits would certainly imply a flaw in the Montreux Convention, thus 
undermining the US, UK, and Turkey’s previous positions.  Byrnes anticipated 
that the Soviets would argue that “the Montreux Convention and the United 
Nations does not provide adequate security for the Straits and insist that the 
logical remedy is system resting on arrangement among Black Sea powers.”217   
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To some, even the UN was not a viable forum through which to 
address Soviet advances on Turkish and Greek sovereignty.  MacVeagh argued 
that even if the UN was able to provide border security to halt the infiltration 
of Communist insurgents, it would not address the root of the problem.  In 
MacVeagh’s opinion Greece’s economic and social crises could not be solved 
unless the internal problems were rectified.  He also estimated that “from our 
(Ethridge and MacVeagh) observation of Russian tactics Ethridge and I feel 
that the Soviets themselves see matters in exactly this same way.”218 
The following day, despite Smith’s forewarning of Turkey’s imminent 
demise at the hands of the Soviets, Byrnes refused to guarantee economic aid to 
Turkey. Additionally, Byrnes, in a telegram to the Turkish Embassy, would 
convey that an economic mission to Turkey could not be sent to assess the 
financial situation.  Byrnes and the administration feared that the Turkish 
citizens would view an undertaking of this magnitude as a “forerunner for 
extensive financial assistance, which in light of Eximbank’s (Export-Import 
Bank) present position, we might not be in a position to provide.”219 
Meanwhile, on January 10th Truman addressed Congress in order to 
request approval of his budget for the fiscal year of 1947.  In his address 
Truman requested $37.7 billion to finance government operations for the fiscal 
year, $11.2 billion of which would be allotted to national defense. On February 
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14th, after reviewing Truman’s request, the Joint Congressional Committee on 
Legislative Budget recommended a budget ceiling of $31.5 billion, allotting the 
Army 1 billion, the Navy 750 million, and the Army overseas relief program 
only 500 million. The new Secretary of State Marshall, disturbed about the 
committee’s allotments, warned that conditions in occupied countries would 
become “impossible” if Congress cut the budget by the proposed amount. 
 Similar reactions to Congress’s proposed fiscal program emanated from 
the Secretary of War Robert Patterson, who worried that the cuts would mean 
that the US would “travel the same old road, disarming while the other major 
powers remain armed.”220  Even Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, 
Truman’s Republican ally in Congress, worried that extensive cuts to the budget 
would signal that America was turning inwards and was no longer willing\able 
to sustain their international commitments.  Vandenberg maintained that a 
budget cut of this magnitude would indicate to the world that America had “a 
chip on each shoulder and both arms in a sling.”221 Eventually, Vandenberg was 
able to convince both the House and the Senate to approve a $34.7 billion 
budget for the fiscal year.  
The administration’s reluctance to commit any aid to Turkey was not 
mirrored in Greece.  On the contrary, by January 11th MacVeagh and Byrnes 
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were actively discussing the creation of a substantive aid program, which would 
need to be approved by Congress.  Judging from his correspondence with 
Byrnes, MacVeagh perceived that “the American government is proceeding 
already to the realization of the policy it has laid down concerning Greece.” 
That is, MacVeagh believed that the US government was now actively moving 
toward executing a policy of financial and logistical support, which had merely 
been elucidated during 1946.222   
Just three days later a discussion between Clayton and the Greek 
Charge, Mr. Paul Econonmou-Gouras further reinforced the US’s verbal 
commitment to provide economic aid to Greece.  When Gouras telephoned on 
January 14th he requested “extraordinary and immediate financial assistance to 
Greece,” to ameliorate Greece’s economic woes.  Clayton replied that while the 
government was “genuinely concerned” and in the process of “exploring all 
possibilities,” they were faced with certain legal restraints, thus making the 
prospect of immediate financial aid grim.  Clayton, however, did anticipate that 
by mid-March the US Government would “present to Congress…a bill 
providing aid to several nations, including Greece.”223 
February did not bring respite from the deluge of communications and 
telegrams stressing the gravity of the situations in Greece and Turkey and now, 
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Great Britain. From February 3rd-12th MacVeagh sent a series of cables to the 
US reporting on rumors that the British were preparing to withdraw their 
troops from Greece.  One of the cables even requested that the US seriously 
consider providing aid to the Greeks, because “The British were not able to 
keep up even the little they were doing.”224 Exacerbating fears of a British 
withdrawal was MacVeagh’s insistence that economic deterioration in Greece 
would soon cause a nationwide revolution, incited by the Soviets sponsored 
communists.  He stressed that “If Greece falls to the Communists the whole 
Near East, and part of North Africa as well are certain to pass under Soviet 
influence.” 225 
The February 17th report from Paul Porter, the Chief of the American 
Economic Mission to Greece to Clayton was no less damning.  Porter 
accentuated that the “makings of a financial collapse,” in Greece, and that the 
state was disintegrating. Porter insisted that US economic assistance and 
continued British military and economic aid would be the best medicine for 
Greece’s economic and political ailments.226   In the midst of these urgent 
cables, Mark Ethridge of the US Investigating Commission reported on 
February 17th that “all signs pointed to an impending move by the communists 
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to seize the country.”227  Ethridge added that the other commissioners, namely 
those from Britain, France, China and Colombia agreed that if Greece collapsed 
the Near East, Italy and France follow suit.  A collapse of this magnitude would 
not only be detrimental to the free citizens of these countries, but to the UN as 
well.  In response to this threat Ethridge recommended that the US and Britain 
work in concert to convince the Soviets that “a most serious situation will arise 
if they permit their satellites and agents to continue to direct and supply guerilla 
forces and foment anarchy in Greece.” 228  
The warnings issued from MacVeagh, Ethridge and Porter did not fall 
on deaf ears.  By February 21st Acheson responded by preparing a proposal 
form Marshall containing specific recommendations and actions to mitigate the 
threats in Greece.  The most pertinent of these recommendations involved the 
immediate provision of economic and military aid.  Acheson recommended that 
the US garner support in Congress for a bill to provide relief funds to the 
Greek Government, lest they fall to communist pressure.  Likewise, though 
Acheson acknowledged that the US must aid in this endeavor because at the 
present, the “British are unable to meet the scheduled needs” of the Greek 
forces.229  
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Just as Acheson was sending his recommendations to Marshall, 
Ethridge too, continued to report on the increasingly tumultuous environment 
in Greece. On February 21st Ethridge would inform Marshall that the political 
unrest in Greece could not be quelled without the reorganization and recovery 
of Greece’s economy.  For Ethridge, Greece’s economic and political woes 
were intertwined, inseparable, and could only be “treated” as a pairing. Because 
of these circumstances Ethridge would insist that only a “national coalition 
government and substantial aid could save Greece.”230 To drive his point home 
he drew analogies between other attempts of Soviet subjugation, noting that 
“The Department is fully aware that in all Soviet states minorities have seized 
power by exactly same methods they are trying here.”  Greece, argued Ethridge, 
was a unique case however, because if it fell under Soviet influence the 
Communists could easily expand into Italy, France, the Middle East, Africa and 
perhaps even to China and the Far East.  Thus, given the strategic importance 
of Greece Ethridge questioned whether such an inchoate organization, the UN, 
was indeed the best hope for peace in Greece.  Answering his own question, 
Ethridge speculated that “The UN is our best hope at the moment, but a hope 
that will be greatly impaired if its first intervention (a fact finding mission in 
Greece to determine the extent of communist infiltration) is not effective.”231 
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The crisis finally came to a head on Friday evening, February 21st when 
the British Ambassador to America reported to the State Department that the 
British government could no longer sustain its military and economic 
commitments to Greece after the close of their fiscal year on March 31st, 
1947.232  Though there had been some indicators that the British were having 
economic problems of their own, Dean Acheson would insist that the 
documents were “shockers.”233 The British Government, though cognizant of 
the impending financial and military collapse in Greece, “had already strained 
their resources to the utmost to help Greece,” and now, “His Majesty’s 
Government…finds it impossible to grant further financial assistance to 
Greece.”  In lieu of British assistance, they strongly suggested that the US 
Government step into the fray and bear the remaining financial burden, as the 
collapse of Greece was imminent if “the financial-economic situation is allowed 
to deteriorate.” 234 
Just as the State Department was absorbing the gravity of the Greek 
situation, they also received word that the British were cutting off their 
economic and military aid to Turkey as well.  The British, though fully mindful 
of Turkey’s strategic importance and the inability of Turkish forces to further 
prevent communist encroachment upon their sovereignty, would no longer be 
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able to provide vital assistance.  As was the case with Greece, the British 
suggested that the US provide funds and military assistance in order to prevent 
such a strategically important state from falling into the Soviet sphere of 
influence. 235  
 Upon receiving word of the impending crisis Acheson telephoned the 
president and Marshall, who were out of town, in order to inform them of what 
had happened. When Truman received word of the impending crisis he 
immediately requested that Acheson work on a study of the situation in 
conjunction with the State-Navy-War Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).  
Three days later, on February 24th, Marshall presented Truman with the 
full text of Acheson’s memo for review.  Acheson stressed that the decision 
whether or not to pick up British slack in Greece and Turkey would be the 
“most major decision with which we have been faced since the war.” This view 
was affirmed by the frequent reports from US Ambassadors and observers such 
as Porter, Ethridge, MacVeagh, who separately relayed that Greece was nearly 
collapsed, and that Turkey would follow close behind.  Regarding estimations 
for aid, Acheson pointed out that for the fiscal year 1947 Greece would require 
about $250 million and that Turkey’s requirements were as of yet, unknown.  
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Also present at the review were Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson, all 
of whom provided the perspectives of the State, Navy and War departments.  
During the meeting Marshall reported that the British were “planning to take 
their troops out of Greece as soon as this could be conveniently done.”  He 
also presented dispatches from Smith in Moscow and MacVeagh in Greece.  
Both ambassadors, though miles away from each other, agreed that the entire 
arrangement in Greece was in jeopardy. Smith believed that “only the presence 
of British troops had so far saved Greece from being swallowed into the Soviet 
orbit.”  In turn, MacVeagh: “sent a picture of deep depression and even 
resignation among Greek leaders; their feeling seemed to be that only aid given 
at once would be of use.”236 Both men were adamant that there was little time 
to think; action had to be taken and a comprehensive aid program had to be 
“presented to Congress in such a fashion as to electrify the American 
people.”237 
Additional memos were also circulating around the State Department, 
including the February 26th memo from Jones, a member of the State 
Department’s public affairs office.  Jones’ memo emphasized that the 
“Congress and the people of this country are not sufficiently aware of the 
character and dimensions of the crisis that impends, and of the measure that 
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must be taken in terms of relief, loans, gifts…if disaster is to be avoided.” As a 
result, Jones expressed his desire to create a program to “inform the people and 
convince the Congress adequately with respect to today’s crisis…the danger 
should be described in full and the cost of both inaction and action 
estimated.”238 Essentially, Jones reasoned that such a program would mobilize 
support among American citizens to pressure the Congress to act.  
That same day, the SWNCC met and managed to agree on a policy 
recommendation, which they hoped would stabilize the situation in Greece and 
Turkey upon British withdrawal.  At three pm  Acheson and Marshall met with 
Truman to present the results of the morning’s committee meeting as well as 
the contents of a memo that General Dwight D. Eisenhower had created, 
outlining the  Joint Chief’s perspectives on the dilemma.  Essentially, the 
secretaries established that the British were not in any condition to provide 
more aid; that the situation in Greece was desperate; that the collapse of Greece 
threatened the security of the US and the Western World; and finally, that US 
aid to Greece and Turkey should be provided immediately.239  After being 
presented with the contents of the studies Truman indicated that the military 
and diplomatic experts had views that were similar to his own and that:  
Greece needed aid, and it needed it quickly, and in substantial amounts.  
The alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the iron 
curtain across the eastern Mediterranean. If Greece was lost, Turkey 
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would become an untenable outpost in a sea of Communism.  Similarly, 
if Turkey yielded to Soviet demands, the position of Greece would be 
extremely endangered. 240 
 
Throughout the meeting Truman insisted that he was still ready to 
commit to a program of economic and military assistance. He claimed that he 
had been pondering the implications of Soviet imperialism for some time now, 
and had been working on establishing a Policy Planning staff in the State 
Department, which would be presided over by George Kennan.  Truman 
believed that decisive action was the only possible route, because the 
alternative, inaction, would be “disastrous to our security and to the security of 
free nations everywhere.”241 The meeting closed with a discussion of how to 
procure a substantial amount of economic aid for the Greek program from a 
fiscally conservative Republican Congress. It was eventually decided that in 
order to convince Congress of the necessity of supporting Greece and Turkey 
economically Truman would need to make a special effort to “advise the 
congressional leadership as soon as possible of the gravity of the situation and 
of the nature of the decision which I had to make.”242  
The next morning, on February 27th, Truman convened a 10 am 
meeting with Marshall, Acheson, and Senators Styles Bridges, Arthur 
Vandenberg, Alben Barkley, Thomas Connally, Speaker Joseph Martin, 
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Representatives Charles Eaton, Sol Bloom and Sam Rayburn. Truman’s primary 
goal during this meeting was to speak directly to the representatives and 
describe the problems created by the imminent withdrawal of British aid and 
troops from Greece and Turkey. Truman insisted that it was imperative that 
Turkey and Greece receive significant amounts of aid and that he “had decided 
to extend aid to Greece and Turkey and…hoped Congress would provide the 
means to make this aid timely and sufficient.”  
General Marshall also made a speech, noting that the US had to “act or 
loose by default”243 Marshall coherently described the reasons that the British 
had to withdraw aid, while detailing how Greece and Turkey were at 
immeasurable risk of falling into the communist sphere of influence. Marshall’s 
speech, though informative, apparently did not visibly rouse the congressmen.  
Even Acheson admitted that the speech was “most unusually and unhappily 
flubbed” by Marshall.  
 At this point, Acheson stepped in and gave what many would later 
describe as the most pivotal speech in procuring congressional interest in the 
affair.  In a sense, Acheson believed himself to be the best prepared in the 
administration to make such a speech because “this was my crisis.  For a week I 
had nurtured it. These congressmen had no conception of what challenged 
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them; it was my task to bring it home.”244 Essentially, Acheson depicted a world 
divided into two discrete spheres of influence, a situation unparalleled “Since 
the days of Rome and Carthage.”245Acheson elucidated what would later be 
known as the “domino effect.”  He related that a victory for the communists in 
Greece would mean inevitable victory for the Soviet communists throughout 
Europe.  Using vivid imagery, Acheson depicted how “like apples in a barrel 
infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all 
of the east...and carry infection to Africa…and to Europe through Italy and 
France.”246  This prospect, claimed Acheson, would pose a direct threat to the 
existence of the US because the US’s values of democracy and freedom could 
not exist in a world where two thirds of the surface was dominated by 
communism.247 
After Acheson’s speech Truman gauged that the members of Congress 
seemed “deeply impressed” by the presentation,” and that there “was no voice 
of dissent when I stated the position which I was convinced our country had to 
take.”248  Further, Senator Vandenberg, a long standing Republican ally of the 
Truman administration announced that the US was obviously facing a crisis.  
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Vandenburg then exclaimed: “Mr. President, if you say that to the Congress and 
the country, I will support you and I believe that most of its members will do 
the same.”249   
From February 28th onward various departments would be charged with 
determining the proper course of action with regards to the aid program to 
Greece and Turkey. Dean Acheson, who was delegated many of the 
responsibilities for the drafting of the aid program because of Marshall’s 
absence in Moscow, was mindful of the gravity of the US’s actions.  Acheson 
acknowledged that “we were moving with incredible speed for so vast a country 
to assume a novel burden far from our shore.”250  Marshall too, despite his 
absence at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, felt strongly about the 
aid program.  Marshall insisted that in his absence Acheson had free reign to do 
“everything necessary” to hold our position in the Near East, “regardless of its 
effect upon the Conference,” in Moscow.  Like Acheson, Marshall saw the 
world as having arrived at an unparalleled point in history.  Thus, given the 
gravity of the situation both Acheson and Marshall agreed that “the matter 
must be put over forcefully; the US position must be made strong and clear.”251 
On the 28th Chief Officers from the State, War and Navy departments 
met to discuss how to effectively present the need for an aid program in Greece 
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and Turkey to Congress and the American public.  The officers eventually 
decided that the speech should make information available to the American 
public so they can form “intelligent” opinions about the crisis in Greece and 
Turkey, while also ascertaining the US’s current strategic situation.  
Concurrently, it would portray the conflict in Greece and elsewhere as a conflict 
between free and totalitarian governments.252 One officer at the meeting 
insisted that “the only way we can sell the public on our new policy is by 
emphasizing the necessity of holding the line: communism v. democracy should 
be a major theme.”253 
The beginning of March brought a formal request by the Greek 
government for US aid. In a series of meetings the administration continued to 
address the situation, and respond to advances from the governments and 
American representatives in Greece and Turkey.  By the time that the US 
received a formal request for aid from Greece on March 3rd, Acheson had 
perceived that “Greece was in the position of a semiconscious patient on the 
critical list whose relatives and physicians had been discussing whether his life 
could be saved.”254  Still, at this point the US and British governments had not 
yet revealed to Greece and Turkey, let alone the world, that the British were 
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planning on pulling out their troops and aid, and that the US was preparing to 
step in, filling Britain’s place.    
On March 7th, Truman held a Cabinet meeting devoted to discussing 
the “Greek situation.” At the meeting, Truman, in conjunction with Acheson 
explained to the cabinet members why the decision had been made to send aid 
to Greece and Turkey, and delineated the role that the British had played, and 
what their withdrawal meant for the stability of the Greek nation, and 
neighboring Turkey.255 Truman explained that he would request $150 million in 
aid for Turkey and $250 million for Greece.  He further emphasized that these 
figures were just preliminary, and that the administration would have to be 
prepared to contribute more aid at a later date.  Acheson, reflecting on this 
experience would insist that Truman perceived no other “alternative but to go 
ahead…realizing that this was only a beginning.”256   
When Truman was done speaking, the Secretary of Labor Lewis 
Schwellenbach pointed out that “Anti-British elements at home might charge 
that we were again pulling British chestnuts out of the fire.”257 In response to 
Schwellenbach’s point, the members of the meeting began to discuss how to 
best inform the American people about the impending crisis, and the necessity 
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of their solution. By the culmination of the meeting Truman had appointed 
Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder as the head of a committee to 
recommend how to inform the American public of the issues surrounding the 
aid program. Other members of the committee included: Acheson, Forrestal, 
Harriman, Patterson and Clinton Anderson.  
On March 8th, Snyder’s Committee met to discuss how the president 
should present the situation to the public. The Committee members agreed that 
“in order to emphasize the gravity of the situation, I [Truman] appear in person 
before a joint session of Congress.”258  Though Truman’s appearance before 
Congress was generally deemed necessary, objections began to surface against 
the sweeping generalities in the text of Truman’s speech.  The administrative 
assistant in the White House, George Elsey objected to the speech as a whole, 
insisting that “there has been no overt action in the immediate past by the 
USSR which serves as an adequate pretext for an all out speech.  The situation 
in Greece is relatively abstract…” Yet Elsey, despite his criticism contradicted 
himself by pointing out that “there have been other instances—Iran for 
example—where the occasion more adequately justified the speech”259   
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Protests to the speeches language were also heard from George 
Kennan, who objected to the “sweeping nature of the comments.”260 Bernard 
Baruch would later be critical of the address as well, calling it “tantamount to a 
declaration of…ideological and religious war.”261 The former secretary of State, 
Byrnes, would also complain that the speech was entirely too general in tone 
with regards to future commitments.262 Even Marshall, who was in Moscow 
when the speech was delivered, was “somewhat startled to see the extent to 
which the anti-Communist element was stressed.”263 Still, there were members 
of the administration such as Clark Clifford who continued to support the 
speech, labeling it “the opening gun in a campaign to bring people up to the 
realization that the war isn’t over by any means.”264 
 In an effort to gauge Congressional opinion on the progress of the 
Greek policy, Truman invited members of his Congress, with the addition of 
Acheson, back to his office on the 10th of March.  After discussing the Greek 
situation, Truman ascertained that Congressional opinion was still largely in 
favor of the policy of economic aid.  Evidently, Truman was further reinforced 
because “Vandenberg expressed his complete agreement with me…There was 
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no opposition to what had to be done.”265  Yet Acheson’s opinions were 
somewhat different, as he perceived that “despite Arthur Vandenberg’s earlier 
assurances, a cool and silent reception,” from members of Congress.  
According to Acheson’s account of the meeting, the congressmen were 
skeptical of Britain’s continued commitment, Truman’s policies, and the 
prospect of making any large fiscal commitments.  For Acheson, the meeting 
was neither an overwhelming success, nor a failure, as very little was said by the 
congressmen, and no commitments of any kind were made.266 
In the days prior to his appearance in front of Congress and the 
American public, Truman and his advisers would work tirelessly to prepare an 
influential speech.  The initial versions of Truman’s speech, which were 
prepared by the State Department, were not to Truman’s liking.  According to 
Truman, the speeches were too centered on statistical data and background 
information making “the whole thing sound like an investment prospectus.”267 
Truman was also critical of the second draft, which he claimed contained only a 
half-hearted policy statement.”268 
On March 12th, 1947 at 1pm President Truman delivered his speech, 
which would later be named “the Truman Doctrine” over national radio, and 
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directly in front of a joint session of Congress.  Truman’s speech, which called 
for Congress’s approval of immediate aid to Greece and Turkey, was intended 
to be “shock therapy” for Congress.269 For Truman, the speech was an essential 
aspect of a program to inform the nation and the entire world how the US 
would respond to “totalitarian” advances upon weak, but sovereign nations. 
Essentially, the address to Congress and the nation would be a “turning point in 
America’s foreign policy, which now declared that wherever aggression, direct 
or indirect, threatened peace, the security of the United States was involved.”270  
Certain aspects of Truman’s speech are worth mentioning, as they 
indicate the desired trajectory of the administration’s new policy. Truman began 
the speech by asserting that “it must be the policy of the United States to 
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or outside pressure.” 271 Here, Truman clearly delineated the 
American commitment to protect the free peoples of the world, while not 
specifically mentioning the identities of the “armed minorities” who were 
subjugating them.  Also, Truman proclaimed that the means to achieve the end 
of security and liberty would be economic, stating, “I believe that our help 
should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to 
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economic stability and orderly political processes.”272 The address became more 
provocative as Truman began to draw a sharp line between two ways of life: 
democracy and totalitarianism.  Truman orated: 
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is 
distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free 
elections, and guarantees of individual liberty…the second way of life is 
based upon the will of the minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. 
It relies upon terror and oppression…and the suppression of personal 
freedoms.273  
 
Finally, Truman concluded by accentuating that the US was responsible 
for helping oppressed nations mobilize for freedom. The preservation of 
freedom, according to Truman, would be beneficial for both domestic and 
international security.  He warned that “If we falter in our leadership, we may 
endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of 
our own nation.”274  Truman, though cognizant that other alternatives existed, 
such as going through the UN, emphasized the need for immediate action, 
which could only be made possible via US aid.  Truman insisted that “we have 
considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis.  But the situation 
is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its 
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related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is 
required.”275 
The standing ovation that Truman received from Congress signaled, 
quite clearly that Truman had achieved what he set out to accomplish.   The 
following day the Congress began work on legislation for an aid program to 
Turkey and Greece. The program for aid would not be approved until April, 
but in the meantime Truman did everything in his power to dispatch as much 
aid as possible without direct Congressional approval.  Public opinion, too, 
rallied in support of Truman’s proposed program of economic aid.  In the 
weeks following the speech Truman would assert that “All over the world 
voices of approval made themselves heard, while Communists…struck out at 
me savagely. The line had been drawn sharply.”276 
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Chapter V 
Adopting a Coherent World Vision: An Analysis of the Truman 
Doctrine  
 
 On March 12, 1947, a mere three weeks after the British informed the 
US that they could no longer sustain key aid commitments, President Harry S. 
Truman stood before a joint session of Congress and requested approval for an 
aid program to Greece and Turkey.  Truman broadcasted to the congressmen 
and the American public that “it must be the policy of the US to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressures,” and that Greece and Turkey would be the first targets of 
this new policy.277 By all accounts the policy delineated in the address, though 
fundamentally in line with the maintenance of US ideals of freedom and liberty, 
departed radically from the administrations previous policies by publicly 
indicating the US’s intention to provide material aid to countries threatened by 
‘totalitarianism.” 
Prior to the March 12th statement, the Truman administration had 
routinely rejected Turkey and Greece’s requests for aid. This would all change 
on February 21st, 1947, when Great Britain notified the US that it would no 
longer be able to sustain its economic and military aid programs to Greece and 
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Turkey.  In essence, “Great Britain had within the hour handed the job of 
world leadership, with all its burdens and all its glory, to the United States.”278  
All things considered, the US did not have to accept Britain’s move to 
hand off the “torch” of global responsibility to the American government.  
Indeed, Truman could have “washed his hands” of the Greece’s and Turkey’s 
financial problems, leading the US into economic and political isolation yet 
again.279 Given the trajectory of the Truman administration’s policies toward the 
Soviets in 1946 and early 1947 many question why Truman and his advisers, 
Secretary of State James Byrnes and Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, in 
lieu of other alternatives, publicly reversed a long-standing policy of conciliation 
and cooperation with the Soviets.  
Truman and Byrnes’ Bipolar Policies of 1945-1947 
From the cessation of World War II and up until Truman’s speech in 
March of 1947, there were numerous members in the State, War and Navy 
departments that exerted influence on the aid program to Greece and Turkey. 
Yet, of all the decision-makers none were as influential on the Doctrine’s 
construction as Byrnes, Acheson and Truman.   
Originally, Truman and Byrnes’ policies toward the Soviets were a 
product of former President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s legacy. Truman and 
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Byrnes held onto Roosevelt’s conception that “at the end of the war there 
would be three great powers…all the wartime conferences had been based on 
the existence of three great powers.”280 Essentially, Roosevelt’s strategy had 
been to build a relationship based on trust with the Soviet Union, in order to 
engender US-Soviet cooperation after WWII. To build this trust and mutual 
cooperation Roosevelt had planned to give the Soviet Union unconditional 
aid.281 In essence, Roosevelt, and subsequently Truman and Byrnes believed 
that the key to maintaining peace with the Soviets was through negotiation and 
the extension of “unquestioned” economic assistance.  
After World War II ended Truman and Byrnes would reluctantly 
ascertain that Roosevelt’s policy of conciliation with the Soviets was not a 
pragmatic one.  Still, from late 1945 to early 1947 Truman and Byrnes did not 
have “any definite, consistent and thought out policy,” with which to handle the 
Soviets.282  In point of fact, both Truman and Byrnes did not want to abandon 
the possibility of negotiating and maintaining an alliance with the Soviets.  At 
the same time they found it increasingly difficult to ascertain whether the 
Soviet’s belligerent actions were the result of insecurity or a new expansionist 
ideology.  As a result of this uncertainty Byrnes and Truman’s policies toward 
the Soviets, for much of the period prior to the declaration of the Truman 
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Doctrine, were bipolar. That is, they had a tendency to “flip-flop” between 
policies that confronted and then in the same breath sought to appease the 
Soviets.  
Appeasing the Soviets 
The bipolarity of Truman and Byrnes’ Soviet policy is evident in the 
series of convoluted policy decisions that they made in the years immediately 
after WWII.  In many instances Truman and Byrnes would go out of the way to 
appease the Soviets. For example, in 1945 and 1946 they would attempt to 
pacify the Soviets by working to establish a system of international controls on 
atomic weapons, in order to mitigate Soviet fears of an Anglo-American 
monopoly on atomic power.  Likewise, when the Soviets refused to pull their 
troops out of Iran by the set date in March of 1946, Truman and Byrnes opted 
to negotiate, sending Byrnes on a diplomatic mission to Moscow to confer 
directly with Stalin.  When the Moscow mission failed, Byrnes proposed that 
the US pull their troops out of Iran first, in order to “set a good example” for 
the Soviets. At one point in 1946 Byrnes even granted recognition to the Soviet 
satellites of Bulgaria and Rumania, rationalizing that a security barrier of 
friendly states might make the Soviet’s less insecure, and thus, easier to deal 
with.283  
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Similarly, when it came to publicly addressing Soviet advances in the 
Mediterranean, both Byrnes and Truman were conciliatory in their response to 
the invasions of these vital sovereign nations.  Behind closed doors, however, 
Truman, Byrnes, and the rest of their administration spoke frequently, and with 
ardent fervor and dismay, about the Soviet’s attempts to dominate Turkey, 
Greece and other vital areas of the Mediterranean.  As early as October 1945, 
Truman expressed his frustration about Soviet advances. In a January 5th, 1946, 
exchange between Byrnes and Truman, the president asserted that he was “sick 
of babying the Russians,” and that the only language that they understood was 
that of “divisions and troops, not diplomacy.”284  Still, Truman, though 
perplexed by the Soviet’s aggressive behavior, strove to remain conciliatory, 
noting that “we were not going to let the public know the extent to which the 
Russians had tried our patience but that we were going to find some way to get 
along with the Russians.”285 Thus, the apprehensions, threats and assertions put 
forth during these private conversations, though indicative of the 
administrations irritation with the Soviets, were never tangibly acted upon prior 
to the Truman Doctrine Speech.  
 
 
                                                 
284 Harry S. Truman, Years of Decisions, 522.  
285 Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation, (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), 245.  
 142 
 
 
Minimally Engaging the Soviets 
 However, a few isolated incidents indicate that Truman and Byrnes 
attempted to outwardly confront the Soviets, though only minimally, using 
organizations such as the UN to indirectly alleviate Soviet pressure.  In early 
1946, Truman privately urged the Iranians to go to the Security Council and file 
a formal complaint against the Soviets for impeding on Iranian territory.  With 
the US tacitly backing them, the Iranians brought the Soviets before the UN 
Security Council, eventually eliciting key territorial concessions.  The US’s 
strategy of using the Iranians (and later the British) as a pawn through which 
US policy could be enacted reoccurred until the declaration of the Truman 
Doctrine.  
Similarly, Truman attempted to incite some reaction from the Soviets 
via inflammatory speeches.  Truman’s tacit endorsement of England’s former 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s infamous “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, 
Missouri on March 5th, 1946 is a principal example of the passive aggressive 
measures, which Truman used to gauge Soviet intentions. 286  In the Fulton 
speech, whose contents was privately approved by Truman, Churchill orated: 
From Stettin in the Baltic to Triest in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has   
      descended  across the continent.   Behind that line lie all the capitals of  
      the ancient states of  central and Eastern Europe…all these famous    
      cities and populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are   
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     subject in on form or another, not only to  Soviet  influence but to a     
     very high and increasing measure of control from  Moscow.287  
 
Churchill went on to explain that the Soviet Union did not want war but 
wanted “the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and 
doctrines.” The fallout from the speech was enormous and many, including 
Time Magazine, saw the speech as “a magnificent trial balloon designed to test 
the American public’s response to the Administration’s new “get tough with 
Russia policy.”288  Indeed, many believed that the speech implied that the US 
and Britain would be willing to form a formidable Anglo-American alliance if 
the Soviets did not “behave.”  
In retrospect, however, Truman and Byrnes preferred less 
confrontational measures, establishing working groups, economic missions and 
UN commissions to report on Soviet advances.  Thus, throughout late 1945 up 
until early 1947 there was no coherent declaration of policy that identified the 
Soviets as a threat. The closest the administration came during those years to a 
logical policy were a series of top-secret memos in the fall and winter of 1946, 
which discussed providing both Greece and Turkey with economic and military 
assistance to counter Soviet advances.  In fact, by September 1946, it had 
become clear to the most influential members of the administration that “the 
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time has come when we must decide that we shall resist with all our means at 
our disposal any Soviet aggression.”289  
Great Britain: The US’s Political Puppet 
Prior to the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, Truman and Byrnes 
chose not to take overt action and ameliorate the deteriorating situations in 
countries threatened by Soviet advances.  Instead, as one memo details, they 
chose to rely on the British to supply the bulk of the military and economic 
assistance, citing the “treaty” relationship between the Greeks and Britain as 
their fundamental rationale.  In reality, the US was using Britain, just as they 
had used Iran, to stifle the expansionism of the Soviets without explicitly 
implicating themselves.  
Essentially, Truman could justify relying on the British, because he 
believed that Soviet aggression was only temporary.  Specifically, Truman 
believed, as Roosevelt had, that the Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was 
trustworthy. In fact, even after the Iranian troop crisis Truman continued to 
adhere to his conception that Stalin could be relied on, noting “I had always 
held him to be a man of his word...”290  Likewise, Truman believed that much 
of the Soviet’s “aggression” was the byproduct of post-war domestic turmoil, 
much like the US was facing.  For Truman, the presence of domestic conflict 
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“might explain some of the things that they had been doing.”291  Similarly, 
Truman articulated that differences between the Soviets and the US were 
bound to arise at the end of the war, but “that we could work them out 
amicably if we gave ourselves time.” 292  In essence, Truman was still striving to 
remain consistent with the beliefs and values of his predecessor, Roosevelt.  
Thus, in early 1947 Truman and Byrnes, though cognizant of the importance of 
Greece and Turkey to regional and US security, continued to rely on Britain to 
maintain the economic and military integrity of Greece and Turkey.  
Dean Acheson: Master Manipulator and Creator of the Truman 
Doctrine 
 Ultimately, Truman and Byrnes, though obviously steadfast in 
maintaining the thrust of Roosevelt’s conciliatory policies toward the Soviet’s, 
were forced by international events and the conceptions of their closest advisers 
to reorient their policies. Specifically, it was the coupling of Great Britain’s 
economic collapse and withdrawal from Greece and Turkey in late February 
with Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson’s world vision that warranted a 
drastic shift in US foreign policy. 
The Truman Doctrine, though delivered by President Truman, was the 
brainchild of one very influential man: Dean Acheson. Acheson, unlike Truman 
and Byrnes, had a coherent belief system guiding his perceptions of world 
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affairs, a system that did not rely on Roosevelt’s policy legacy.  Thus, early on 
Acheson had consolidated his perceptions regarding Britain’s waning power 
and the Soviet’s devious intentions in Greece and Turkey, thus allowing him to 
present a formidable argument to Truman, Byrnes and Congress in support of 
an aid program.  
In many ways, Acheson was a realist when it came to international 
affairs. Fundamentally, Acheson believed that a nation’s power lay in its 
political, economic and military capabilities.  For Acheson, US foreign policy 
was a “grand strategy with which the United States proposes to deal with the 
main facts—the thrusts and problems they present---of the outside world.”293 
Not surprisingly Acheson was convinced that US foreign policy would have to 
be altered in the post World War II era in order to effectively deal with one 
particular event in the world system.  This event was the “decline and in some 
cases the disappearance of the great empires of Western Europe and of Japan; 
and the emergence of the pre-eminent power of the United States and the 
Soviet Union.”  Acheson believed that the world order as we once knew it had 
collapsed after World War I and II. Specifically, the British Empire, whose 
power had once controlled the political and economic institutions in both 
Western Europe and her colonies, was now exhausted economically and 
militarily.  
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Acheson’s New World Vision  
In lieu of Britain, Acheson was determined to see the US assume the 
role of world leader.  In essence, this new policy would involve the US stepping 
into the limelight, accepting its place as a world leader and creating  “a workable 
system of free states, which can be defended with military power, incite 
economic revival and bring about political cohesion.”  Acheson had first 
broadcast his beliefs on June 4th, 1946 in his Harvard Club Speech, where he 
emphasized the urgent need for the US to step up as the world leader. 
However, Acheson predicted that several obstacles would prevent the 
US from accepting its new role as a responsible and benevolent world leader.  
The first obstacle, and perhaps easiest to remedy was that the US, though 
materially capable of assuming the role as a world leader, lacked the “experience 
and discipline,” to do so.294  The second obstacle for Acheson was the 
isolationist sentiment of the American people.  Divided by an ocean from the 
conflicts of Europe, the US was historically “interested in their own absorbing 
and immensely profitable affairs, and only secondarily interested in the doings 
and business of distant peoples.”295 
The US’s history of isolationism would prove to be most salient 
obstacle in the way of Acheson’s ideal world vision. In January of 1947, 
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Acheson’s worst fears of isolationism were confirmed with the induction of a 
Republican dominated House (245 Republicans-118 Democrats) and Senate (51 
Republicans, 45 Democrats).296  Elected during November of 1946, the “class 
of 1947” consisted of a variety of prominent, fiscally responsible and 
isolationist senators, such as Robert Taft.  Essentially, they had been elected on 
a platform that countered many of Truman’s policies, including cuts in 
government spending, a return to pre-war price levels, and rapid demobilization 
of the armed forces.  Members of Truman’s inner circle feared that the new 
Congress would “carry us back to the political isolation of the 1920s and the 
economic isolation of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.”297  George Kennan, the 
former charge d’affaires in Moscow, and a lecturer at the Naval War College 
saw these legislators and many of the American’s that elected them as a result of 
an era in which the US had “grown, sheltered by two oceans and prospering in 
untroubled isolation behind doctrine of no entangling alliances.”298   
British Withdrawal: Final Catalyst for the Truman Doctrine 
In the end, it was the tangible withdrawal of British aid, aid that the US 
had been using as a mechanism to resist the spread of Soviet communism in 
nations like Greece and Turkey, which necessitated that Truman rework his 
conceptions and strategies to preserve Western hegemony in the Near and 
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Middle East.  Ultimately, Truman in lieu of his previous conciliatory policies, 
latched on to the conceptions and strategies set forth by the man with the most 
coherent perception of world events: Dean Acheson. 
From the day that British withdrawal of aid was announced it was 
assumed by Dean Acheson and members in the highest levels of the Truman 
administration that the US would step into the fray and take Britain’s place, in 
order to halt the “Iron Curtain” from descending across Europe.  The Director 
for Near Eastern and African Affairs Loy Henderson perceived that members 
of the State Department, especially Acheson, had immediately decided on a 
course of action; that the US would provide economic and military aid to 
Greece and Turkey. Specifically, when Henderson asked Acheson “whether we 
were still working on papers bearing on the making of a decision or the 
execution of one,” Acheson replied that it was the latter, and that “under the 
circumstances there could only be one decision.” 299 The only variables that 
remained, in the eyes of Acheson and his counterparts, were to outline the 
course of action and how to justify the program to Congress and the American 
people. 300 Ultimately, the emergent threat of Soviet subjugation in vital regions, 
the financial collapse of a historical superpower, the burgeoning threat of 
isolationism in the US, and the strength and coherence of Acheson’s world 
                                                 
299 Dean Acheson, Present at Creation, 218.  
300 George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, 314-315. 
 150 
 
 
vision,  convinced Truman and the entire administration of the necessity of a 
policy statement like the Truman Doctrine.  
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Chapter VI 
 The Origins of the Marshall Plan 
 
Introduction 
The winter of 1946-1947 was particularly difficult for the European 
nations, especially France and England.  Colder than normal temperatures and 
severe droughts coupled with industrial exhaustion from almost five years of 
war had produced dire economic, social and political conditions. These 
conditions were so grave that Churchill would characterize Europe as a 
“rubble-heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground for pestilence, disease and 
hate.”301 Exacerbating the situation was the emergent balance of payments 
problem in the nations most ravaged by the war. Specifically, Great Britain’s 
supply of dollars, critical for purchasing American commodities was dwindling, 
thus endangering not only its capacity to provide basic necessities for Britain’s 
people, but one of America’s primary markets for such commodities.   
During the post-war era, the US had attempted to help the Europeans 
circumvent the aforementioned difficulties by providing billions of dollars of 
piecemeal aid to afflicted countries.  From 1945-1947 the US had given 15 
billion dollars of aid in order to support foreign countries.302 In the short-term 
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this aid was instrumental in “averting stark tragedy” in Europe.  Yet, by 1947 
the administration was cognizant that short-term, piecemeal assistance would 
not be enough to fully rehabilitate Europe’s most devastated nations.  President 
Harry S. Truman and his cast of advisers would soon conclude that a “more 
comprehensive program was needed to achieve the rebuilding of the economy 
of Europe.” 303  
The administration’s answer to Europe’s economic ills was the 
European Recovery Plan (ERP), popularly known as the Marshall Plan.  The 
Marshall Plan, much like earlier aid programs such as the Truman Doctrine, was 
designed to provide economic assistance to ailing countries in order to 
safeguard the economic and political environment abroad.  However, the 
similarities stopped there.  Unlike former aid programs, the Marshall Plan was 
comprehensive and would be designed, implemented and overseen by a concert 
of European nations over a period of four years.   
What makes the Marshall Plan an appropriate subject for a study in 
presidential decision-making is not just how, when or why the administration 
decided to announce the program to aid Europe. These factors are important 
and will be discussed, but they are not paramount to our study.  Indeed, it is the 
early emphasis on balancing the European initiative for designing the plan with 
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American control that makes the study of the administration’s decision-making 
process during the formulation of the Marshall Plan program so remarkable.   
Phase I:  Discussion and Delivery 
One of the first official mentions of a program of aid to the European 
nations came on March 5th in a memo by Undersecretary of State Dean 
Acheson to the Secretary of War Robert Patterson. Acheson argued that the 
program of aid to Greece and Turkey, which was on the verge of being 
presented to Congress, was just the tip of the iceberg when it came to extensive 
foreign aid programs.  According to Acheson, the problems in Greece and 
Turkey were merely symptoms of a larger economic crisis occurring throughout 
Europe, especially in Great Britain.304  In light of this crisis, Acheson had sent 
instructions to the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee (SWNCC) and the 
Treasury Department to initiate a study investigating the feasibility and benefits 
of providing financial, technical and military aid to economically struggling 
nations.   
With Acheson serving as the impetus, the SWNCC met for the first 
time on March 11th and agreed to create an Ad-Hoc Special Committee to study 
and report back in three weeks on the problems and benefits of an extensive aid 
program.305  Primarily, they were responsible for writing a preliminary report on 
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the countries that might require aid from the US in the upcoming months.  The 
report would include information pertaining to the external threats faced by 
each country, the relevance of those threats to US national security, and the 
types of aid that the countries would require. Further, the report would have to 
account for the countries’ willingness and ability to help themselves as well as 
the foreseeable consequences if the US failed to aid them.306  
Acheson was not the only member of the Truman administration who 
expressed alarm about Europe’s perilous economic situation.  In his March 18th 
and 23rd reports to the President, Herbert Hoover, who had recently returned 
from an economic mission to Germany and Austria, observed that the world is 
“currently involved in the most dangerous economic crisis in all history,” and 
that a lack of economic stability was not only damaging from a humanitarian 
standpoint, but from the standpoint of peace and stability as well.307 
At the same time, members of government not directly in Truman’s 
inner circle were less accommodating to any plans of additional aid. This line of 
thought was expressed clearly by John J. McCloy, the president of the 
International Bank, in his address of April 18th, 1947.  McCloy, having heard 
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rumors about a new program of aid wanted to make it clear that the 
International Bank would not get involved.  He stated clearly that the bank 
“can’t and we won’t grant loans in order to accomplish political objectives.  We 
can and we will refuse loans where the political uncertainties are so great as to 
make a loan economically unsound.”308  While the first part of McCloy’s 
statement was tacitly understood by the administration, the second portion was 
damaging, in that it implied an aversion to providing further aid to protect and 
bolster marginalized areas.  Thus, by early spring 1947, the administration had 
ascertained that any aid would have to come in the form of grants or “as a 
national investment in peace and prosperity.”309 
Meanwhile, on April 21st, just three weeks after its first meeting, the 
Special Committee of the SWNCC produced a report on their assessment of 
the feasibility of an additional aid program to foreign nations.310  The report 
elucidated in clear terms the “balance of payments problem” that would soon 
emerge in Europe and threaten the continent’s economy, with effects that by 
early 1948 would spread to the US as well.  The authors of the study pointed 
out that in 1947 the US would export at least 16.2 billion dollars of goods and 
services to the world, while only importing 8.7 billion dollars of goods and 
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services.  Essentially, the US would export at least 7.5 billion dollars more in 
goods and services than it imported.  This excessive exporting on the part of 
the US, coupled with the lack of exports from Europe would mean that “world-
wide misdistribution and shortages will exist in the year ending June 30, 
1948.”311  
 In light of this threat, the committee emphasized that it was in the US’s 
best interest to promote the revival of production and trade in Europe.  This 
would allow Europe to increase its volume of exports, thus providing it with 
more dollars to spend in the US market.  The committee agreed that economic 
recovery and expansion in Europe was contingent on an increase in European, 
especially German, production capabilities.  Also they agreed that recovery 
would be feasible only if the effort was coordinated amongst the European with 
the common goal of creating and sustaining a healthy and integrated economic 
system.312  The committee warned that these steps, though financially costly for 
the US in the short-term, would assure that long-term security and would 
accord with the US national interest.  
While Acheson and the SWNCC had been hurriedly preparing their 
assessments of the necessity of foreign aid, Secretary of State Marshall was 
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abroad in Moscow at the Council of Foreign Ministers.  While at the conference 
Marshall and his aides had encountered opposition from the Soviets to any 
proposals that would strengthen the Western European economy.  After almost 
six weeks and 44 sessions, the Soviets and the Americans had not agreed on a 
single point.   
By the close of the conference Marshall and his advisers believed that 
the Soviets were purposely trying to block any initiatives that might strengthen 
the political and economic unity of Europe.  Specifically, the Soviets were 
reluctant to increase unity across Germany’s four separate occupied zones in 
order to facilitate a revival of German production and trade with the rest of 
Europe.313 Marshall calculated that the Soviets were attempting to stall 
European recovery to a point where the economic, and later, political 
conditions would disintegrate far enough for the Soviets to step in and 
dominate Germany and other enfeebled European nations.314  Thus, Marshall 
determined that the US had little choice but to aid the vulnerable nations of 
Europe.  
In response to the Soviets, Marshall, still in Moscow, cabled George 
Kennan, then a lecturer at the Naval War College, and instructed him to leave 
for Washington, DC and set up a Policy Planning Staff to begin studying the 
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problems of an extensive European aid program.315 Regarding this moment in 
history, Truman recalls that Marshall’s reports from Moscow “confirmed my 
conviction that there was no time to lose in finding a method for the revival of 
Europe.”316 Marshall didn’t stop there, and immediately upon his return to the 
United States on April 28th, he delivered a radio address proclaiming: 
 The recovery of Europe has been far slower than had been expected.   
       Disintegrating forces are becoming evident.  The patient is sinking while  
       the doctors deliberate…whatever action is possible to meet these pressing problems  
       must be taken without delay.317  
 
 Marshall was not the only member of the State Department trying to rally 
Congressional, public and administrative support for an extensive aid program 
to “save” what was left of Europe.  In Acheson’s May 8th speech in Cleveland, 
Mississippi, a speech that some have called the “Prologue to the Marshall Plan,” 
he pointed out that economic reconstruction and recovery in Europe, though 
necessary, could not be accomplished on a nation by nation or piecemeal basis.  
European recovery, insisted Acheson, would have to be dealt with holistically. 
He further emphasized that there were numerous reasons the US should 
support such aid, including preserving national security by preventing 
“totalitarian regimes” from taking root; the balance of payments problem and 
the emergent humanitarian crisis in Europe.  Acheson pointed out that the US 
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would not be “bailing out” the European nations. Indeed, the aid would be 
ensuring the stability of the American economy.  Specifically, he noted that “if 
our foreign markets were to be cut off sharply as a result of the foreign inability 
to buy the result might be extremely serious to the domestic economy and 
employment.”318 Put simply, the United States was the only county that had the 
capabilities to execute and oversee such a program because America’s 
industries, infrastructure and financial institutions were the only ones that did 
not take a direct hit during the war.   
Acheson’s speech, though positively received by his immediate audience 
was not given much attention in the US by the media and the public.  However, 
the speech received a lot of positive attention in Europe, probably due to the 
fact that Acheson had informed three of his friends, who happened to be 
reporters in Britain, of the importance of his speech.319  Back in Washington 
DC Joseph Jones, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public 
Affairs, would note that the speech, acted “within the State Department and 
other government agencies…as a powerful stimulus, and instruction to staff 
work and discussions already in progress.”320 
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The staff work that Jones was probably referring to would have been 
the effort by George Kennan’s newly established Policy Planning Staff (PPS) to 
produce a coherent study of the types and quantity of aid that the European 
nations would need for both short term survival and long-term rehabilitation.  
This task, given its broad scope, was a formidable one for a staff which had not 
been formally established until May 2nd,  consisted only of six members, and 
met only three times before it issued its preliminary report on May 23rd.321  
According to accounts by both Kennan and Jones, the initial PPS report was 
based on studies and  suggestions made by the Ad-Hoc Committee of the 
SWNCC,  suggestions from the State Department’s Economic Office and  
judgments the staff had made after examining Acheson’s May 8th speech.322 The 
report strove to create a set of principles, which would be used when “Framing 
the master plan for US assistance in Europe.”323 In essence, Kennan and his 
staff were merely drawing up a “plan for a plan.” 324 
The preliminary report of May 23rd began by clarifying that the PPS did 
not believe that Europe’s social, economic and political problems were the 
result of communism, but instead the result of almost a decade of war.  In light 
                                                 
321 George Kennan , Memoirs: 1925-1950, 328; Joseph Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 240-241; A second, more 
thoroughly researched report would be released in July of 1947.  
322 The members of the PPS included George Kennan, Joseph E. Johnson, Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel III, 
Jacques Reinstein, Ware Adams and Carleton Savage 
32316 May 1947,  Memo by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, FRUS 1947, Vol. III, 220; Jones, The 
Fifteen Weeks, 241; George Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, 329.  
324Joseph Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 241. 
 161 
 
 
of this realization, Kennan and his staff recommended that “The American 
effort to aid Europe should be directed not to the combating of communism as 
such but to the restoration of the economic health and vigor of European 
society.”325 Kennan’s staff calculated that if the US was able to address and 
solve the economic problems afflicting Europe, the continent would be less 
susceptible to communist and totalitarian influences.  
In order to “root out” the economic problems of Europe the US would 
have to approach the problem from both short and long term perspectives.  In 
the short term Europe would have to initiate a “crash program” to improve 
European coal production and eliminate other “bottlenecks” in the production 
of steel, agricultural and other commodities. The short term program would 
have to be initialized as soon as feasibly possible in order to have a positive 
psychological effect on the demoralized countries of Europe, while 
concurrently revealing to America the depth of Europe’s difficulties. Moreover, 
without some sort of short term solution to boost morale, Europe might 
“disintegrate” thus making the long term problem irrelevant.   
Due to the complexity of Europe’s economic woes, the PPS’s plan for 
the long term was far more elaborate.  Kennan’s group suggested that the long 
term program would have to be supported by the US but initiated, planned and 
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executed by a concert of European nations.  The staff clarified that such a 
program would be proposed by the US, but in the end it would be the: 
Business of the Europeans. The formal initiative must come from     
      Europe;  the program must be evolved in Europe…the role of this    
      country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a             
      European program and of the later  support of such a program by      
      financial and other means at European  request.326  
 
In particular, Kennan’s group emphasized that the European effort must be a 
joint effort, not a series of isolated and nationally interested appeals from 
individual nations for large sums of aid.  This approach was preferred by 
Kennan’s staff for numerous reasons. For one thing, a joint effort would 
promote economic integration, multilateral trade and cooperation in Europe: all 
conditions that had been lacking since before the war.  Also, the US Congress 
would not accept another program of interim and piecemeal aid that “failed to 
get at the heart of the problem.”327   In the end, as Kennan recalled, the PPS’s 
first memo was instrumental in introducing three principles that would become 
integral to the final Marshall Plan; first, the necessity of European initiative, 
second, the extension of an offer to all of Europe, including the Soviets, and 
third, the notion that a revival in Germany’s production capabilities was 
essential to promote European recovery.    
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The May 23rd PPS Memo was not the only important document 
produced that month by a key State Department member.  On May 27th 
William Clayton, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, delivered a 
memo to Acheson outlining his analysis of the European economic situation.  
Clayton had penned the memo on his return trip from Europe, where he had 
been in close contact with the leaders of many of the Western European 
nations.  He warned that: 
We grossly underestimated the destruction to the European economy  
      by the war…Europe is steadily deteriorating.  The political crisis reflects 
      the economic…without further prompt and substantial aid from the    
      United States,  economic, social and political disintegration will        
      overwhelm Europe.  
 
Unlike his peers, Clayton didn’t hone in on the ramifications of Europe’s 
disintegration for world peace and US security.  Instead, Clayton emphasized 
the disastrous effect European “disintegration” would have on the US 
economy, with regards to unemployment, economic depression, and the 
accumulation of a “heavily unbalanced budget on the background of a 
mountainous war debt.”328  
Clayton felt that in order to rectify Europe’s’ economic problems the 
United States would have to organize a policy that would guarantee the 
provision of US aid to Europe.  He argued that there was no need for a 
commission to study national assets and liabilities in order to determine if the 
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US was capable of providing such aid.  Instead, he insisted that the US had 
enough resources and the production capability to supply sufficient aid and that 
the American people merely had to “draw in their own belts just a little” and 
organize a fiscal policy that would efficiently distribute US goods and surpluses 
in Europe. The aid, which would come mostly in grant form, would consist 
primarily of commodities that were already in surplus in the US such as food, 
coal, cotton and tobacco.  Not unlike Kennan, Clayton suggested that the grant 
should be based on a European wide plan, worked out by the European nations 
in order to facilitate cooperation, multilateral trade and mutual assistance with 
regards to commodities shortfalls.  Clayton emphasized that “Europe cannot 
recover from this war and again become independent if her economy continues 
to be divided into many small watertight compartments as it is today.”  Yet, 
unlike Kennan, Clayton was wary of leaving the intricacies and initiative for 
such a vital program solely in the European’s hands, given their less than 
impressive track record for cooperation.  In fact, the final line of his memo read 
“the United States must run this show.”329 
Just a day later on May 28th, the heads of offices in the State 
Department assembled in order to talk about the PPS and Clayton Memos.  
During this meeting there was an extensive discussion about whether the US or 
the Europeans should assume the bulk of the responsibility for drafting the 
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recovery program.  Kennan argued, as he had in the PPS memo, that this was a 
European problem and thus warranted European generated initiatives and 
solutions.  Alternately Clayton and the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs Willard Thorp both argued that the US would need to play 
an extensive role in the drafting of such a program because the complexity of 
the economic situation coupled with the historical inability of the European 
nations to agree with each other.  It was determined that the US would need to 
find a way of “balancing the dangers of appearing to force the American way on 
Europe with the ultimate danger of failure and economic collapse.”  At the end 
of the meeting, Marshall’s assistant, Charles Bohlen stepped in and suggested 
that the US inform Europe that the US would only be willing to furnish aid 
provided there was concrete evidence that the Europeans were producing a 
plan adhering to the principles of cooperation, multilateral aid and joint 
programming originally set forth by the United States.  Still, despite the various 
views of the situation set forth in this meeting, no coherent statement of policy 
was agreed upon.330  
A clear and public statement of the State Department’s preliminary 
policy on an aid program to Europe would not be articulated until George 
Marshall’s June 5th commencement speech at Harvard University.  The speech, 
which was similar in character to Acheson’s speech at the Delta Council in May, 
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emphasized the failing European economy and America’s overwhelming 
responsibility to lend assistance toward rebuilding Europe.  Thus far, US aid to 
Europe had been inadequate because of its piecemeal nature.  What Europe 
needed was a comprehensive and preventative recovery program that would 
address the economic problems of Europe not on national basis, but as a 
systemic and supra-national problem.  The US government, given the healthy 
state of the nation’s economy, would have to be at the forefront of such an 
effort.  Yet, Marshall insisted that it would have to be Europe, not the US that 
would take the initiative to formulate the plan.  Marshall stated:  
It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to      
      undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe  
      on its feet economically.  This is the business of the Europeans.  The   
      initiative, I think must come from Europe.  The role of this country    
      should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a  European program   
      and of later support of such program so far as it is practical to  do so.331  
       
      In essence, Marshall was stating that the US would support a recovery 
program, if and only if it was based upon a cooperative plan derived by the 
afflicted European nations.  The US would play an advisory role during the 
drafting phase and in the end, provide what aid it could, as long as the plan 
abided by the principles that the US had set forth.  There would be no more 
“individual shots in the arm” of aid to Europe.  These shots had been 
                                                 
331 Press Release Issued by the Department of State, June 4, 1947. FRUS 1947 Vol. III, 237-39. 
 167 
 
 
ineffective and Congress would no longer approve them.332 In summary, the 
principles as they were set forth in the Marshall Plan and other supporting 
documents involved stressing the importance of European collaboration in 
terms of resource sharing, joint programming, multilateralism, maximum self 
help, and the revival of German production.333 
Part II:  Minimal US Intervention and the European Initiative 
Marshall’s declaration at Harvard set off a chain of events that had, as 
Truman would call it, the effect of immediately “electrifying the free world.”334  
Prior to Marshall’s appearance at Harvard, Acheson had again contacted three 
of his friends in the British press, informing them that a groundbreaking speech 
was going to be made by Marshall and that it would be in Britain’s (as well as 
Europe’s) best interest to forward the contents of the message to the British 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin immediately after its release.335 Bevin, along 
with Frances’ Foreign Minister, George Bidault responded almost immediately 
to Marshall’s address, and expressed interest in a joint European Recovery Plan 
(ERP).   
By June 17th the UK and France had already taken “initiative,” holding 
“exploratory talks” in Paris regarding the organization of a European 
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conference to discuss European wide recovery.  Both Britain and France 
thought it would be unwise to organize the program within the ECE, given the 
likelihood that the Soviets would not cooperate.  However, both did express 
interest in using the ECE at a later date if the Soviets agreed to cooperate with 
the general guidelines of the program.  Marshall concurred with their 
assessment, noting that: 
While the use of a UN body whose terms of reference directly cover   
      this type of  problem would be desirable and in accord with our long   
      range objectives toward  the UN, we share the fear that effective and   
      prompt action might be very difficult  there, whether because of the    
      inefficiency of a new and untried body or because of a continuance of  
      the obstructive tactics pursued by eastern countries… 336   
 
       Ultimately, Bevin and Bidault extended an invitation to the Soviet 
Union’s Foreign Minister Molotov to come to Paris and discuss the prospective 
program.  Still, both the British and French delegates were hoping that the 
Soviets would refuse to participate all-together.337 Yet, in spite of their hopes, 
the Soviets did accept the invitation, and Molotov scheduled a visit to Paris for 
June 27. 
Meanwhile, members of the State Department were determining the 
type and quantity of support that the US could provide Europe. Kennan 
insisted that an extensive background study on European Recovery had to be 
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conducted.  The study would include an analysis of the availability of essential 
commodities and services in Europe such as coal, electrical power, steel, food, 
inland transport, shipping and shipbuilding.338  On June 24th the White House 
issued a statement calling for a careful study and report on the effects of the 
provision of foreign aid on the US’s domestic interests and economy. Three 
committees were formed to carry out this task. The first, the Krug Committee, 
which was established under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior 
Julius Albert Krug, would assess the state of the US’s natural resources.  The 
Nourse Committee, which would be composed of members from the Council 
of Economic Advisers, would study the impact of further aid on the US 
economy.  Finally, a non-partisan Committee would be responsible for 
ascertaining the amount and quantity of US resources that could be reasonably 
provided currently for assistance overseas.  They would also play and advisory 
role to the President.339 
Perhaps America’s largest effort to “lend a helping hand” to the 
Europeans began on July 25th with the establishment of the State Department’s 
Committee on the European Recovery Program.340 The Committee, chaired by 
Thorp and composed of representatives from every office of the department 
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concerned with recovery, met every Tuesday and Thursday in order to consider 
Marshall’s proposal.  Their meetings, which lasted well into July and August, 
produced consensus on a variety of issues, like the need to revive European 
production and integrate economies; that the US should maintain a “veto” over 
the distribution of aid and the direction of the program; that the US should 
make bilateral agreements with each country professing adherence to principles 
of joint programming, mutual aid and self help; that the US should focus in the 
short term on commodity assistance to avoid burdening US taxpayers and to 
jumpstart recovery; and finally, that the World Bank would be responsible for 
making long term loans to facilitate modernization.341 
In spite of the early consensus among members of the Committee, 
differences did emerge between two groups.  The first group, known as the 
“Traders,” felt strongly that the key to European recovery laid in increasing 
intra-European trade as quickly as possible.  Trade, they said, could increase as 
soon as the European economies were integrated, and non-convertible 
currencies and bilateral agreements were replaced with a “currency clearing 
scheme” and a customs unit.  On the other hand, the “Producers” argued that 
the Traders were thinking too far ahead, and that intra-European trade could 
not be increased without first reviving and restoring the production capabilities 
of Europe’s pre-existing industries.  This could be accomplished by increasing 
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production in bottlenecked areas of the economy, like coal, transportation, 
agriculture and power.  In the end, a compromise favoring the Producers was 
reached after significant discussion during the Meetings of June 25th, and July 1, 
3, 8, 10 and 15th.   In the long run, the Committee decided that it would indeed 
be beneficial to adopt a higher level of intra-European, multilateral trade.  
However, in the immediate short run, three things had to happen:  first, the 
creation of a supranational organization, whose purpose would be to allocate 
scarce resources, increase production, set production targets, and coordinate 
national recovery plans; second, faster integration in coal, transport and power; 
and finally, the provision of grants by the US for essential commodities and 
capital equipment, which could be used to restore previously existing industries 
and reduce bottlenecks.342   
From June 27th to July 3rd, while the US was continuing work in their 
Committees, the French, British and Soviets were meeting in Paris.  From the 
beginning of the Paris sessions it was readily apparent to all present that the 
Soviets were not going to be easy to bargain with.  Immediately, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotov illustrated his “obstructionist and delaying 
tendencies” by proposing a set of unreasonable demands to the US.343  Molotov 
told the delegates to demand that the US provide the Europeans with an exact 
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monetary figure that they were willing to contribute to European recovery.  
Both the British and French delegates were strongly against this proposal, 
insisting that this would be the equivalent of asking the US for a blank check.344  
By July 3rd if was apparent to the American Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom, Lewis W. Douglas, as well as to Bevin and Bidault that the Soviets, 
because of their inability to compromise, would not be participating in the joint 
conference on European recovery.  In fact, just two days prior on July 1st the 
Soviets threatened the British and the French, stating that if the Soviet plan was 
not adopted, and an alternate plan was issued by the French and British in its 
place then there would be “Grave consequences.”  Yet despite this threat the 
British and French replied that they would carry on as planned, and by the end 
of July 3rd invitations had been sent to 22 European countries, inviting them to 
Paris to formulate a European Recovery Plan. 
On July 12th 16 European nations gathered in Paris for the opening of 
the Conference on European recovery.345  The Soviet satellites, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, had originally stated their willingness to be involved, but the 
Soviet Union had insisted that their satellites not participate.346  At the first 
meeting Bevin was elected President and Sir Oliver Franks was appointed as the 
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Chair.  One of the conferences’ first actions was to organize a Committee on 
European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), which would be a forum integral to 
the formulation of the recovery plan.  By the end of the first week an Executive 
Steering Committee composed of the UK, France, the Netherlands, Norway 
and Italy had been established to direct the conferences work. Four technical 
committees were also established to study key economic sectors such as food, 
agriculture, power, steel, coal and transportation.  A plan of work, outlining 
objectives and types of statistics required to justify an aid program was also 
composed, along with a set of technical questionnaires prepared by each group.  
These questionnaires would then be distributed to each country, filled out and 
returned for analysis.347   
The first week of work in the CEEC produced positive and acceptable 
results.  The countries appeared to be working together and taking the type of 
initiative Marshall had outlined in his speech. However, the honey-moon period 
ended quickly. Soon, reports were flowing into the State Department that 
relations at the conference were turning sour.  In particular, the French and the 
British were attempting to dominate the Plan’s form, thus impeding the drafting 
of the program.348 The first problem emerged with the French and their 
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preexisting Monnet Plan for industrial re-equipment and industrialization.349  
The French wanted very much to incorporate their plan into the ERP, but 
modifications made by the Committee to the plan were unacceptable to them. 
They argued that the modifications would “revive Germany” at the monetary 
expense of the French.  In the end, the French would not “abandon their 
support for a recovery scheme that emphasized industrial reconstruction and 
modernization, or modify the Monnet Plan.”350 
To exacerbate the situation, in late July members of the Benelux 
delegations and the Swiss, Swedes and Italians turned against the Monnet Plan, 
claiming that it did little to help the smaller countries and promote the type of 
European Unity that Marshall had delineated in his speech.351  Moreover, it 
would allow the larger countries, like England and France, to monopolize on 
American assistance, and later, to dominate the European economy after 
recovery was completed.352   In lieu of the Monnet Plan, the Benelux delegates 
proposed a plan that would use Europe’s existing production capacity, 
including Germany’s industries, to stimulate recovery.  This would involve 
reviving pre-war markets in Germany, balancing budgets in various European 
countries, establishing realistic exchange rates and removing trade barriers.353 
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During this same period, July 20-25th, the British, like the French, were 
being equally implacable.  The British were unwavering in their refusal to 
support any initiatives that might possibly compromise their already enfeebled 
trade and payments position.  By late July and early August, the British were in 
severe financial trouble, with their dollar reserves nearing rock bottom and 
decreasing by at least $176 million a week.  Put simply, the British would not 
and could not support any moves to liberalize trade and payments when they 
were already in desperate need of bilateral arrangements to stunt their trade 
deficit and stop their reserves from shrinking to nothing.  Thus, all of the 
initiatives proposed by the Benelux group, initiatives that at the time seemed to 
fuse the lines of thought of the American Producers and Traders, were vetoed 
by either the French or the British delegates, leaving the conference at a 
stalemate on most issues.354   
The US, though well aware of the deadlock in the CEEC, did not 
intervene.  That is not to say, however, that the State Department was dormant. 
Studies were still being conducted and compiled, especially by Kennan’s PPS.  
On July 23rd Kennan’s PPS issued a report to Marshall entitled “Aspects of the 
European Recovery Program from the US standpoint.”  The 62 page study was 
an extension of the PPS’s previous study that had been submitted in May and 
was prefaced by a note from Kennan stating: 
                                                 
354 Michael J. Hogan, “Paths to Plenty,” 349. 
 176 
 
 
This report constitutes a preliminary estimate…these considerations are 
      set forth  tentatively, and they should be accepted with caution; for the  
      factual material on which they are based is still far from complete.  
 
The crux of the problem, according to the report was to “to make 
available to lead countries those imports necessary to reestablish their 
economies on a pay-as-you go basis.”355 This new study examined further the 
US’s interests in European recovery, what type of program would be successful, 
considerations regarding American relations to the program, the demands of 
the individual countries, and the prospects for private American investment in 
such a program.356   
In principle, the report prescribed that US aid would be directed toward 
reviving industries, such as coal, that will help more than one country at a time, 
while simultaneously lessening European reliance on American aid.  In the final 
analysis, the PPS determined that the program would only be costly for the US 
and its taxpayers in the short-term. The benefits, however, would be long-term, 
affecting issues such as the maintenance of the UN and the maintenance of a 
balanced world order. As the report pointed out in the final lines: 
The older cultural centers of Europe are the meteorological centers in  
      which much  of the climate of international life is produced and from   
      which it precedes. Until  hope has been restored in Europe, there can be 
      no real revival of confidence and security in the affairs of the world at   
      large.357  
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Part III:  US Intervention and the Birth of the Marshall Plan 
By the beginning of August a dark cloud of American doubt had 
descended over the conference in Paris.  In general, the US observers in Paris 
were disappointed with what they saw.  The Benelux Proposal, which had 
coherently fused the visions of the Traders and the Producers, had been thrown 
out because of British and French inflexibility.  Cooperation and joint 
programming had all but broken down as individual countries were now, in lieu 
of a coherent plan, beginning to compile exactly what Marshall and Kennan had 
warned against:  individual and uncoordinated lists of separate national 
requirements for recovery. Clayton, in an attempt to halt the compilation of 
individual lists, clearly elucidated for the Belgian Prime Minister what US 
requirements for aid would be.  They included four principles that had been 
repeated to the delegates numerous times: a joint survey of requirements; 
measures of self help; an increase in trade; anything else they can think of that 
will garner American public and Congressional support. 358  
On August 6th, increasingly discouraged by the Conference’s progress, 
Clayton and the Ambassadors Douglas and Caffery sent a memo to Marshall 
and the new Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett expressing their concerns.  
In the memo the men articulated that it was time for the US to offer the 
European’s a degree of “friendly assistance” in drafting the ERP. The men 
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suggested that, for now, the aid be confined to an “informal” and “appropriate” 
presentation to the Paris Conference of “our views covering a few basic 
undertakings by each country.”359 In short, they felt that the output of food and 
coal should be maximized, that currencies should be stabilized and proper rates 
of exchange fixed.  The US representatives in Europe also felt that the need for 
Europe to increase production, distribution and exchange of goods between 
countries was a principal condition for US aid, and should therefore be 
repeatedly communicated to the conference. 
Marshall replied on August 11th, that a degree of friendly aid would be 
beneficial but that he and others Washington worried that aid in drafting would 
look like the US was pre-approving the aid program before it even got to 
Congress.  Marshall was hesitant to convey this impression given the “feeling in 
Congress…that they must not be presented on a crisis basis with a virtual 
commitment to any precise course of action as they claim was done in the case 
of Greece and Turkey.”360  In essence, the US could not offer a great deal of 
assistance, for fear that they would look like they were dictating and pre-
approving the Europeans plan.   
Shortly thereafter, John D. Hickerson, the Deputy Director of the 
Office of European Affairs, sent a memo to Marshall, which reiterated the need 
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for the US government to extend a helping hand to European countries in 
drafting the program. He emphasized that any assistance would be helpful, 
because in its current form the ERP would not be approved by Congress. 
Hickerson, cognizant of Marshall’s concerns, offered a feasible alternative to 
direct US intervention.  Hickerson believed that the US should offer to provide 
assistance by informally reading the first draft of the plan for the purposes of 
“clarification” and to make sure that it is in a form that Congress will be able to 
“digest” and understand.  When doing this, however, the US must emphasize 
that they are not endorsing the plan, just facilitating a smoother presentation to 
the US Congress.361  The Europeans had to bear in mind that  the “US and the 
President are in no sense committed until the completed plan is reviewed, 
carefully examined, approved and presented by them to Congress.”  Moreover, 
Hickerson emphasized that the risks involved with helping the Europeans with 
the plan were minor in comparison to the failure of the plan to pass through 
Congress.362    
As the month of August drew on it became increasingly apparent that a 
coherent and effective program of aid was a necessity if Europe was to survive 
the upcoming months.  An August 14th Policy Planning Memo cautioned that 
without a workable European Recovery Program (ERP) before the end of the 
                                                 
361 11 August, 1947 Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, FRUS 1947, Vol. III,  350-35. 
362 11 August 1947, Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs to Marshall, 
FRUS 1947, Vol. III, 351-356.  
 180 
 
 
year, Europe would disintegrate.  The PPS warned that in a worst case scenario 
a series of financial collapses might actually trigger the economic isolation of 
key European nations. Specifically, the PPS estimated that Britain would face 
financial crisis by mid-October, and the French, Italians and Austrians would 
meet a similar fate in early 1948. 363 
The alarm bells being sounded by the delegates in Europe and by 
Kennan’s PPS did not fall on deaf ears in Washington.  By mid-August Lovett 
and Marshall were both aware that something would have to be done to ensure 
that Congress would accept the ERP. 364  In particular, Marshall and Lovett 
were worried that they were going to receive from the Europeans exactly what 
they did not want: “A European Shopping List” or an “itemized bill summing 
up perspective deficits.” 365  A note from Lovett to Marshall conveys the depths 
of Lovett’s, and the State Department’s concerns over the prospective plan.  
Lovett wrote that the European plan was scheduled for submission in 7 days, 
yet the only thing that had been produced was 16 separate shopping lists that 
Congress would not approve.  In order to avoid a potential disaster Lovett 
suggested two avenues of action.  First, that Lt. Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel 
Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of State and Kennan be sent to Europe 
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to “update” Clayton and Caffery on the Department’s position, and second, 
that the submission deadline for the ERP be extended by at least two weeks.366   
Policy makers and administrators in Washington, DC, cognizant of the 
need for urgency with regards to an ERP, met on August 22nd to discuss the 
State Department’s overall position on the Paris Conference.367  Regarding 
providing more “friendly aid” to the CEEC, the members decided that the 
Europeans would need to decrease projected aid requirements and show more 
effort at cooperation before the US stepped in.  The US would be willing to 
“screen” the reports prior to their submission, and even, if need be, push the 
deadline back from September 1st to mid-September.  From the Department’s 
point of view a delayed submission of the ERP was preferable to a total 
rejection due to time constraints.    
By the end of August and the beginning of September it was clear to 
members of the State Department that they would have to make a renewed and 
unified effort to bring the European CEEC nations’ wishes in line with US 
expectations.  During the final week of August the State Departments team of 
economists, known as the “Friendly Aid Boys,” arrived in Paris to review the 
CEEC’s technical reports.368 What they found was discouraging.  The reports 
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were unacceptable to these expert economists and a rejection by Congress 
seemed all but inevitable. 
On August 30th the American representatives met with the CEEC’s 
Executive Committee for almost three hours.  During the meeting, Clayton and 
Caffery did not sugarcoat their disappointment with the progress of the 
CEEC’s plan thus far.  For one thing, the plan’s preliminary estimate of 29.9 
billion dollars in aid was far too large for Congress or America to digest.  The 
presentation of such a figure was, in the eyes of the American delegates, more 
evidence that the plan was based on individual nations’ assessments, not on a 
cooperative effort to pool resources, maximize productivity and increase trade.  
Clayton and Caffery remonstrated to the CEEC that for the plan to be accepted 
the program would have to be the result of a cooperative effort aimed at 
reducing the amount of foreign assistance necessary until Europe’s economy 
could be self-sufficient.  Without evidence of the prior, it would be impossible 
for the US Congress to approve funding for the ERP. 
 Come September little changed in the Europeans’ attitudes toward the 
ERP, in spite of the firm warnings issued by the American delegates and 
Friendly Aid Boys.  The British were still adamantly opposed to any plan that 
might subject their financial and trade policies, or their standard of living to 
supra-national control.  Likewise, the French would not acquiesce and accept 
any changes to their Monnet Plan.  Even the Scandinavians were causing 
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problems by refusing to engage in any plan that might “circumvent” the UN.  
As a whole, the individual members of the conference were still reluctant to 
coordinate their planning in order to increase productivity and make a joint 
assessment of additional needs. 
On September 4th Kennan produced a pivotal memo describing what he 
saw during his visit to Paris and how he thought the conference’s failures could 
be rectified.  For Kennan, the European conference reflected “all the 
weaknesses, escapism, and paralysis of a region caught by war in the midst of 
serious problems of long term adjustment and sadly torn by hardship, 
confusion and outside pressures.”  Each individual country had some “illness,” 
that according to Kennan was infecting the conference like a virus and adding 
to its failure.  The British were “truly sick” and “incapable of viewing her own 
situation realistically,” especially with regards to standards of living.  Britain’s 
ills, however, were not just confined to the island; they were “endemic among 
all governments in one degree or another.” For example, even the 
Scandinavian’s were “pathologically nervous about the Soviets.”   
According to Kennan’s analysis, the US would have to step in and 
decide what was best for Europe.  The US would have to decrease and edit the 
aid estimates, as well as edit the document itself because “Europe is only 
partially capable of making, on her own behalf…and within the time which the 
circumstances allow, the effort which the Harvard speech envisioned.”  Timing, 
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to Kennan, was also of the utmost importance.  Waiting for the next session of 
Congress to approve the edited aid program would be impossible, as many of 
the European countries would succumb to financial collapse in that time frame.  
As a result, the US would have to develop and implement a short-term aid 
program, without European solicitation, which would “buy the US time,” to 
determine the needs and form of a long-term aid program.369   
Kennan’s memo had a powerful effect on the State Department 
members in the US.  The Department took its first steps to take control of the 
plan on September 7th by pleading with the home governments of the 16 
European nations to edit the reports.  Specifically, they wanted the reports to 
include the American “essentials,” which had been stressed time after time by 
the representatives in Europe.370 The State Department also urged the 
participating governments to postpone the reports release (originally scheduled 
for September 15th) so that the general and technical reports could be edited.  
Finally, the State Department urged that the report, when released, be deemed 
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“preliminary,” in order to clarify to Congress that it could be amended by 
American economic experts.   
Just two days later, on September 9th, in a meeting of its newly 
established Advisory Steering Committee (ASC) the State Department formally 
adopted the position that the US would have to openly intervene in the CEEC’s 
planning body. 371  The ASC rationalized that the CEEC’s plan could not and 
would not be supported by the US Congress, thus necessitating US action to 
create a viable plan. To do so, the ASC established a series of subcommittees 
that would be dispatched to Paris in order to bring the CEEC’s plan in line with 
the US essentials.372  Moreover, the US representatives decided to officially 
extend the submission deadline through September and insist that the report 
produced be called “preliminary.”  When the reports were done, the conference 
would adjourn and the reports would be reviewed by officials in Washington.  
If the reviewers deemed it necessary, the European representatives would 
reconvene during late October in Washington to discuss further alterations.373   
In the final days of the Conference the US representatives, including the 
“Friendly Aid Boys,” worked closely with the Europeans to correct the 
individual and joint reports.  Caffery, Clayton and Douglas held discussion on 
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policy issues with the heads of the European delegations while the Friendly Aid 
Boys worked closely with the technical committees to realistically reappraise 
and revise their reports.  Even the preamble to the ERP was revised to make it 
more “digestible” to the US Congress.   
By September 17th it seemed, at least to Caffery, that America’s friendly 
aid had come to fruition.  Caffery reported to Marshall that the: 
 New provisions are satisfactory and in some case exceed, from the    
       standpoint of the firmness of our commitments, our expectations…in 
      their work the  representatives of the 16 European nations have blazed a 
      new path in the history of Europe, if not the history of the world. 374   
 
On September 22nd the report was signed by the 16 European nations 
and sent to the State Department for review.  The Conference for European 
Recovery went on recess while the report was analyzed in the United States.  
 The European delegates reconvened in Washington, DC during the 
week of October 22nd to consult with the US representatives on the report.  The 
Europeans wanted constant reassurance that the aid program would not 
infringe upon their individual sovereignties, that the US would not control local 
currency from sales of American commodities, and that the amount of aid 
provided would be sufficient to cover all their deficits.375  The US, however, 
refused to reassure the Europeans of anything.  Instead, they ‘got tough’ with 
the Europeans, noting that most of the assistance would come, if it came, in the 
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form of commodities and that purchases outside of the US with US dollars 
would be limited.  Furthermore, they emphasized that the level of aid had been 
drastically reduced from the proposed figure and the Europeans would have to 
decrease the consumption and standards of living for a short period.376   
The end result of the DC conference when it adjourned in early 
November was that the “Marshall Planners had simply lectured the Europeans 
on American requirements for aid.”377  A few last minute changes were made to 
the report, especially with regards to sections about increasing production in 
Europe.  As one CEEC official later recalled, the Marshall Planners just made 
the report as “attractive as possible for presentation to Congress.”  The final 
approval for the European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan, occurred in the 
Senate on March 13th, and then later in the House on March 31st. 378  On April 
3rd, 1948 Truman would announce the passage of the Marshall Plan, or the 
Economic Cooperation Act of 1948.379 
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Chapter VII 
Approximating Rationality:  The Marshall Plan Decision 
 
Introduction 
In their capacity as decision makers, foreign policy analysts are 
confronted with varying degrees of uncertainty and risk.  Arguably, the 
decisions involved in the presentation and implementation of the Marshall Plan, 
or the plan for European Recovery (ERP), were among the most precarious 
and uncertain decisions that members of the Truman administration would 
have to make.  They were decisions that involved a great deal of risk, as they 
would impact the economic and political well-being of the United States, and 
most of Western Europe as well.  Indeed, they were also decisions that entailed 
a cognizance of and tolerance for uncertainty, especially given the tide of public 
and Congressional opinion regarding foreign aid programs, and the historical 
inability of the individual European nations to cooperate.   
In spite of these hurdles, members of the Truman administration 
intimately involved in the ERP exceeded expectations, making strategically wise 
decisions while under the scrutiny of domestic and international actors.  What 
follows is an analysis of the Marshall Planner’s decision-making process during 
1947-1948.  Throughout the analysis it will become obvious that President 
Truman participated only marginally, if at all in the discussions surrounding the 
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Marshall Plan decision.  In effect, Truman was merely a “rubber-stamp,” 
agreeing in principle about the need for aid, but leaving the details to his 
advisers. Indeed, it was Truman’s Secretary of State George Marshall who took 
responsibility for the bulk of the planning. In a sense, by juxtaposing the 
processes of these two decision makers, Truman and Marshall, one can 
comprehend how differently the two approached foreign policy making.  As we 
discovered earlier, Truman relied on his “gut reactions,” historical analogies and 
the belief systems of his predecessor to make decisions.  Alternately, Marshall’s 
decision-making process stands up to the examination of the most discerning 
eye with regards to approximating the ideal rational choice model of decision-
making. 
Secretary of State George Marshall and his Team of Advisers 
Secretary of State George Marshall, though only in office for three 
months when planning for the ERP commenced, provided substantial direction 
and had a sizeable influence on all aspects of the program.  Marshall’s positive 
effect on the plan was due to the changes he made in the State Department. 
Marshall’s State Department, unlike his predecessor’s, James Byrnes, was an 
organized one.  This was partially a result of Marshall’s experience in the 
military, as well his open decision-making style.  Regardless of its source, 
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Marshall’s presence gave the State Department an unprecedented sense of 
unity, direction, and efficiency.380 
From the beginning, members of the State Department like Marshall’s 
assistant Charles Bohlen and the Head of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) 
George Kennan, would notice that Marshall sought out the advice and opinions 
of his subordinates when making a decision.  This was unusual to them, 
because it was something that former Secretary of State James Byrnes had never 
done.  Bohlen in particular would note that “I quickly discovered that the new 
Secretary wanted a lot more information and advice than Byrnes had.” 381   
Marshall was a careful listener by nature, and even more so when 
making an important policy decision.  When making a decision Marshall would 
call in the individual members of the Department to get their opinions.  
Similarly, in group-decision-making settings Marshall would use an analogous 
process, ascertaining all-sides of the problem and then making up his mind.  
Bohlen observed that: 
Marshall had a power of command that I have never seen equaled.  He  
      would listen carefully to all sides of a question or problem, make sure he 
      had all the facts,  and then make up his mind.  Once the decision was   
      made, there was no turning  back, a characteristic that apparently       
      developed during his military training.382  
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However, his ability to listen to all sides of the argument did not paralyze the 
decision-making process, drawing it out indefinitely.  Indeed, Marshall would 
“listen for a long time without comment, but when the debates between 
members of his staff seemed destined to go on indeterminably and he could 
stand it no longer, he would say, ‘Gentlemen, don’t fight the problem; decide 
it’” 383 
Though a decisive decision maker, Marshall, unlike Truman, was not a 
knee-jerk decision maker and could tolerate dissent.  His subordinates and even 
the president were comfortable voicing contrary opinions, because early on 
Marshall had established that he wanted the facts, and the “complete blunt 
truth.”384 Kennan observed that with Marshall “There were times when I had to 
disagree with him and give him unwelcome advice.  But he had never held 
himself out as a political pundit.”385 
Unlike Byrnes, Marshall’s relationship with the individual decision 
makers was also open and orderly.  In particular, Marshall treated Truman with 
respect, and “never forgot, as Byrnes did, that Truman was President.”386  The 
respect was mutual, as Truman considered Marshall to be one of the most 
“profound and astute men I have ever known.”387 According to Bohlen’s 
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observations Marshall was not afraid to voice his opinion to Truman and tell 
him when he was about to make a foreign policy blunder. For example, in 1948, 
when Truman asked Marshall if he should lift the arms embargo on Palestine, 
Marshall responded bluntly, stating “I’m not going to vote anyway, but if I were 
I would vote against you if you so demeaned the office of the President of the 
United States.”388 This open and mutually respectful relationship greatly 
facilitated the formulation and execution of a coherent and workable foreign 
policy.  
Marshall was not the only actor to produce a sizeable influence on the 
decision-making environment during the formulation of the ERP.  Indeed, 
other important administrators like Secretary of War Robert Patterson, 
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union 
and Great Britain William Averell Harriman, Undersecretary of State Dean 
Acheson and Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs William Clayton, 
were intimately involved with the ERP decisions.  Patterson, Forrestal and 
Harriman would be instrumental in encouraging some of the more isolationist 
members of Congress of America’s responsibility to use its power in order to 
positively rebuild a new world order.  Forrestal described it best, elucidating 
America’s challenge as “—to achieve accommodation between the power we 
now possess, our reluctance to use it positively, the realistic necessity for such 
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use, and our national ideals.”389   These men were also among the first to 
recognize that the Soviets would be impossible to negotiate with and that they 
would become a menace to European security.  Joseph Jones, Special Assistant 
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, would later recall that they 
consistently supported the ERP and that there was “never any question where 
they stood.”390 
Clayton held similar views to his colleagues regarding the US’s 
responsibilities to the world and the Soviet threat. It was Clayton’s belief that 
“democracy, and freedom and the security of the US were at stake in the 
restoration of the world economy.”391 However, Clayton’s take on the specifics 
of the ERP varied, because of his firsthand experiences dealing with Europe’s 
economic problems.  These variances were correlated to his attendance at the 
Geneva Trade Conferences from April to May of 1947.  In Geneva Clayton had 
the opportunity to travel throughout Europe, speak to the leaders of Western 
European nations, and literally experience the tangible economic effects of the 
war.  It was after this trip that Clayton realized that salvaging Europe’s 
economy and similarly, US interests in Europe, would be contingent upon 
massive amount of US aid and support, and European economic federation.392 
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A Rational Response to an International Dilemma 
Marshall’s Harvard speech, which elucidated America’s terms for a 
comprehensive aid program in Europe, and his later decision to wrest some of 
the “initiative” for the programs planning from the European’s can be viewed 
as a rational response to a series of international dilemmas.  Rationality in 
foreign policy making is a rather nebulous subject in that it is more a less an 
ideal, rather than an actual phenomena.  However, given the appropriate set of 
decision-making circumstances, such as the nature of the decision-making body 
and the interactions between its disparate members, something that 
approximates rationality can be attained.   
To determine if Marshall’s decisions stand up to scrutiny one must do a 
piecemeal analysis of his decision to offer aid contingent on European 
“initiative”, and then revoke some of the initiative. The first question is, did 
Marshall, prior to the Harvard speech, have a clear definition of the problem 
before him? Moreover, did Marshall view the problem as political, economic, or 
both?  Evidence shows that Marshall and his advisers viewed the problem as 
both political and economic. Politically, the problem was how to get Congress 
and the American public to authorize another aid program in Europe when 
already so much money had been spent on recovery.  In Marshall’s words, the 
problem was simply “how to put it [the aid proposal] across” to American 
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people so that they would want to help.393  After the failure of the UNRRA to 
provide long-term relief, and then the appropriations to Greece and Turkey, 
Marshall understood that: 
 Any new proposal for more funds to be appropriated would be       
       ruthlessly repulsed.  Therefore, the manner of statement, the first      
       approach, and similar  factors had to  be most seriously considered.  It  
       is easy to propose a great plan,  but exceedingly  difficult to manage t 
       the form and procedures so that it has a fair chance of political       
       survival.394  
 
Economically, Marshall viewed the problem as how to remedy the 
balance of payments problem.  Marshall and his advisers calculated that if the 
balance of payments problem in Europe was not rectified through a 
stabilization and aid program, then the US would face severe domestic 
economic consequences.  Moreover, the European nations, without access to 
dollars with which they could purchase necessities, would fall into disarray, 
becoming vulnerable to communist subjugation. 
Next, one must ascertain if the Marshall Planners had a clear perception 
of the goals they were trying to achieve when they announced a program of aid 
dependent on European initiative.  In point of fact, Marshall and his key 
advisers had elucidated a series of goals that they hoped to accomplish with the 
Marshall Plan.  The first and second goals were intimately related, and involved 
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preserving the economic integrity of the US, while decreasing the political 
influence of the Soviet Communists in Europe.  Since 1946 reports had been 
flowing into the US that the economic situation in Europe was rapidly 
deteriorating, and that the US’s piecemeal aid program had not been effective in 
the long-term.  Things really heated up with Herbert Hoover’s March analysis 
of the economic situation in Europe.  Hoover wrote that Europe was currently 
involved in an exceedingly dangerous economic crisis, one that would affect the 
US’s domestic economy, because of balance of payments, and also the US’s 
national security as well.   Similarly, in his May 8th speech Acheson insisted that 
without European recovery the US economy would suffer and unemployment 
would sky rocket.395 
Again, Kennan’s May 23rd PPS memo set forth similar concerns, 
linking economic aid to the reduction of communist influences in Europe.  
Kennan’s memo was clear in emphasizing that economic deterioration was not 
the direct result of Soviet communism.  However, it did point out that the 
economic situation was fostering an environment where communism could 
take advantage of the disorder and gain a strong foothold throughout Western 
Europe.  According to Kennan the US would have to stop the spread of 
communism throughout an area that was traditionally pro-western and 
embraced the values of freedom and democracy.  To do this, the US would 
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have to be instrumental in promoting a recovery program, which would be 
planned and executed by the Europeans.396 
The final goal was to propose a plan of aid that had the possibility of 
being approved by Congress and the American public.  Given the tide of 
American opinion regarding aid, and the isolationist sway of the Republican 
dominated Congress, Marshall and his advisers understood that the plan would 
have to be ground-breaking in order to be accepted. 397  Thus, the Marshall 
Planners attempted to make the plan more attractive to Congress and the public 
by giving the initiative for planning to the European’s.  Further they tried to 
make it more palatable by emphasizing that aid would be conditional on the 
principles European economic cooperation, joint planning, and increases in 
production. Marshall thought that in order for the plan to be well received in 
the US: 
It was imperative that the European countries ‘come clean’—that is,    
      that they come up with a workable plan based on actual requirements  
      beyond the existing resources at their command, not on what they     
      thought the United States would give.”398  
 
Essentially, the Marshall Planners marketed an approach which didn’t 
just emphasize the revival of individual countries.  Instead it aimed to revive the 
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entirety of Western Europe’s economy at once, in order to promote sustainable 
economic recovery.   
After agreeing upon a definition of the problem, and isolating their 
goals, the question remains: did the administration consider alternatives to an 
aid program based on European initiative, and then systematically select the 
alternative with the highest chance of successfully maximizing their goals?  
Moreover, did they consider the risks associated with a program emphasizing 
European imitative? The answer to these questions is overwhelmingly, yes.   
During early 1947 there was only one alternative to a program of aid 
based upon the European initiative.  As previously mentioned, Congress was 
resistant to approving another aid program based on piece-meal assistance to 
individual countries.  Senator Arthur Vandenberg had made this abundantly 
clear to the Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson when he announced that 
Congress would refuse any program of aid if they were again approached with a 
“fait accompli” like in the case of the Truman Doctrine.399   
Economic institutions, such as the International Bank were also ruled 
out as feasible providers of assistance.  These institutions had neither the 
revenue nor the legal ability to provide such aid.  The President of the 
International Bank, John McCloy made this abundantly clear in mid-April.400 
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According to the New York Times columnist, Martin Lippman, “The deficit of 
the western European countries cannot be met…by the World Bank, or the 
American banking community. The sums are too large…the transactions are 
abnormal.”401  
The only other viable alternative was to provide no aid at all.  Yet, 
according to the assessments of Marshall’s top advisers the risks associated with 
ignoring the European’s need for aid were enormous.  They included, just to 
name a few, the loss of Western Europe to the communists, the breakdown of 
the European economic order, the disappearance of the western ideals of 
democracy and freedom in Europe, and economic turmoil in the US.  
The administration, though not faced with many alternatives, did take 
the time to systematically assess the risks inherent in giving the Europeans the 
“initiative” or responsibility for drafting an aid program.  The first risk of 
assigning the Europeans initiative in the publicly broadcasted Harvard Speech 
was that the Europeans might not respond.  This outcome was not likely given 
Europe’s desperation for even a plausible solution. Also, top policy makers 
assessed that making an offer would not hurt America’s prestige.  Merely a 
rejection or lack of response on the part of the European’s  would indicate that 
“rigor mortis has already set in on the body politic of Europe as we have 
known it and that it may be already too late for us the change decisively the 
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course of events.”402 Still, Acheson worked hard to keep this from happening by 
making sure that copies of the speech were forwarded by British journalists to 
both Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and Foreign Minister George Bidault as 
soon as Marshall made his speech.   
The second risk was that the Europeans would fail to devise a coherent 
plan, abiding by the US principles of self-help, cooperation and joint 
programming. In point of fact, Marshall and his advisers were cognizant that 
historically, separate European nations could not cooperate, especially when it 
came to economic matters.403  For example, Europe was replete with trade 
barriers and non-interchangeable currencies, thus exacerbating its traditional 
economic isolationism. 
After conferring with his advisers, Marshall was willing to risk the 
conference’s failure in order to maintain the European initiative.  Marshall and 
his advisers were able to tolerate this risk for a few reasons.  First and foremost, 
the US had run out of options.  This was literally our last hope to salvage 
Western Europe.  Second, Marshall and his advisers knew that at any point the 
US could step in and give a degree of “friendly aid” if they saw the conference 
going downhill.  Though not an ideal situation, as it might alienate the 
European planners and enrage Congress, it was still a feasible contingency plan.    
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At the same time, there were marked benefits associated with allowing 
the Europeans to have initiative for the planning of the program.  With the 
planning in the hands of the Europeans the Soviets could not accuse the US of 
“dictating” a program based on “imperialist” intentions.  Similarly, the US 
Congress and public could not charge the administration with “confronting 
them with another fait accompli.” Thus, European initiative would give the 
impression of more public and Congressional control over the European’s 
destiny, as opposed to the dictation of just another aid program.  
Likewise, the economic and political disintegration, as reported by 
Marshall’s top economic analysts was enough to warrant a risk of this 
magnitude.  In particular, Marshall and his advisers, who had been in Moscow 
for a meeting with the Soviets earlier in the year, were completely convinced 
that the Soviets were attempting to take advantage of Europe’s downward spiral 
to expand their communist sphere of influence.  Marshall explained that: 
It was my feeling that the Soviets were doing everything possible to    
      achieve a  complete breakdown in Europe.  That is, they were doing    
      anything they could  think of to create greater turbulence.  The major   
      problem was how to counter this negative Soviet policy and restore the  
      European Economy.404  
 
Thus, the risk of European failure at generating an acceptable plan, though 
substantial, was worth the possible benefits of success.   
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During the initial planning stages Marshall was confronted with a single 
voice of dissent. That voice was William Claytons, the Undersecretary of State 
for Economic Affairs.  Clayton, in his May 27th memo accentuated that an aid 
program emphasizing European economic cooperation was essential to the re-
establishment of an economic order.  However, he also insisted that “the US 
must run this show,” implying that the US would have total control over the 
planning and execution of the program. 405  His rationale was that a concert of 
European nations could not possibly agree on a single joint program, and that 
nationalistic differences would hinder the planning.  Moreover, he did no think 
the separate nations would be able to overcome their individual interests in 
order to effectively pool their resources for a continent wide aid program.406 
One could argue that Clayton’s suggestions, which were based on the 
thoughtful analysis of an economic expert, were set aside because of a 
phenomenon called groupthink.  Groupthink occurs in decision-making bodies 
when “the members striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”407 Yet, given Marshall’s 
orderly decision-making process, one that emphasized analyzing various 
viewpoints, often-times in isolated settings so that they would not influence 
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each other, it is unlikely that groupthink impeded the decision-making process. 
Such an analysis is supported fully by the observations of Marshall’s advisers. 
Regarding Marshall’s decision-making process, Kennan observed that: 
Mr. Marshall’s way of handling that meeting made a great impression on 
      me.  After summarizing the main issues, he went around the table,     
      asking each on in turn to express his views.  A number of problems and 
      some objections were  raised.   When all had spoken, the Secretary only 
      asked: ‘Are we safe in directing such a  proposal to all of Europe?  What 
      will be the effect if the Soviets decide to come  in?408  
 
Moreover, scholars of presidential decision-making assert that 
groupthink is less likely to occur in a “multiple advocacy” decision-making 
environment, which closely resembles Marshall’s. In the end, multiple advocacy, 
an “advisory arrangement designed to ensure that many viewpoints and options 
are enunciated on policies,” facilitated a decision-making environment less likely 
to be affected by groupthink.409 
In reality, Marshall had fully ascertained the risks of relying on the 
European initiative.  Thus, Marshall was able to accept the risks as reasonable, 
given the overwhelmingly large benefits associated with his chosen course of 
action.  Moreover, at the time, Clayton was the only top administrator pushing 
for total American control over the planning stages.  The rest, including 
Kennan, his entire Policy Planning Staff, Acheson and the majority of the State 
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Department were fully convinced that the initiative for the planning of the 
program must be incumbent upon the Europeans, in order for the program to 
be even considered by the US Congress.  
Perhaps the most interesting facet of this study is the shift in the 
planning “initiative” from heavily incumbent on the Europeans to largely under 
the control of the Americans in late August and early September.  The question 
here remains, why did Marshall suddenly approved a shift in control over the 
programs planning from the Europeans to the Americans, especially since he 
had rejected the proposal in late May?  An examination of relevant 
memorandum reveals that Marshall only approved the shift after receiving a 
series of analyses from the US representatives in Europe and in DC stating that 
such a shift would be imperative if a “workable” program was going to be 
produced from the conference.  Now, Clayton was not the lone voice 
emphasizing the need for more American control over the planning station. 
By early September 1947 it was clear to the Ambassador to the UK 
Lewis Douglas, the Ambassador to France Jefferson Caffery, the United States 
Political Adviser for Germany Robert D. Murphy, and to Kennan, just by 
looking at the European’s preliminary drafts, which were “mere shopping lists,” 
that a change was in order if an acceptable plan was to be produced.  Initially 
Marshall was hesitant to approve such a change in initiative, because he did not 
want to give Congress or the Europeans the impression that he was “pre-
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approving” a plan.  At that point the “feeling in Congress was very strong that 
they must not again be presented on a crisis basis with a virtual commitment to 
any precise course of action as they claim was done in the case of Greece and 
Turkey.”410 
Eventually, Marshall changed his views on this matter. In particular, it 
was Kennan’s visit to Europe, and his strongly worded memo of September 4th, 
which tipped the scale for Marshall.  Earlier in the year Kennan had been an 
important advocate for the European initiative, so his insight weighed heavily 
on Marshall’s decision.411 Similarly, the risks involved with not switching to the 
European initiative were far greater than the benefits of positive Congressional 
and public opinion. As Caffery pointed out, it would be much easier to reassure 
Congress that the “US and the president are in no sense committed until a 
completed plan is reviewed, carefully examined, approved and presented to 
them” than to get them to approve a “European shopping list.”412  Marshall, 
after receiving the separate, but also concurring advice of his top advisers chose 
to adopt Clayton’s plan and approve an increase in US involvement and 
advising.  In the end, Marshall demonstrated his rational decision-making 
process by being able to revisit his previous decision, recognize that 
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circumstances had changed, and adjust his policies to properly address and 
mitigate the problems that arose from those new circumstances.   
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Chapter VIII 
The Evolution of Decision-Making in the Truman Administration 
 
Introduction 
When analyzing decision-making in foreign policy one must take into account 
where and how “hurdles to rationality,” might appear and impede the decision-making 
process.  Initially, this study focused on identifying those hurdles, then isolating and 
tracing their presence throughout three disparate case studies.  Thus, the following 
three summaries attempt to methodically encapsulate how these “hurdles to rationality” 
manifested in the decision to drop the atomic bomb, deliver the Truman Doctrine, and 
formulate the Marshall Plan.  As the study progressed, I also became interested in 
tracing if, and exactly how the decision-makers altered their decision-making processes 
given the passage of time and the acquisition of decision-making experience.  Thus, the 
final section of this chapter derives a fundamental link between the acquisition of 
decision-making experience and the ideal rational process.   
A First Wrap Up: The Atomic Bomb Case 
A careful analysis of the atomic bomb case illustrates that rational decision-
making was hindered in the individual and group settings. Initially, the Secretary of 
State, James F. Byrnes was able to dominate the decision-making process by creating a 
decision-making body, the Interim Committee, which was pervaded by groupthink. 
Groupthink is defined as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are 
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deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity 
overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”413   
Essentially, Byrnes used his Machiavellian attitude to manipulate the functioning of the 
group and block the most formidable voices of dissent.  As a result, the group had a 
tendency to come to conclusions that were similar to his.  Specifically, Byrnes 
continually intimidated and subordinated even the highest ranking officials in the 
political and military fields, such as General Marshall.  Marshall, though opposed to 
Byrnes’ path, never formally dissented in the decision-making group.  For Marshall, 
being the “good soldier” entailed maintaining military professionalism.414  The 
subordination of the military realm to the Byrnes’ political objectives was of utmost 
importance to Marshall. 
Moreover, Byrnes exercised clear control over the lead decision-maker, 
President Harry S. Truman, especially when they interacted in private and informal 
settings. Byrnes’ influence is particularly evident in the manner in which he manipulated 
Truman’s thinking, often reworking the president’s initial instincts to coincide with 
Byrnes’ personal objectives.  Byrnes capitalized on the fact that Truman, because of his 
insecurity and lack of experience in foreign policy, was easily swayed.   
Likewise, Byrnes made every effort to keep his advisory system as informal and 
private as possible, thereby diminishing the flow of ideas and dissent that Truman was 
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exposed to.  Thus, Truman was constantly “manipulated by the shrewd politician he 
made his personal representative for atomic bomb matters—the man he privately called 
his “conniving” secretary of state, James F. Byrnes.” 415  So, when Byrnes told Truman 
that the use of the bomb would be vital instrument with which to “manage” the Soviets 
after the war, Truman was inclined to agree.  And again, when Byrnes insisted, against 
the advice of every other one of Truman’s military and political advisers, that the 
conditions of the surrender not be altered, Truman again complied.  
Still, it is impossible to blame one man for the entire trajectory of Truman’s 
thinking.  The fact remains that less than rational policy decisions are often the product 
of the lead decision-makers own cognitive short-comings. In this case, Truman’s 
decision-making process was guided by history, especially his own personal history as 
an American soldier. In essence, Truman’s internal train of thought relied on historical 
analogies relating to his experiences as an artillery captain during World War I.  
Truman’s use of his own personal experiences to form a coherent vision of the plight 
of American soldiers in Japan can be explained using Schema Theory.  
At its core, Schema Theory purports that each decision maker has only a limited 
amount of time and energy to devote to the decision-making process.  Accordingly, the 
decision maker utilizes cognitive short-cuts, such as analogies, to simplify their 
decision-making process.  In many instances this method of reasoning saves time, 
which is often necessary during a crisis situation.   Yet, reasoning by using historical 
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analogies, or schemas to simplify the problem and make it more familiar can easily 
disrupt the rational process, especially if the decision-maker utilizes incongruent 
analogies.  
Using history as his guide, especially his own personal history, Truman 
reasoned that the alternatives to direct atomic use were “politically unwise,” and would 
have meant more American casualties.  For Truman it became obvious that the lives of 
his American boys, his nation of sons fighting abroad, were markedly more important 
than the lives of the enemy. For Truman “a quarter of a million of the flower of our 
young manhood were worth a couple of Japanese cities.” 416  The death and casualty 
statistics for the alternatives to direct atomic use, in light of Truman’s emotional and 
historical connection to the American soldiers, were not acceptable.  While there may 
have been many different numbers floating around as estimates for the number of lives 
that would be lost in a Pacific land battle, none of them mattered to Truman.  Already 
the blood of too many American boys had been spilled on foreign soil.  
The analogy Truman utilized in this situation was inherently fallacious.  One 
cannot begin to compare the casualties caused by atomic weapons to those caused by 
the conventional weapons that Truman would have had access to during WWI.  The 
fact remains that Truman, though warned consistently about the bomb’s dangers by the 
atomic scientists, could not ascertain, (because of his own cognitive shortcomings and 
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reliance on Byrnes and individual sets of priorities), the effect that these weapons 
would have on Japan and the future of international relations.   
Byrnes’ behavior, and to an extent, Truman’s contingent decision, can be 
explicated utilizing the non-compensatory theory of decision-making. Essentially, non-
compensatory theorists postulate that “foreign policymakers, instead of comparing 
both the positive and negative aspects of a number of viable options, stress the positive 
factor of its favored policy and the negative elements of other alternatives.” 417 In 
essence, decision-makers systematically negate viable alternatives while simultaneously 
supporting their preferred courses of action. For example, Byrnes negated plausible 
alternatives, such as altering surrender terms, by stressing the negative aspects of that 
policy.  That is, he convinced Truman that such a move would not only betray for 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s legacy, but it would indicate US weakness as well.  
Evidence indicates that prior to Potsdam Byrnes had convinced Truman that if the 
Japanese surrendered, then the US would have no opportunity to demonstrate the 
bomb’s power to the Soviets.  Thus, the atomic bomb, the United States’ “master-card” 
would not be a useful tool with which to control the Soviets.   
Furthermore, scholars of non-compensatory theory also assert that “political 
leaders review alternatives in light of a political dimension and reject all alternatives that 
may damage them politically…”418  In essence, the dimension that political leaders 
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often prioritize when eliminating alternatives is political favorability or expedience (the 
extent to which a policy decision will alienate constituents and Congress). Interestingly 
enough, Byrnes, and by default, Truman, continually highlighted the positive political 
aspects of direct atomic use, noting that it would allow the US to “control” the Soviets 
while concurrently saving American lives, and placating a war-weary American public.  
Alternately, they ignored the negative facets of the alternative, facets which would not 
immediately affect their political standing. These facets included the fact that the bomb 
would kill thousands of Japanese civilians; endanger the future of the entire human 
civilization; and provoke a nuclear arms race, which would subsequently foster a 
chaotic international environment.  .  
A Second Wrap Up: The Truman Doctrine Case 
A systematic analysis of the decision to deliver the Truman Doctrine indicates 
that both irrational and rational decision-making processes were present during 
different phases of the Doctrine’s formulation. Initially, rational decision-making was 
bypassed because of particular hurdles to rationality.  Specifically, the absence of a 
rational process becomes evident in the way alternatives to the Truman Doctrine were 
only briefly and unsystematically considered prior to the withdrawal of British assistance.  
This lack of consideration stemmed from Truman and Byrnes’ reluctance to abandon 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s legacy.  However, rationality was evident in later phases of the 
decision, specifically during 1947, given the strength and coherence of Undersecretary 
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of State Dean Acheson’s historically based world vision, and the absence of viable 
alternatives to the Doctrine.  
At first, the Truman administration, though cognizant of the Soviet threat, 
would only discuss reorienting their policies toward Greece and Turkey.  On October 
21st, 1946 a policy anticipating the Truman Doctrine, and endorsing material and 
monetary aid to Greece and Turkey had already been delineated.  Moreover, vaguely 
antagonistic actions, such as supporting Iran’s complaints against the Soviets in the 
UN, and providing tacit support for Churchill’s inflammatory Fulton speech, indicated 
willingness by the administration to take a tougher stance with the Soviets. Yet, tangible 
action indicating the US’s explicit disapproval of Soviet policies was not taken until a 
much later date, and even then it was initiated more so by Acheson, than by Truman 
and Byrnes.  
Cognitive Consistency, a theory which purports that decision makers utilize a 
set of core beliefs and values to organize the random stimuli, such as world events, into 
a simplified ideological construct, explains Truman and Byrnes’ inaction. Specifically, it 
explains why Truman and Byrnes did not formulate a plan prior to Britain’s financial 
collapse, in order to mitigate the Soviet threats to Greece and Turkey.  In point of fact, 
Truman and Byrnes could not abandon the Rooseveltian conception that the Soviets 
could be placated through negotiation.  This is evident in Byrnes’ reluctance to use the 
atomic bomb to bully the Soviets at the Council of Foreign Ministers in fall 1945, as 
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well as his repeated attempts to negotiate with Stalin in December 1945.419  Even 
Truman had a penchant for blaming Soviet resistance on post-war “domestic turmoil,” 
rather than sheer Soviet insolence. As a result, even after the confrontation in Iran, 
Truman still believed that the Soviet Union could be negotiated with, and that the 
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was a “man of his word.420”   
The question remains, then, why did Truman and Byrnes reorient their views, 
accept the necessity of the aid program and then verbally proclaim their change of 
policy to a world-wide audience? A thorough analysis reveals that Dean Acheson’s keen 
perceptions of world events provided the rationale for such a drastic declaration of 
policy.  For Acheson, the world situation in early 1947 was analogous to the situation 
the US faced after World War I, and up until the beginning of the Second World War.  
According to Acheson, the US had receded into isolation post World War I and could 
not risk isolating itself again, especially in the shadow of a dual threat: British financial 
collapse and expansionist Soviet communism. The result of isolationism the first time 
around had been World War II. Apparently, however, the US and its citizens had not 
learned from the past. As Acheson and others perceived, the US was once again setting 
out on a similar path by electing a Congress that applauded isolationism, was fiscally 
conservative, and pushed for the demobilization of the US troops.  Ultimately, 
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Acheson feared that a resurgence of isolationism in the US would be a catalyst for the 
Third World War.421 
Moreover, Acheson’s perception of this dual threat of British financial collapse 
and Soviet communist expansionism was not unfounded.  In fact, the US had 
ascertained that the British were in a precarious financial position as early as October, 
1946, and that US aid might be necessary to cover Britain’s commitments. Likewise, 
Acheson had ample proof, in the form of reports, letters and memos from 
Ambassadors in Greece and Turkey that Soviet subjugation was slowly, but surely 
inundating the Near and Middle East.  Additionally, these reports emphasized that 
without further aid these countries would collapse, leaving Western Europe vulnerable 
to Soviet subjugation as well.422  
The lack of viable alternatives to the Truman Doctrine also buttresses the 
argument that Acheson’s final decision to draft and support the Doctrine approximated 
rationality. Essentially, there were only two alternatives considered in place of providing 
direct aid to Greece and Turkey.  The first option was to do nothing, and leave both 
Greece and Turkey to fend for themselves, while the second was to work through the 
United Nations. In reality, leaving Greece and Turkey to fend for themselves was never 
considered. To leave either state without any source of aid would have been equivalent 
to handing over vital strategic regions to the Soviets.  Literally every analysis of the 
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situation, be it from the Joint Chiefs, the White House assistants Clark Clifford and 
George Elsey , or the US Ambassador to Greece Lincoln MacVeagh,  predicted that 
the collapse of Greece or Turkey would cause a domino effect, endangering the 
sovereignty of pro-American countries in Western Europe.  As Acheson so aptly 
pointed out, the US’s way of life could not survive in a world where 2/3 of its nations 
were communist.   
Likewise, solving the dispute through the UN was not a viable option.   In 1947 
the UN was a nascent organization, and thus ill equipped to support a full scale 
operation involving military, economic, and social aid. MacVeagh argued that even if 
the UN were able to provide border security to halt the infiltration of Communist 
insurgents, it would not be able to address the social and political roots of Greece’s 
problems. MacVeagh contested that “even should the UN succeed in establishing 
border security its success can mean nothing as regards to the objectives and principal 
interests of the US.”423 Further, MacVeagh stressed that UN action, though a tangible 
gesture of disapproval to Soviet policies, would not be viewed by the Soviets as a 
formidable threat.  
Similarly, operating through the UN would be too slow, given the composition 
of the Security Council and the veto power of the Soviet Union. Even if the Soviet’s 
didn’t veto aid to Greece and Turkey, the aid that the UN could provide would be too 
little and too late.  As Truman related, the situation in Greece and Turkey was “an 
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urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related 
organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.”424 
An important facet of rational decision-making entails being cognizant of and 
attempting to mitigate the risks associated with your final policy decision. In this case, 
critics of the Truman Doctrine assert that such a public and “inflammatory” reversal of 
policy indicates the absence of rationality in Acheson’s decision-making process.  
Particularly, critics of the Truman Doctrine often assert that it was too confrontational 
and “universal,” and ultimately led the US to the Cold War by pitting Soviet 
communism and ideology against American democracy.  What these analysts fail to 
realize is that the Doctrine only mentions communism once, in reference to the 
Communist guerillas in Greece.  In fact, Acheson, when giving the speech writers 
instructions, emphasized that the speech would not pit communism against democracy, 
but instead, would stress the dangers posed to democracy by all totalitarian regimes. 
Joseph Jones recalls that Acheson’s directions were that “the theme of our new 
approach should be that the security of the United States depends upon our going to 
the aid of any and all democratic governments…our line should be that war with the 
Soviet Union is not inevitable…this should be presented as a way to avoid war.”425  
Though never explicitly confirmed by Acheson, this tactic seems to suggest that 
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Acheson was attempting to minimize the risks associated with delivering the doctrine 
by not directly antagonizing the Soviets.   
Likewise, a content analysis of the speech also confirms Acheson’s, as well as 
the rest of the administration’s reluctance to directly threaten the Soviets.  For instance, 
the Doctrine proposes that assistance to nations threatened by totalitarianism should be 
“predominantly economic and financial,” and not military.  This suggests that the US, 
though interested in maintaining the economic and political integrity of the region, was 
not ready to infiltrate aggressively with troops.   
In the end, the Truman Doctrine was not a subversive scheme, thought up by 
an administration which sought to implicitly combat the spread of communism. 
Indeed, it was calculated and sound statement of policy formulated via a rational 
process. In essence, it was Acheson’s way of preventing the US from receding into 
isolation once again and instead, emerging from the Second World War as a new world 
power. Similarly, it was a rational reaction two threatening world events: imminent 
financial collapse in Britain, and increasingly subversive behavior by the Soviet 
Communism throughout the Near and Middle East and Europe. Thus, the Truman 
Doctrine sought to minimize the risk of antagonizing the Soviets while simultaneously 
coercing a conservative and isolationist Congress to assert America’s economic and 
political strength, in hopes of mitigating the chances of future conflict.  
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A Third Wrap Up: The Marshall Plan Case 
The formulation of the Marshall Plan is a particularly intriguing case as it was 
based on a series of decisions that were made primarily by Truman’s closest advisers, 
with little input from Truman himself.  In this case, the primary decision-maker, 
Secretary of State George Marshall, was cognizant of the need to balance the risks 
associated with a plan dictated by European initiative with Congressional opinion and 
the imminent threat of European economic collapse.  Thus, the decision-making 
process utilized by Marshall to formulate and then reorient the structure of the Marshall 
Plan deviates markedly from the earlier processes we have studied, in that it very closely 
approaches a rational process.  
As previously illustrated Marshall had a very clear-cut definition of the problem, 
an orderly advisory system, and the unusual ability to perform a relatively unbiased 
cost-benefit analysis of his various options.  Reflecting on Marshall’s orderly decision-
making process, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff George Kennan would assert 
that the Marshall Plan decision was so well thought out because of Marshall’s insistence 
on “seeking out what he considered the best advice he could get, in enlisting that advice 
in the manner most calculated to assure its orderly preparation and presentation, and in 
exposing it to the most qualified criticism he could find.426   
Essentially, Marshall’s decision-making body was so successful in part, because 
it was not pervaded by groupthink.  Instead it emphasized a system of multiple 
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advocacy.  A decision-making environment governed by multiple advocacy allows the 
“advisers to discuss different and, sometimes, opposing perspectives in front of him 
(the lead decision maker) without fear of repercussion.”427  For example, both Kennan 
and Jones recorded that they were not fearful of providing Marshall with their 
dissenting opinions.  Similarly, Clayton was not hesitant to go against the grain and 
insist that the responsibility for formulating the plan should lie with the US, not the 
Europeans.  In the end, Marshall, though he didn’t take Clayton’s advice right away, 
was willing to at least listen, consider it, and then implement it when the time was right.   
Marshall, given his propensity to seek a wide array of thorough advice, was able 
to do a fairly rational cost-benefit analysis when it came to devising a plan to implement 
the Marshall Plan.  For instance, when deciding to give the European’s the initiative 
Marshall rightly perceived that costs (e.g. level of uncertainty\ production of a 
European shopping list) were worth the benefits that would accrue (positive public and 
congressional opinion, higher willingness to support.) 
Most importantly, however, Marshall was able to do what few foreign policy 
decision makers can do.  Marshall was able to continually reassess the decision-making 
environment, and adjust his policies to match any fluctuations in that environment.  
That is, Marshall was able to reorient his original decision to rely on the European’s 
planning initiative when it became apparent that the policy had failed.  After receiving 
various reports, like Kennan’s in early September, Marshall was able to reassess the 
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situation and ascertain that US assistance was inevitable if a workable plan was to be 
produced. Ultimately, Marshall’s ability to constantly reassess and adjust his perceptions 
to the changing environment, an ability that is rare for most foreign policy decision 
makers, is what led to the eventual acceptance by Congress of the Marshall Plan for 
European Recovery.   
The closest theoretical construct to explain Marshall’s process in formulating 
the Marshall Plan is the compensatory theory of decision-making.   According to this 
model decision makers rank their alternative policies by evaluating their individual 
dimensions (e.g. political, economic, and military).  In the end, the decision maker will 
choose the alternative that has the highest total cumulative score for all the dimensions.   
As a result of a this process “a particular alternative—for example, the use of force—
may score low on the political dimension, such an alternative could still be adopted if it 
scored high on the military dimension.”428 
Using the compensatory process Marshall was able to perform a “rational 
calculus” in order to decide both when and to whom the planning initiative would go 
to.  In the beginning, Marshall calculated that the planning initiative had to go to the 
European’s, so that Congress and the Public had some chance of supporting the 
facilitation of the European Recovery Conference.  Thus, Marshall would have 
prioritized the dimension of “political acceptability” (would Congress and the Public 
consider appropriations to another major aid program and support the Conference), 
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over the dimension of initial “political feasibility” (would the plan the European’s made 
actually work).  In the end, the alternative which had the highest score for political 
acceptability would have been the one that allowed the European’s to have the bulk of 
the planning initiative. Essentially, European initiative indicated to the US that this was 
not just another “piece meal” or “interim” aid program, designed to give individual and 
non-sustainable “shots in the arm” to ailing countries.  Indeed, the European initiative 
indicated that the plan would be a holistic and “European” solution to a problem 
whose roots were not just economic, but systemic, given the history of economic 
isolationism in Europe.  .   
Yet, by early September, Marshall had to reassess his first set of calculations, 
because of the dynamic nature of the US political environment, as well as the poor 
progress of the European Conference.  That is, Marshall now ranked political feasibility 
over political acceptability.  This switch occurred, because by early September, the US 
had already invested itself in supporting the Conference.  Now, the acceptance of the 
plan was entirely contingent on whether the Congress thought it was a “feasible” and 
fair plan.  After viewing the preliminary draft of the plan, which resembled “European 
shopping lists” and absorbing the advice of his advisers in Europe Marshall calculated 
that handing over some initiative to the Americans would be the alternative that 
maximized the plan’s political feasibility.   
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The Evolution of Decision-Making in the Truman Administration 
One may ask, why study three seemingly disparate decision-making cases for a 
single president? The answer is that over the years scholars have published scores of 
articles and books that have sought to explicate a president’s decision-making process 
by piecing together and then analyzing a single case study.  However, few if any of 
these studies have engaged in a comparative analysis of a single president’s decision-
making process in multiple case studies and over a relatively long span of time.  That is, 
no one has answered a question that should be integral to the study of presidential 
decision-making:  Are individual decision makers’ processes static? Specifically, does 
experience change how presidents choose their advisers, and interact with their core 
decision-making body?  In the case of Harry S. Truman, the answers to these questions 
are varied.  
The case of the atomic bomb is intriguing because it was the first and probably 
most significant decision that Truman would have to make during his presidential 
career.  However, during the first process Truman was “flying by the seat of his pants.” 
A few trends, regarding Truman’s decision-making process can be established from this 
initial study.  The most important is that Truman, because of his lack of experience and 
education, relied fully on the conceptions of his Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and 
Truman’s predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in order to define the problem and rank 
alternatives. Thus, Truman’s beliefs remained consistent with Byrnes’ and Roosevelt’s, 
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both of whom saw the bomb as a quick way to end a war that had already cost too 
many lives.   
In the atomic case it became evident that Truman’s personal experiences as an 
artillery captain in World War I influenced how he defined the problem.  Specifically, 
the problem for Truman was how to win the war with Japan while simultaneously 
sacrificing as few of the “American Boys” as possible. Likewise, Truman’s closed off 
and “informal” advisory system, one which was dominated by Byrnes, allowed him to 
accept the notion that changing the terms of surrender was not a feasible alternative, 
despite a resounding chorus of dissenters.  
The Truman Doctrine case provides an interesting perspective on decision-
making because of the presence of both rational and irrational decision-making 
processes. During the early stages (1946) of the Truman Doctrine case there were few, 
if any changes to Truman’s decision-making process as many of Truman’s former 
decision-making patterns had not yet been abandoned.  That is, Truman was still reliant 
on Byrnes’s advice, while concurrently nurturing Roosevelt’s conception that the 
Soviet’s could be placated. However, come 1947, a few changes to Truman’s process 
can be observed.  Specifically, the quality of the adviser that Truman relied on 
(Acheson as opposed to Byrnes) did improve, as Acheson had the ability to assess the 
risks associated with his policy choice, as well as a coherent and accurate world vision 
to guide his policy formulation. Thus, the irrationally that characterized the first stages 
of the decision-making process were virtually eliminated by 1947, when Truman made 
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the formulation and justification of the doctrine incumbent upon a more rational and 
capable adviser, Dean Acheson. 
In the final case, the Marshall Plan, Truman disappeared from the decision-
making apparatus, virtually handing over a blank check for action to Marshall. Truman 
had appointed Marshall as his new Secretary of State in January of 1947, but Marshall’s 
absence in Moscow at the Council of Foreign Ministers until April inhibited his ability 
to play a primary role in the decision-making apparatus until the Marshall Plan. In many 
respects, replacing Byrnes with Marshall was a strategically wise decision on Truman’s 
part. Byrnes had become increasingly belligerent as Secretary of State, oftentimes 
setting his own agenda, (as he had in Moscow during December 1945) and excluding 
Truman entirely from the decision-making process.  Truman indicated his frustration 
with Byrnes’ behavior, noting that “I came to feel that in his role as Secretary of State, 
Byrnes was beginning to think of himself as an Assistant President in full charge of 
foreign policy.”429.Marshall, on the other hand, respected Truman, and consulted him 
about major policy decisions.430  So, to an extent, Truman realized that if he was going 
to rely heavily on his advisers, they should at least be respectful and open with the rest 
of the administration.   
Handing over the bulk of the responsibility to Marshall, though seemingly 
dangerous was indeed Truman’s wisest decision of all.  Essentially, Marshall’s respect 
for Truman, as well as his open and orderly decision-making process (a process that 
                                                 
429 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Volume One, Year of Decisions, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), 546.  
 226 
 
 
was the polar opposite of Byrnes’) ensured that the Marshall Plan was not 
compromised.  As George Kennan so aptly pointed out, Truman should be applauded 
for delegating responsibility, responsibility that he did not have the experience to 
handle, to the most competent people he knew.  In fact, Kennan recorded that: 
President Truman deserves credit… for his perception and political courage in 
      selection as Secretary of State one of the most experienced, selfless, and most  
      honorable of America’s professional public servants, in giving to that man his  
      confidence and wide latitude of action, and then supporting him in an individual 
      initiative which, had it been  misfired, could have brought embarrassment and  
      misfortune to the administration.431 
 
Fundamentally, this study illustrates that Truman himself did not change 
significantly as a decision-maker from 1945-1947.  In fact, even during the Marshall 
Plan case Truman is still compensating for his lack of knowledge in international affairs 
by relying fully on advisers. Yet, Truman’s process was not entirely static.  By the 
culmination of 1946 Truman had ascertained that it would be the quality of his advisers, 
their respect for him, as well as the openness of their decision-making circles, which 
would make or break the foreign policies in his administration.  In the end, Truman’s 
realization, which correlated the quality of his advisers to the strength of their decisions, 
facilitated the transition from a haphazard and non-compensatory style of decision-
making under Byrnes to an efficient and orderly compensatory style under Marshall.   
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